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ABSTRACT
This dissertation attempts to create a justification of liberty from an evolutionary 
perspective. I argue that the classical liberal institutions of rule of law, private property, 
and the private sphere fulfill natural human desires while creating a spontaneous order in 
which cooperation can flourish. These classical liberal institutions are good for humans 
because they satisfy our evolved human nature. This human nature has evolved 
primarily through natural selection. It is complex and yet predictable if one understands 
the environments in which we evolved. Human nature will include both universal desires 
and patterned variability in those desires.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT
Introduction
I argue that classical liberal institutions are good for humans because they satisfy 
our evolved human nature. This human nature has evolved primarily through natural 
selection. It is complex and yet predictable if one understands the environments in which 
we evolved. Human nature will includes both universal desires and patterned variability 
in those desires.
Classical liberal society (or free society as I will sometimes refer to it) is a society 
in which the government plays a minimal role and in which individual freedom is 
maximized wherever possible. This includes free markets, but the major force of my 
argument will be the role of individual freedom in making day-to-day decisions about 
one's own desires and how those desires relate to the kind of life one wants to live. 
Classical liberal societies support individual freedom within a stable rule of law. This 
rule of law creates a general framework that prevents individuals from harming one 
another while providing important information about the environment and the individuals 
in it that aids cooperative action. The classical liberal government is defined by broad, 
open-ended freedom, proscribing only certain means (such as force or fraud), and 
generally allowing individuals to rank their ends as they see fit.
Human nature is complex and will express itself differently in different
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2environmental contexts. This human nature, however, also manifests important 
universals that provide an anchor for that variation. Human nature is both individualistic 
and highly social, and we expect both self-interest and social pressure to play important 
and interrelated roles in human behavior. The individualistic and social desires will often 
conflict. These conflicts can be resolved through a spontaneous order where individual 
self-interest and the social desires of humans are both allowed to play a role in human 
life.
Assumptions
My rooting of human values in biological facts appears to violate the fact-value 
distinction, and it does in some ways. I believe, however, that it is time to reject or at 
least modify that distinction and to realize that insofar as biology affects human life and 
happiness, then facts really do bear on values. If we want to know what the best way of 
life is for humans, we must understand what humans are like. Evolutionary psychology, 
sociobiology, behavioral ecology, and other fields of study in the life sciences can help 
us understand what we are and why.
Ultimately, I do not violate the fact-value distinction, because I do not argue that 
whatever is part of human nature is somehow good. But I do argue for looking at human 
nature and trying to determine what the best way of organizing ourselves is in order to 
take advantage of both the individualistic and social desires. How we organize ourselves 
socially affects the extent to which we fulfill the potential within human nature as well as 
the amount of suffering individual humans experience. Individual suffering is the 
obvious negative outcome of bad social organization; failure to achieve the potential
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3contained in human nature is another, less obvious result of bad social organization.
My argument has two facets. In the first place, I argue that certain traits of 
human nature such as our lack of omniscience make liberal institutions more efficient 
than their more centralized counterparts at providing humans with what they need for a 
comfortable existence. This is the pragmatic side of the argument. Second, I argue that 
liberal institutions minimize the coercion that leads to some of the causes of human 
suffering by providing humans the freedom to live according to their natural desires. 
Liberal institutions therefore minimize suffering and maximize the actualization of the 
potential of human nature. This is a moral argument, as least insofar as suffering is bad 
and achieving one's potential is good. Not all kinds of suffering are avoidable, and not 
all kinds of suffering are bad, but it is my contention that since there are plenty of 
unavoidable causes of suffering in human life, letting the government add to that 
suffering seems unnecessary and wrong. Moreover, I assume that a life lived in 
accordance with the natural desires that together create a complete life is the only way to 
human flourishing and that such a life is the best life.
I assume that government-induced suffering is bad. I do not spend time 
defending this assumption in detail. Obviously one could argue that some forms of 
government-induced suffering are good and/or necessary, such as punishing criminals, 
but whether that punishment is actually good for the criminal is an argument as old as 
Plato. Apart from punishment and other less-clear forms of governmental coercion, it at 
least seems obvious to me that governmental coercion of innocent citizens, especially in 
areas of evolutionary import like reproduction and child-rearing, leads to excessive 
individual suffering as well as governmental inefficiency. Even classical liberal societies
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
allow for some coercion in order to protect all individuals from the threat of force or 
fraud. Coercion for this protective purpose is ideally the only justifiable reason for 
coercive action by government, though there may be some exceptions.
The pragmatic and moral arguments for individual freedom intersect. 
Governments that are contrary to human nature are less efficient because they require 
overcoming people's innate desires and tendencies, which causes individual suffering as 
well as large-scale suffering since inefficient governments cannot provide well for their 
citizens. The more government needs to overcome human nature, the more coercion is 
required. Coercion is expensive for the government and painful for the people. Less 
coercive societies are less expensive in governmental terms and cause less suffering.
As far as large-scale societies go, liberal institutions are best for humans. If one 
chooses to live in a small-scale society, the situation may be somewhat different, but 
human nature still restricts what even the smallest and most voluntary societies may do, 
as I will suggest later in considering the case of the kibbutzim. It is important to see 
human nature as a real and permanent limit on what government is capable of achieving 
through positive law. These limitations do not mean that we must give up on trying to 
make life better, only that we must do so in a way that is compatible with human desires 
and human freedom.
Organizational Logic
I start out with a justification for the application of evolutionary psychology to 
political theory. In this chapter I take a look at criticisms of evolutionary psychology and
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5argue that the evidence from evolutionary psychology is robust enough to serve as the 
basis for my discussion of human nature. In attempting to use human nature to support a 
particular political regime, I discuss not merely the universal desires that unite people, 
but also the important differences between people that create the incredible variation we 
see in the human species. Such variation is as politically important as the universals, and 
I hope that I succeed in treating both adequately. Much of the resistance to evolutionary 
psychology comes from overly simplistic forms of the hypotheses generated by that field. 
Evolutionary psychology is a broad field with complex hypotheses that take into account 
development, environmental differences, stage of life, and other important causes of 
human variation. Evolutionary psychology does not expect that all humans act the same 
way, especially under different circumstances.
I rely heavily on Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek as two of the foremost 
proponents of classical liberalism. I have many reasons for doing this. In the first place, 
both have been somewhat overlooked as political thinkers, and their complex theories of 
human behavior and society are worth a second look, no matter what your ideological 
persuasion. Both have a deep appreciation for the benefits of free society, and both base 
their opinions on specific beliefs about human behavior.
Smith and Hayek have an understanding of society that closely mirrors the one 
that emerges from biological paradigms. Smith's arguments for grown institutions and 
Hayek's emphasis on spontaneous order as the basis for free society both demonstrate an 
understanding of evolutionary processes and the ways in which order gradually emerges 
from disorder. Human nature is ultimately influenced by two kinds of evolution: social 
and biological. Biological evolution places the rough groundwork in place, while social
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
evolution takes that rough groundwork and molds specifics according to environmental 
pressures and the particular circumstances of a people. Smith and Hayek concentrate on 
social evolution, but it is necessary to understand both kinds and their influence on 
human behavior.
Another, related reason to deal with Smith and Hayek rather than other political 
thinkers devoted to free society is that both have a thread in their thought that needs to be 
more clearly defined. This thread is a kind of thinking that I will refer to throughout this 
dissertation as “natural conventionalism.” I see both Smith and Hayek as believing that 
conventions, rather than being purely man-made, are rooted in human nature. Smith 
especially focuses on the natural moral sentiments and extrapolates much of human 
social life from these sentiments. If conventions are in fact heavily influenced by nature, 
there may be a way, through the combination of the thought of Smith and Hayek and 
evidence from biological sciences, to eradicate or at least temper the often acrimonious 
distinction between nature and convention that has run through political philosophy for 
millenia.
Simply coining a phrase does not mean that one has created or discovered 
something new. This idea of natural conventionalism is present in Burke, Smith, and 
other thinkers, especially those of the Scottish Enlightenment, yet none of these thinkers 
had the knowledge of what precisely was meant by the natural part of the equation, thus 
leading to accusations of relativism or conventionalism by detractors. I believe that this 
idea is underdeveloped in many of these thinkers and worthy of more attention by 
political thinkers of today.
By natural conventionalism I mean that the natural human desires shift and mold
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7human conventions to create conventions that have their roots in nature, but whose full 
form can only be fulfilled through human social customs, conventions, and laws. Natural 
conventionalism is therefore related in some ways to the biological theory of emergence, 
and is also closely related to ideas of spontaneous order. I think that Smith and Hayek 
represent two of the most original thinkers in terms of finding a middle ground between 
nature and convention, and it is for this reason as well that I think they fit extremely well 
with a discussion of the relationship between biological nature and human social 
organization.
My use of Smith and Hayek as important representatives of classical liberal 
thought does not assume that either of the two are the ideal representatives of classical 
liberal society. In fact, in many ways I think that both miss out on important aspects of 
classical liberal or free society that could make the case supporting these societies much 
more strong. I try to supplement their views when possible with evidence from the 
natural sciences, and in other places I will point out thinkers who actually get it right 
where I think that Smith, Hayek, or both fall short. I chose these two thinkers because, 
overall, I think their work is some of the best in describing and justifying the foundations 
of a free society, and because in both of their cases their thinking overlaps with 
biological justifications for free society.
The three main chapters, on rule of law, private property, and the private sphere, 
are organized around three main threads of thought. I lay out Hayek and Smith's 
particular understanding of each classical liberal institution. I then turn to the evidence 
from human nature that supports the naturalness of each of these institutions. In some 
cases, the biological evidence supports Smith and Hayek's discussions, and in other cases
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8it supplements their thought. In each case I argue that these three classical liberal 
institutions grow out of our biological human nature.
I take up the primary classical liberal ideas of rule of law, private property, and 
the private sphere and individual rights. In the chapter on rule of law I argue that there is 
an innate rule of law that supplements positive rule of law, and that makes us particularly 
social. This innate rule of law makes much positive law unnecessary, but also supports 
the need for a minimal rule of law that prevents force and fraud in human interactions. In 
the chapter on private property I argue that humans have a natural desire for private 
property, and that private property rights are naturally conventional in the sense that they 
grow gradually out of natural human desires for territoriality and control over resources. 
In the chapter on the private sphere I argue that it is natural for humans to have a private 
sphere that is outside of governmental control where individuals make their own 
decisions regarding survival and reproduction. I argue that particularly in terms of 
parenting and livelihood humans should be left alone to pursue these goods as they see 
fit, with government interfering only to prevent force and fraud.
After these three basic chapters, I turn to some objections that might be made to 
the conclusion that classical liberal institutions best fulfill human nature. The first 
objection is that regimes based on equality may allow for greater fulfillment of human 
nature than regimes based on liberty. I argue that apart from classical liberal regimes 
being compatible with human nature, there are psychological barriers that are the result 
of evolution that prevent large-scale (or even small-scale) societies based on equality 
from being successful. These barriers include inclusive fitness, status and dominance 
hierarchies, and individual differences. The latter can be caused by a variety of
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9evolutionary factors, not to mention the numerous environmental factors like education 
and upbringing. In the second of these chapters I respond to the objection that free 
societies occasion a loss of excellence in human life, and that perhaps we should be 
willing to incorporate more coercion in human life in exchange for more excellence in 
the form of honor, courage, and justice. I respond that classical liberal society properly 
understood actually promotes individual excellence, though I admit that there may be 
some corresponding losses, such as the desire for military valor. Moreover, classical 
liberal society provides the most comprehensive fulfillment of human nature, providing 
an outlet for all of humanity's various desires. The excellence of a classical liberal 
society is therefore more comprehensive than the excellence of societies that base 
themselves on one specific aspect of the human experience. I also include a chapter on 
Herbert Spencer. Spencer is another classical liberal thinker who uses evolutionary 
thinking as a foundation for his arguments. Spencer, however, diverges from Smith and 
Hayek in that he promotes a kind of utopian anarchism that is based on Lamarckian 
evolution. I argue that such a view of evolutionary processes leads to a view of human 
nature as radically malleable, which makes Spencer closer in spirit to utopian egalitarians 
than to the classical liberals with whom he is usually grouped.
I finally spend a short chapter replying to various arguments concerning the fact- 
value distinction, the problem of radical variation, and the problem of historicism. I 
respond to each of these by arguing that the fact-value distinction is a false distinction, 
and that facts affect human values because we have natural human desires, which are, by 
definition, both facts and values at the same time. In terms of the problem of radical 
variation I argue that human nature, while it presents us with variation, does not present
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us with radical variation. Instead, the variation of human nature is patterned variation, or 
variation according to natural principles. Finally, I argue that even though evolutionary 
theory is a historical theory, it does not lead to the relativistic problems of historicism 
since it creates, for all practical purposes, stable human desires that do not change.
I end with a conclusion that summarizes my major points, as well as outlining 
what I think the major political implications of the previous discussion are. One of the 
major themes that runs throughout the dissertation is the problem of complexity. Just as 
Smith focuses on grown regimes and Hayek focuses on spontaneous order to explain the 
complexity in human nature, I argue that the complexity of human nature precludes 
simple answers to the question of how to organize ourselves. The advantage of classical 
liberal theory is that it advocates limited government as the proper response to human 
complexity. This complexity will tend to support prudential contemplation rather than 
dogmatic assertions and actions and will, I think, bring us back to a more ancient 
understanding of man in contrast to the overly-simplified modem view.
Why Such a Project Makes Sense
It has been argued persuasively by many before me (Amhart 1998; Masters 1989) 
that in order to properly understand the science of politics one must understand the 
science of human nature. Every species of which we are aware has a particular social 
structure ranging from solitary to highly complex. The form of these social structures 
depends on the kind of animal under investigation. One does not expect the high levels 
of cooperation seen in wasps to also work among groups of unrelated monkeys.
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Understanding human nature can help us understand politics. Human nature can help us 
identify what works and also can help us identify what does not.
Moreover, understanding human nature is required if we are to predict even some 
of the outcomes of particular political policies. A lack of respect for the stability of 
human nature has created human suffering throughout history. This suffering has often 
been the result, not of malice, but of good intentions that went awry. Utopian thinking, 
in general, tends to assume a malleable human nature. If the assumption of malleability 
is false, it is important to understand what that means for the quest for perfection.
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CHAPTER 2: IN DEFENSE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
I will argue that certain permanent facets of human nature place restrictions on 
possible political systems. These facets of human nature evolved through natural 
selection and therefore they are enduring. I draw much of my material from the field of 
evolutionary psychology. However, evolutionary psychology has come under fire from 
numerous directions in recent years, from the predictable attacks of creationists to the 
more surprising internal critiques from those within the broad field of evolutionary 
theory. In this chapter I will respond to David Buller's (2005) critique of what he calls 
“narrow” evolutionary psychology. I hope to show that even the most thorough 
criticisms do not detract from “broad” evolutionary psychology's use as an analytic tool. 
There is ample evidence from “broad” evolutionary psychology (which includes both 
“EP” and “ep”, as Buller designates them), which includes sociobiology, ethology, and 
evolutionary theory in general that humans have a relatively fixed nature that restricts 
human activities. For my purposes, that is all that is necessary. My argument does not 
assume or necessarily require the massive modularity and other more controversial 
claims of “narrow” evolutionary psychology, though, as will be discussed below, such 
claims have more merit than Buller suggests. Moreover, though I have used the terms 
“narrow” and “broad” evolutionary psychology, it is somewhat unclear whether these 
distinctions actually have much meaning.
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Buller's work is, on first read, persuasive. Like most scholarly work, however, 
the devil is in the details, and Buller's work is an excellent example of the importance of 
details. Buller takes aim at four or five of the major findings in evolutionary psychology. 
He begins by questioning the argument that the brain is massively modular, and that each 
of these modules were evolved and are adapted for a particular reasoning task that was 
important in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation (EEA). He then moves into 
questioning the evidence for cheater-detection in social contract reasoning, the 
Cinderella-effect, as well as patterns in sexual jealousy. I will briefly lay out Buller's 
major arguments. This will be admittedly over-simplified, since his book is both dense 
and long. After this, I will lay out the responses from evolutionary psychologists and 
other scholars to Buller's claims.
Buller's first target is EP's “massive modularity” hypothesis, and he looks at 
Cosmides and Tooby's work on cheater-detection as a way of arguing against modularity. 
Cosmides and Tooby use the Wason selection task to argue that humans are better at the 
task when it triggers social contract reasoning. Their major contention is that in logically 
identical sets of the task, people are incredibly bad at a content-neutral form of the game, 
but very good at a game in which the content it designed to discover cheaters.
Buller argues that the differential success on Wason selection tasks is not due to 
our sensitivity to the content, but to our sensitivity to the particular form. He argues that 
Cosmides and Tooby accidentally combine deontic conditionals, those which are 
concerned with an obligation, or an implicit request for action, with indicative 
conditionals, which are mere statements of fact. The reason then that we do better on 
some tasks than others is that while the content is different, the form of the task is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
different as well. Buller argues that we are more sensitive to deontic conditionals since 
they require action than we are to indicative conditionals (2005,174).
Buller's next criticism is leveled at the data from Buss on mate-choice, 
particularly the argument that men and women differ in how they choose mates. Buller 
questions the mate-choice argument on two grounds. The first is the ground of ultimate 
explanation, which is the question of whether these preferences really are adaptations. 
The second ground is the question of whether such preferences actually exist. Buller 
settles mostly on the latter, arguing that Buss's contention that males prefer young 
females while females prefer high status males is not borne out by the data (209). 
Moreover, Buller questions the claim of universality that Buss makes, arguing that “the 
mate preferences in which Evolutionary Psychologists are interested tend to vary with 
age and social class, among other things” (210). Buller spends the rest of the chapter 
picking apart Buss's data and research, and concludes that the patterns we see do not 
corroborate Buss's hypotheses. Buller prefers the alternative hypothesis of “homogamy,” 
meaning that people generally tend to prefer partners similar to themselves (215).
Buller moves on to a systematic critique of Buss's research on jealousy. His final 
conclusion is that “jealousy may well be a human psychological adaptation, but there is 
simply no good evidence that men and women possess distinct psychological 
mechanisms that have been tailored by natural selection to perform different functions” 
(345). Buller's alternative to the Buss argument that men and women are sensitive to 
different types of jealousy is the “relationship jeopardy hypothesis,” where both sexes are 
capable of learning and determining what poses the greatest danger to their relationship, 
whether it be emotional or sexual infidelity (332). Buller claims to have struck a middle
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ground between an argument for no adaptation in jealousy and the Evolutionary 
Psychology approach. He also claims that cross-cultural data and research from other 
scientists in fact supports the relationship jeopardy hypothesis rather than the sex- 
differences hypothesis of EP.
Buller next takes aim at the “Cinderella effect.” Margo Wilson and Martin Daly 
have argued that the presence of a step-parent in the home is a risk factor for abuse, since 
from an evolutionary perspective, step-parents have no genetic incentive to care for 
unrelated offspring, and may in fact have an incentive to get rid of step-children since 
they are often competitors to their own biological offspring. Buller argues that the data 
that Wilson and Daly cite fail to support the claim. He points out that the effect they find 
could be due to reporting bias, since it is likely that doctors and others will be more 
willing to believe a step-parent capable of abuse than a biological parent. Additionally, 
the data they claim supports their theory actually shows the opposite pattern to the one 
expected if one follows evolutionary psychology's logic (417).
Buller offers the competing hypothesis that instead of abuse being triggered by 
the lack of parental love, as Wilson and Daly claim, it could be triggered by the presence 
of “psychological factors that are not at all widespread in the population of (substitute) 
parents” (412). If this is true, then we would expect to see radically different patterns of 
child abuse than Wilson and Daly posit, and Buller argues that we do in fact see these 
different patterns.
Buller finally turns his attention to the broad concept of human nature. He ends 
the book with what appears to be a call for relativism, arguing that if we look at the 
situation in the correct light, “universal adaptations will appear no more definitive of our
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'nature' than nonuniversal adaptations or nonadaptations” (480). Ultimately, he argues, 
“we will see that human nature is just as great a superstition as the creation myth of 
natural theologians” (ibid.). Buller derives this claim from his argument that cultural 
universals are not the same thing as psychological universals, and that in EP's desire to 
find the latter, it has confused them with the former. Buller's overall point is that we are 
still adapting to our environments, and that evolution properly understood will supply us 
with many more differences than the similarities we seek. If this is true, then the quest 
for a human nature, at first glance at least, seems to be a moot one.
Cosmides and Tooby, Daly and Wilson, and Buss and Haselton have all written 
letters defending their research against Buller's critiques. In each case, Buller ignores 
scores of supporting evidence, or manipulates existing evidence to fit his theory. Daly 
and Wilson challenge Buller's argument that evidence of increased abuse by step-parents 
could be the result of a recording bias. Buller ignores the magnitude of the effect, which 
Daly and Wilson argue “would require that every Canadian preschooler's death 
considered accidental, plus hundreds more that were blamed on specific diseases, were 
really disguised murders” (507). The possibility of a recording bias would require such a 
magnitude of recording bias as to essentially require a large-scale conspiracy against 
step-parents. Moreover, Daly and Wilson point out that Buller ignores the “dozens of 
confirmatory studies” of the “Cinderella effect,” and in fact misrepresents the content of 
the studies he does cite to support his criticisms (ibid). There seems to be no reason to 
dismiss the common-sense and empirically supported fact that the presence of unrelated 
individuals in a home can lead to stressful situations that can, in turn, lead to abuse or 
neglect (see also Daly and Wilson's more extensive reply to Buller's criticisms on the UC
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Santa Barbara webpage). Moreover, “Other lines of evidence provide additional support 
for the Cinderella effect,” including “victim self-report studies, and the reports of 
stepparents themselves” that they feel less affection and concern toward stepchildren 
than toward their biological children (Miele, 5).
Cosmides and Tooby offer a short reply to Buller's claims, pointing out similar 
problems with his research to those cited by Daly and Wilson. Buller seems to have 
focused primarily on a small subset of the research done on cheater detection, ignoring 
experiments where “subjects perform poorly on deontic rules -  even natural, familiar 
ones -  when these do not resemble social contracts or precautions” (Cosmides, et al. 
2005; 505-506). Buller's claim that the ability of individuals to perform on tests is 
related not to the presence of social exchange or cheaters, but to whether the tests are 
deontic (involving obligations) or indicative (involving facts) in nature is not borne out 
by other research that he does not cite.
Cosmides et al. further point out that evidence from cases of neural trauma shows 
that “focal brain damage can selectively impair social contract reasoning while leaving 
precautionary reasoning intact” (505). They also cite evidence that such “dissociation 
within the domain of deontic rules has recently been replicated using neuroimaging” 
(ibid.), thus offering support for the existence of different modules for reasoning about 
contracts and reasoning about hazardous situations. If there are different brain areas for 
handling different kinds of deontic rules, Buller's argument that the real difference is the 
type of logical set-up is much less persuasive. It seems highly likely from the evidence 
that humans respond differently to the content of the task in which the reasoning takes 
place, rather than to different logical forms of the task. The evidence from neuroimaging
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also supports the idea that responses to logically identical tasks with different social 
content are handled by different parts of the brain, which could support the argument for 
modularity in social contract reasoning.
Buss and Haselton reply to Buller's attack on their research on male and female 
jealousy (2005, 506-507). Again, the primary issue is that Buller underestimates (or 
purposely simplifies) the complexity of the evolutionary hypothesis. The hypothesis 
concerning sex differences in jealousy is a multi-faceted one, made up of thirteen 
separate “sex-differentiated design features” (506). Buller focuses on only two of these, 
and Buss claims that “he misrepresents even these” (ibid.). Buss points out that in his 
research he has always been “careful to state the prediction not in terms of absolute 
levels of jealousy, which are affected by many factors external to the hypothesis, but 
rather in sex differences in sensitivity to different forms of infidelity” (ibid.). In fact, 
Buss argues, the data that Buller provides in the book in fact supports Buss's overall 
claim, but does not support the strawman, simplified argument at which Buller takes aim. 
Studies of sexual jealousy are complex, and evolutionary psychology predicts complex 
responses, especially when there are external factors that bear on the response, such as 
presence of children, attractiveness of mate (in physical and material terms), length of 
relationship, and so on. Nowhere do Buss and the others who have worked on jealousy 
make the simplified absolute claims that Buller criticizes. His critique of the simplified 
claims works, but only to actually further support the actual claims made by Buss and his 
colleagues.
Other evolutionary psychologists, psychologists, and philosophers of science 
have come to the aid of evolutionary psychology, though in some ways the aid may have
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come too late. Buller's book was received favorably in the press, including an article in 
Slate headlining “Evolutionary psychology gets evolution wrong” (Schaffer, 2005). It is 
apparent that many of those who read Buller's book and wrote on it were unaware and 
did not bother to check on the data and methods he uses to reject an entire field of study. 
It is also apparent that many who jumped on Buller's bandwagon were probably sick of 
the simplistic use of evolutionary psychology by the media and popular culture. 
Evolutionary psychology is a sexy and intriguing paradigm, which means that it will be 
both overexposed and oversimplified. At any rate, one of the primary issues that other 
reviewers found with Buller's book is his sketchy treatment of data, either ignoring 
studies that do not support his arguments, misrepresenting conclusions of research that he 
does use, and playing with his own data to the point of it becoming meaningless. Add to 
all this the strawmen arguments he accuses evolutionary psychologists of making, and 
you get a recipe for confusion.
In Buller's treatment of Buss's research on mate-choice, the way Buller aggregates 
the data on mate-choice across all cultures, rather than looking for the result that men 
prefer younger women within each culture “gets rid of the theoretically expected effect, 
but that is no criticism, because it does not test the evolutionary paradigm at hand” 
(Holcomb 2005,400). Evolutionary theory does not predict that we will find the exact 
same patterns of mate-choice across all cultures. Some cultures marry earlier than 
others, others have high divorce rates, while in others marriage is relatively stable. The 
evolutionary paradigm predicts that within the variation of human cultures we will find 
that men generally prefer younger women and that women generally prefer higher status 
men. These patterns will vary in strength based on cultural norms, but the patterns will
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still exist. Aggregating the data only hides the within-culture patterns. Again, the 
misuse of data to test theories that no good evolutionary' psychologist would espouse 
seems surprisingly unscientific for a philosopher of science.
Others say simply that “...Buller's criticism fails on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds” (Bryant 2006, 482). Buller's criticism of modularity, for example, and its 
corresponding arguments for “cortical plasticity” is “inconsistent with a large body of 
data in cognitive and social psychology detailing extensive non-adaptive behaviors in 
contemporary environments, only explicable in reference to past adaptive problems” 
(ibid.). If human evolution really is occurring as rapidly as Buller claims, and if the brain 
is as plastic as he believes it is, it is unclear what to do with the data Bryant cites on non- 
adaptive behavior as well as the immense data on the results of neural trauma to different 
parts of the brain.
In defense of Cosmides and Tooby, Bryant points out that cheater-detection 
“stands as one of the more robust theories in cognitive psychology in the last two 
decades, and the work has been recognized” by the major associations in psychology (not 
simply by fellow evolutionary psychologists) (484). Indeed, the peer-reviewed articles 
by Cosmides and Tooby alone on the Wason selection task and cheater-detection in 
general are extensive. Moreover, Cosmides and Tooby have gone above and beyond the 
call to respond to the criticisms of their work, including doing work on deontic and 
indicative conditionals that Buller ignores.
Even more dubious than Buller's specific attacks on particular research are the 
overall conclusions he draws concerning human nature. Bryant concludes his review of 
Buller's book, pointing out that “the denial of species-typical design is an implicit
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rejection of all scientific psychology, let alone physiology and anatomy” (486). The fact 
that human nature varies makes the study of it no less scientific than the study of 
anatomy. The human body varies across many categories, but no one argues that this 
variation precludes us from understanding what the human body generally looks like, or 
from categorizing and studying its many parts. Every science deals with some degree of 
variation. Human behavior is variable, but it is not radically so.
Buller himself argues that there probably are adaptive mechanisms in human 
nature, and praises the work of some within the field of evolutionary psychology. Even 
if the evolutionary arguments behind EP are incorrect, that is, if we do discover that it is 
not the result of natural selection but, perhaps, intelligent design, it is extremely difficult 
to get around the fact that the patterns of behavior described by evolutionary 
psychologists and those in related fields in the areas of mating, mental reasoning, social 
situations, parenting and childcare, and so on, are universal, having been replicated 
numerous times in different environments and with different cultures. If there is in fact 
no human nature, it is not only difficult to explain these outcomes, but all the research in 
psychology proper, experimental economics, anthropology, sociology, and political 
science that demonstrates durable patterns of human behavior needs to be reexamined 
under the light of “plasticity” of a kind never before seen in the animal kingdom. Such a 
view is simply not supported by the evidence from any known science of human 
behavior.
The major criticism of Buller's work seems to be that the hypotheses that he 
consistently takes aim at are strawmen set up in overly-simplified terms. Bryant argues 
that “the all-or-nothing strawman is knocked down, and victory is declared. In the
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celebration, a new hypothesis is often presented that is quite comparable to the actual 
position of the evolutionary psychological theory he attacks” (485). As Bryant points out 
in reference to Buller's criticisms of Buss, the argument “seems to be about denying the 
proposition wrongly attributed to Evolutionary Psychologists that all males prefer nubile 
females all the time” (ibid.). Holcomb agrees, arguing that “Buller's original criticisms... 
sometimes lapse into caricatures of work he attacks” (393). Buller ignores the subtleties 
of evolutionary psychology's arguments. Evolutionary psychology is about, more than 
anything, patterns of human behavior. These patterns are often context-dependent: they 
depend largely on the age of the individual, the type of mating pool available, the 
environmental resources at one's disposal, as well as myriad other indicators from the 
broader social and physical environment. What evolutionary psychology does so well is 
to predict what the effect of particular contextual cues will be on these patterns of 
behavior. The subtleties of evolutionary psychology that Buller misses are integral to the 
science itself. Because human nature is not a one-size fits all mechanism we would 
expect quite a bit of individual variation. Evolutionary psychology can explain how and 
why that variation exists; it is unclear whether Buller's alternative hypotheses can do 
either.
Buller further mischaracterizes the field by polarizing the field between 
“Evolutionary Psychology” and “evolutionary psychology,” one of which is a dogma, 
and the other is a field of inquiry. However, as many reviewers have pointed out, many 
of those whom Buller claims as being members of the latter group (of which he 
approves) actually see their work as complementary to the work done in EP. In fact, 
there really is no real line between “EP” and “ep.” What we have is a dynamic field
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
where important issues are being debated, where people agree and disagree and carry on 
research to prove their point. All, however, are tied together by the conviction that by 
understanding our evolutionary past we can understand our present psychology. By 
presenting the field as fractured and split by dogma, Buss does an injustice to the myriad 
aspects of human psychology on which almost all evolutionary psychologists agree.
To further the idea of a schism, Buller argues that “dogma” like massive 
modularity is wholly accepted by “EP.” Miele (2007) points out that Buller's criticism of 
modularity as the central dogma of EP is creating a strawman, since “...modularity and 
adaptation to novel environments are two of the central debates, not dogmas, in EP” (2). 
There are many evolutionary psychologists who express concern over the massiveness of 
the massive modularity hypothesis (Bechtel, 2003). Even Buss, Miele points out, 
acknowledges that there are probably domain-general mechanisms, and that “no 
evolutionary psychologist has ever claimed that domain-specific modules are 
hermetically sealed off from each other by any neurocognitive firewalls” (3). In fact, the 
interaction between these modules “lies at the cutting edge of research” (ibid.). No 
evolutionary psychologist has claimed that we know everything we need to know about 
how human psychology works. The hope is that understanding the ultimate explanations 
of human behavior might help shed light on the proximate mechanisms, many of which 
are still very much mysteries. Evolutionary psychology is a large and growing field, with 
many different researchers focusing on many different aspects of the human psyche. 
There are, fortunately, debates to be had and research to be done, which is the sign of a 
healthy field, not a schismatic one.
Ultimately, the attention that Buller's critiques have brought to the field will
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probably be helpful. What does not kill you makes you stronger, and this is true 
especially of scientific criticisms. Most of Buller's main points have been refuted. But a 
few criticisms are likely to stick and will be healthy for the field as a whole. In the first 
place, the overuse of evolutionary psychology by those who are unfamiliar with its 
subtleties and methodologies has become somewhat of an embarrassment to those well- 
versed in both broad and narrow EP. The practitioners of the field should perhaps try 
harder to refute those doing sloppy research in EP as a way of purifying the field and 
maintaining standards. Moreover, more attention should be paid to well-respected 
researchers who offer alternatives within the framework of evolutionary psychology. As 
Holcomb points out, “When [Buller] recounts the criticisms, claims, and alternatives of 
such respected scientists, his book succeeds...” (Holcomb, 393). As Holcomb points out, 
scientific progress requires the consideration of many different hypotheses, weighing 
each on their relative merits (394). Wliat Buller's book does well is to offer alternative 
hypotheses that might fit the data, as well as bringing to light less well-known 
evolutionary psychologists who offer alternatives to the mainstream scientists.
It is too bad in some ways that Buller's book has such serious methodological and 
theoretical problems, since a focused criticism of evolutionary psychology would be 
beneficial to the field as a whole. There are, however, a few ways in which evolutionary 
psychology can become stronger.
Evolutionary explanations can benefit from more integration with animal 
behavior. Buller pays almost no attention to the myriad studies in animal and primate 
behavior that show very similar behavioral patterns to the ones he is claiming do not 
exist in humans. It would be very strange indeed for something to be present throughout
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mammals and our closer relatives and to be completely absent from us. Hrdy's (1999) 
work on motherhood is an excellent example of a broad approach to evolutionary 
psychology that uses evidence from primate behavior, historical studies, and cross- 
cultural studies. Finding evidence from primates or even other, less related mammals 
that matches evidence from human psychology, the odds significantly increase that such 
a behavior is an adaptation.
Evolutionary psychologists should play up one of their primary strengths, which 
is using a mix of methods. Focusing on different methods from animal behavior, 
neuroimaging, studies of neural trauma, ethnography, cross-cultural data, and other tools 
from both the biological and social sciences will help to create a solid body of evidence 
that adequately defends the claims of evolutionary psychology. It is for this reason that I 
have tried to compile a mix of data and evidence from very different sources as a way of 
avoiding the pitfalls of focusing on one particular methodology. On this same note, more 
attention needs to be paid to methodology by both those who blindly follow and those 
who blindly criticize evolutionary explanations of human behavior. Those who accepted 
Buller's faulty evidence and distortion of facts are as bad as those who swallow weakly 
supported evidence and wild claims based on evolutionary logic.
How I Use Evolutionary Psychology
I will try to make a persuasive case that classical liberal regimes are the most 
compatible with what we know about human nature. My understanding of human nature
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is heavily influenced by evolutionary psychology, broadly conceived. There is 
considerable confusion as to what the term “evolutionary psychology” means. I use the 
term broadly, to denote, as Buller terms it, a “field of inquiry” (2005, 8) rather than a set 
of “specific theoretical and methodological doctrines” (8). It should be pointed out as 
well that many of the “specific theoretical and methodological doctrines” that Buller cites 
are criticized by those within the field as well as those without, and that the work of 
“broad” evolutionary psychologists has played an important role in questioning some of 
the major tenets of more “narrow” EP. In the chapters following I will refer to 
evolutionary psychology, which I see as a “large, sprawling, heterogeneous scientific 
community that includes psychologists, anthropologists, biologists, and others” (Delton, 
et. al. 2006,265). I look at evolutionary psychology as a method of providing ultimate 
explanations for human behavior based on the environment in which we evolved, as well 
as a way of pinpointing stable and universal aspects of human nature. I disagree with 
Buller's overall characterization of EP and evolutionaiy psychology as separate entities, 
since I see both as providing important evidence of a universal human nature, and both 
having much to offer the broad attempt to understand both the stability and variability of 
human nature.
In some respect, what follows does not inherently stand or fall with evolutionary 
psychological explanations of human behavior. Even if Buller and other critics of 
narrow evolutionary psychology are correct, and much of the research done thus far has 
been flawed in that it makes leaps from behavior and ultimate explanations of that 
behavior, what remains from much of this research is a broad understanding of human 
nature as complex, variable, and yet with universal desires, wherever they come from.
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What evolutionary psychology helps us do, as Buller admits, is to create hypotheses for 
what kinds of adaptations we might need or want to look for, and then suggests ways to 
test this. That there might be problems within evolutionary psychology as far as how its 
hypotheses are tested does not seem to have much relevance for the seemingly 
commonsense arguments about human nature such as that parents love their children, 
that private property is a natural desire for humans, or that, more broadly, humans have a 
natural rule of law which provides a framework for different levels of law like custom 
and positive law, thus providing the pattern within the patterned variation of human life. 
Even if we are wrong about the ultimate basis of this universal human nature (which 
seems unlikely given present evidence) it would be extremely unlikely that all the 
patterns we have discovered in human psychology from fields as various as ethology, 
evolutionary psychology, experimental economics, and sociobiology are mere chimeras. 
What might prove dangerous to an argument like mine would be the discovery that there 
was no human nature, or that the human nature that actually exists is radically different 
from the one I derive from my evidence.
In Buller's final statement concerning the myth of human nature, I think we find a 
radical misunderstanding regarding what precisely human nature means. Part of human 
nature will be the universal desires like those of parental care and mating, which even 
Buller must acknowledge to be the closest thing we have to psychological universals on 
his definition. It is these universals that Buller appears not to like (though it is unclear 
then how he can agree with some kinds of evolutionary psychology). What Buller and 
others seem to miss is that human nature is characterized as much by differences between 
people as it is by the universals that humans share. What is important in human nature is
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that there are somewhat predictable patterns of differences, so that we can argue with 
some certainty why it is that these differences exist, as well as predict the environmental 
circumstances in which these differences would probably occur.
Anyone looking around the world can reject out of hand a static human nature 
that makes all of us have the same desires and rank those desires in exactly the same 
way, irrespective of environment, social milieu, and stage of life. No evolutionary 
psychologist claims such a thing. It is, however, the goal of evolutionary psychology as 
a field to pinpoint and highlight the universals that we find across human cultures, and if 
they give short shrift to the differences, perhaps that is simply because highlighting those 
differences can best be left to other fields, or another time. My argument for classical 
liberalism relies heavily on both the universals of human nature and the patterned 
variation within human nature. That the latter is evidence that there is no human nature 
is just as false as saying that the universals preclude that variation.
As stated above, I have tried to get my evidence from a mix of fields including 
experimental economics, evolutionary psychology, and animal and primate behavior, as 
well as the intuitions and theories of political philosophers. In large part because the 
field of biopolitics is so new, much of what I claim here is tentative. However, I believe 
that the evidence that exists supports my claims, and that if, indeed, human nature is what 
we think it is, that political implications follow. Evolutionary psychologists and political 
theorists alike may not like my application of biological principles to politics. But it 
seems obvious that insofar as man is an animal, and a political animal, we must try to 
understand humanity in terms of its animal nature. Doing so will hopefully throw into 
relief all the ways in which man has emerged from that animal nature, not the least of
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which is in his capacity for freedom. Though I expect people from both fields to be 
somewhat averse to such a treatment of humanity, I am not the first to attempt such a 
study and, with the growing movement toward consilience in the sciences, both social 
and otherwise, I will almost certainly not be the last.
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CHAPTER 3: INTRODUCTION TO 
THE THOUGHT OF ADAM SMITH AND FRIEDRICH HAYEK
Adam Smith
Adam Smith is perhaps best known for his Wealth o f Nations and for being one of 
the best-known proponents of capitalism and free markets. His thought, however, is 
much deeper and more complex than such a reputation would seem to support. His 
primary interest is moral philosophy, and he saw economics as a branch of moral 
philosophy, rather than as a separate discipline. He saw his works fitting into a whole 
system of philosophy, but it is sometimes difficult to see the connections between his 
various works on moral sentiments and economic theory. In particular, The Theory o f  
Moral Sentiments (TMS) and The Wealth o f Nations (WN) seem at times blatantly 
contradictory, which some thinkers have termed “The Adam Smith Problem” 
(Haakonssen 2006, 164-165, 369-371). The Adam Smith problem consists in the 
difficulty of understanding why Smith promotes and defends capitalism even in the face 
of his own criticisms that it lowers the level of the human experience, and may actually 
detract from happiness rather than promote it, or in the words of one commentator, why 
“Smith bases his moral philosophy on the motive of sympathy and his economic theory 
on the motive of self-interest” (164). In the following I lay out briefly his works and how 
I see them fitting together, and I try to demonstrate why Smith's work in particular is
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useful for those of us interested in the biological explanations of human nature and 
politics. What will come out in the rest of the dissertation is that human nature consists 
of both sympathetic and self-interested impulses, which together create a spontaneous 
order or “invisible hand.”
The Theory o f Moral Sentiments serves as an attempt to lay out how moral 
judgments are made. One of the most important statements in TMS is the first sentence: 
“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary 
to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it” (9). These 
principles of human nature that concern man with the fortune of others are at the heart of 
Smith's argument in TMS, and also at the root of the argument from the classical liberal 
tradition. Men are naturally social, according to the classical liberals. They are not, like 
Hobbes supposed, created in a State of Nature that must be modified through government 
to allow for survival. According to Smith (and later, to Hayek) man is certainly naturally 
selfish, but he is also a social creature who is concerned in varying degrees with his 
fellow man. This natural sociality makes government, and especially free government, 
possible.
Moreover, this natural sociality plays an integral role in the very creation of 
government. There is no state of nature at all, according to Smith. Government grows 
slowly out of the society in which it is found, according to the circumstances and needs 
of that society, especially that of property (Smith, 1982a). This rejection of the state of 
nature can be found in other classical liberals like Burke in their preference for grown 
rather than founded regimes. This gradual growth of governmental institutions is further
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related to the classical liberal reliance on spontaneous order, and in Smith's case, with his 
suspicion of “men of systems” (1982a, 233-234).
In the final sections of TMS, Smith lays out the major systems of moral 
philosophy. According to him, all of them miss some important aspect of human nature 
and morality, though each contains a germ of truth. His system is the most 
comprehensive, but for that reason the most complex and least concrete. Smith sees the 
quest for simplicity as inherently dangerous since it necessarily conceals important 
aspects of what it means to explain.
In one section of TMS, Smith shifts from the moral sentiments to the political, 
demonstrating the interrelated nature of his studies. He discusses the dangers of 
innovation for political systems, and points out the conceit of the man of system who 
strives to “new-model the constitution, and to alter, in some of its most essential parts, 
that system of government under which the subjects of a great empire have enjoyed, 
perhaps, peace, security, and even glory, during the course of several centuries together” 
(232). Radical innovation is dangerous in politics, and Smith's argument is supported by 
his later arguments concerning the role of the “invisible hand” in bringing about slowly 
(and more safely) what the innovators would like to do drastically.
At the root of Smith's argument is the assumption of complexity. Smith argues 
that the man who truly loves his country will “respect the established powers and 
privileges even of individuals, and still more those of the great orders and societies, into 
which the state is divided” (233). Further, this man will learn to accept the “confirmed 
habits and prejudices of the people” where he cannot change them through persuasion, 
and will “remedy as well as he can, the inconveniencies which may flow from the want
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of those regulations which the people are averse to submit to” (ibid). Political life for 
Smith is much more complicated than simply making laws and enforcing them. It 
requires an understanding of the prejudices and habits of a people, which requires an 
understanding of their history. It requires combining careful, gradual innovation when 
possible with the utmost respect for established institutions that have weathered the test 
of time and which are unlikely to be either wholly harmful or useless. Smith's discussion 
of government seems more Aristotelian than Lockean, and it emphasizes the complex 
interplay between the best and the best possible. It is precisely this difficulty that makes 
central control counterproductive if not dangerous.
Smith's stress on the complexity of human nature that we see in TMS supports his 
arguments for the invisible hand in the WN (though he only uses that term once), and it 
also supports to his arguments for the gradual growth of governmental institutions in the 
Lectures on Jurisprudence (U ). Smith saw moral philosophy as encompassing most of 
what we consider the social sciences. Economics, political science, and even our biology 
as feeling animals are all part of a system of moral philosophy that attempts to explain 
how humans behave toward one another and how we ought to live together. The biology 
of human nature influences our sociality which influences the systems we create for 
living together. However, along with the interrelation of various studies, perhaps the 
most encompassing description of Smith's thought is his overall suspicion of systems, or 
at least his suspicion of systems wrongly understood. A complex human nature cannot 
support a simple system, whether of moral philosophy, economic theory, or government. 
Smith sees systems as inherently dangerous, and argues for allowing complexity to work 
itself out at the level of the individual.
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The effect of this complexity on Smith's view of government is best described by 
the only system he views favorably, the “system of natural liberty” (1981, 687). 
According to this system, “the sovereign has only three duties to attend to”: that of 
protecting the society from external dangers, that of protecting individuals within the 
society from violence of other members, and finally that of supporting public goods that 
cannot be effectively maintained through market forces. More generally, “every man, as 
long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own 
interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with 
those of any other man, or order of men” (ibid). Thus, men are left to pursue their own 
varied inclinations and interests their own way, provided they do not turn to force or 
fraud. Leaving men thus free allows the most efficient use of their own particular talents 
and goods given their own peculiar circumstances, while at the same time discharging 
government from the onerous and counterproductive task of ordering the lives of 
individuals.
This system of natural liberty is the only system that Smith seems to view with a 
kindly eye, and is the important bond that ties TMS, WN, and U  together. Smith sees the 
moral sentiments as providing the bond that ties men together prior to government, and 
also as a flexible (though not infallible) system forjudging the actions of men. These 
moral sentiments will guide individuals through their daily lives and interactions with 
others. One facet of the moral sentiments is that we feel more strongly for ourselves and 
those close to us than those who are farther away or unknown. Smith saw the 
combination of these natural moral sentiments with the force of the market as a way to 
provide for those unknown individuals while supporting oneself and those nearby. Thus,
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our natural moral sentiments, when supported by market forces and free trade, gradually 
create a complex system of government that approximates a “system of natural liberty” 
whereby individuals use their own knowledge and feelings about events to unknowingly 
influence the greater good.
Hayek's Thought
Hayek follows in the footsteps of Smith as a defender of classical liberalism and 
free markets. The two differ theoretically, however, especially in regard to their 
particular views on nature, as well as on the moral status of free market systems.
Hayek is more prolific than Smith, and his work is thus somewhat easier to discuss in 
terms of general themes than specific works. By far his most comprehensive work is the 
Constitution o f Liberty, which lays out, at least to some extent, the major themes that 
Hayek sees as at the heart of classical liberalism. These major themes include the 
problem of knowledge, the importance of the spontaneous order, rule of law, the ends 
versus the means of government, and the moral status of freedom and individualism. As 
with Smith, these major themes are all interrelated. For Hayek, the fundamental issue is 
the problem of knowledge and the argument that no one person can have the knowledge 
necessary to centrally control a society or an economy. This concern, while implicit in 
Smith's discussion of the complexity of human nature, is not laid out as forcefully in 
Smith's thought.
Perhaps the best statement of the tradition in which Hayek sees himself comes in 
the Constitution o f  Liberty, where Hayek differentiates between the British and French
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traditions (1960, 54-62). Hayek traces the origins of the British tradition (of which he 
sees himself as a part) to the Scottish enlightenment, including “David Hume, Adam 
Smith, and Adam Ferguson, seconded by their English contemporaries Josiah Tucker, 
Edmund Burke, and William Paley, and drawing largely on a tradition rooted in the 
jurisprudence of the common law” (1960, 56). Hayek sees the fundamental distinction 
between the French and the British tradition as a distinction between concern over who 
rules and how one rules. For the French (who include some English thinkers like 
Hobbes), the question is not whether the content of rules are legitimate, but whether the 
ultimate source of those rules is a legitimate source. For Hayek, as we will see especially 
in the chapter on rule of law, the point is not necessarily who is making the particular 
rules, but what the content of those rules is, and how they are enacted. For the French, 
with their preference for democracy and equality, the primary concern is who makes the 
decisions.
One key difference between the English and the French, and one that will be 
discussed in the rest of this dissertation, is that of the ends of government. While the 
English see themselves as broadly supporting a certain way of life including liberty, 
comfort, and commercial interests, they do not see themselves as supporting particular 
social outcomes beyond the creation of a general framework. The French, on the other 
hand, see government as solving particular problems rather than as supporting a 
framework for individual action. One could argue that the English concentrate on the 
individual good while the French focus on the common good, but this would ignore the 
point of much of Hayek's discourse, which is that the attempt by the French to create 
social equality, or commit to particular ends, actually prevents the achievement of those
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ends, as government becomes more and more inefficient. Thus, not only does the 
classical liberal constitution support individual liberty, but it also tends to support the 
comfort and overall well-being of the society as a whole. The argument that free 
government supports both the well-being of the individual and that of the greater society 
is central to both Smith and Hayek's justifications for classical liberal government.
For Hayek, the problem of knowledge is at the heart of complex societies. 
Hunter-gatherer societies have relatively few variables to deal with since they are 
generally small and each member's interests are closely allied with those of the other 
members of the group. This small number of variables and convergence of interests 
means that central planning is possible and perhaps even necessary for the survival of the 
group. Some amount of central planning is necessary for the creation of hunting parties, 
and the divvying up of goods, as well as in the planning of migration patterns. The case 
becomes radically different once we see a shift toward agriculture and division of labor. 
Smith points out in L/(1982b, 14-15) that in the different levels of society, hunters have 
the least government (almost to the point of no government at all) and little property. 
Hayek agrees (1983, 49).
The more complex societies become, however, the more the problem of 
knowledge becomes manifest. It becomes impossible to regulate and guide the 
movements of thousands of people with various interests, different families, and a variety 
of goods to barter or sell. Hayek argues that the only way of dealing with the problem of 
knowledge is to allow for the creation of a spontaneous order. The spontaneous order 
emerges from the actions of thousands of unrelated individuals who pursue their own 
interests, guided by traditional and generalized rules of conduct.
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These traditional and generalized rules of conduct form the basis for the rule of 
law that is integral to the success of the spontaneous order. It is interesting that while 
there is a connection in Smith's thought between the moral sentiments and the invisible 
hand (though it is by no means an unproblematic connection), Hayek eschews the natural 
moral sentiments in favor of basing his spontaneous order on a rule of law that consists 
of general, customary rules that create a framework in which individuals can pursue their 
varied interests. Hayek looks to custom where Smith looks to nature. In either case, the 
spontaneous order is created through the separate actions of individuals who are 
operating within a framework of general guidelines. These general guidelines, which do 
not aim at any specific end, but instead attempt to make prediction more simple and 
make knowledge more readily available to diverse individuals, are at the heart of what 
Hayek sees as the job of the true legislator. The job of the legislator is not to figure out 
how to achieve particular ends, but to figure out the best way of supporting the actions of 
millions of unknown individuals in unknown pursuits. The government supports 
spontaneous order by creating a broad framework but leaving the particular ends of that 
framework up to the individual operating within it. This is a very different view of 
government than that of the French thinkers who prefer direct action aimed at a specific 
end.
Hayek and Smith on Nature
While both Smith and Hayek make persuasive cases for free-market economies 
and free government in general, their arguments are theoretically vulnerable at the base.
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Both men root their arguments in a kind of understanding of nature that is either 
somewhat empirically flawed, or is simply theoretically vulnerable. Hayek operates 
primarily off a flawed understanding of human nature. Smith's problem is more one of 
theoretical confusion. His view of human nature is supported by modem biological 
accounts of human nature, but his theoretical basis for that nature leaves his theory open 
to charges of relativism. In both cases, evolutionary theory and other evidence from the 
biological sciences can provide support for Smith and Hayek's conclusions, while 
supplementing their theories and providing a solid grounding for their theories.
One way in which Hayek and Smith differ from each other, and in which 
evidence from evolutionary theory strengthens their positions, is in their discussion of 
nature. While the role or status of nature is dubious in Smith's thought, it is almost non­
existent in Hayek's. The problem with ignoring nature is that both thinkers place 
themselves on the slippery ground of conventionalism, which makes their overall 
arguments, which claim to be true everywhere and always, suspect.
Smith uses nature more directly than Hayek. He uses the term “nature” 
continually throughout all of his works. The terms “nature” and “natural” come up 
continually in the TMS, and the “natural” processes of commercial society are 
continually referred to the WN. What is more difficult is to understand precisely what 
Smith means by this nature. In TMS, the use of nature seems to come close to that of the 
evolutionary argument. The moral sentiments are the natural sentiments of mankind. 
They seem to be somewhat universal, though they can be perverted. The foundation of 
this nature is unclear, however. According to Smith, the moral sentiments are put in 
place by the Author of Nature, who could be God (as seems intended in some places) but
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could very well be something else entirely. Either way, according to Smith, “by acting 
according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily pursue the most effectual 
means for promoting the happiness of mankind” (1982a, 166). Moreover, at one point 
Smith argues that “the administration of the great system of the universe, however, the 
care of the universal happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God 
and not of man” (237). Man's business is to care for his own happiness and that of those 
closest to him. Thus, whatever the grounding of this nature, it is part of man's nature to 
care about different people differently, and the inability of man to be universally 
benevolent is part of the foundation for classical liberal thought which dictates that we 
concentrate on those closest to us, and in this way support those farther away.
The problem for Smith is that his understanding of nature becomes somewhat 
relativistic. The moral sentiments, however natural, can be easily perverted and 
corrupted, most particularly by wealth. It is unclear what the foundations of these 
sentiments are, and therefore it is unclear whether they are based in anything stable 
enough to avoid relativism.
While Smith's nature is somewhat confusing and possibly somewhat relativistic, 
Hayek's approach is to ignore the natural impulses of man, because he sees them as a 
danger to capitalist society. I describe his argument in more detail later on, but the 
important point is that Hayek chooses to base his theories on convention rather than 
nature. This conventional emphasis opens the door for a kind of relativism that 
eventually undermines his argument. Hayek's rejection of nature makes it impossible for 
him to make a moral argument for the free society. Instead, he must argue from a 
pragmatic perspective, leaving his moral and philosophic claims for a free society (what
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there are of them, that is) undefended.
He certainly makes both practical and moral arguments for classical liberalism, 
though his major defense of the free society is that it solves the problem of knowledge. 
This epistemological argument, while a strong one, begs the question of why this 
problem of knowledge exists in the first place. To answer this question one must go back 
to the existence of a complex human nature.
Hayek does in fact root this problem of knowledge in a certain understanding of 
human nature, but it is an extremely simplistic one, based on what we all lack rather than 
on what we all share. He lays out two propositions that are at the heart of classical 
liberal thought. The first is “an expression of the belief in a certain similarity of all 
human beings: it is the proposition that no man or group of men possesses the capacity to 
determine conclusively the potentialities of other human beings and that we should 
certainly never trust anyone invariably to exercise such a capacity” (1960, 88). The 
second is that “the acquisition by any member of the community of additional capacities 
to do things which may be valuable must always be regarded as a gain for that 
community” (ibid.). The major impulses that lead one away from the free society and 
toward socialism are an exaggerated belief in the power of man's reason on the one hand, 
and on the other, an desire rooted in envy that men be made equal. These two together 
are the prime enemies of the free society, and Hayek accordingly does his best to 
eliminate both of these from circulation. The problem is that both of these are results of 
man's nature. On the one hand, Hayek argues that we all naturally cannot know what we 
need to know for central planning to work. On the other hand, he argues that we 
naturally desire equality, and that this natural desire must be suppressed. He thus argues
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that we use the free society to compensate for our natural ignorance on the one hand, 
while such a society requires the suppression of our natural desire for equality on the 
other. This love-hate relationship with nature forms the basis for much that is 
inconsistent in Hayek's thought.
His dislike of nature arises in one place from his argument that the determinism 
of the modem science of human nature has eradicated the free will that is necessary for 
the development of responsibility. He argues, “the admission that the working of man's 
mind must be believed, at least in principle, to obey uniform laws appeared to eliminate 
the role of an individual personality which is essential to the conception of freedom and 
responsibility” (1960, 72). Fortunately for our purposes, evolutionary theory is not 
deterministic, and the very fact that it produces variability within populations and 
flexibility within individuals actually supports Hayek's arguments rather than refutes 
them. But it is obvious that simplistic understandings of human nature left Hayek 
suspicious of all attempts to make human nature more predictable, for fear it would open 
the door to more centralized control.
Hayek then shifts to a conventional defense of the traditional rights that are at the 
core of classical liberalism. He eschews the natural rights of Locke and Hobbes, in large 
part because such rights tend to be used by the French revolutionaries, for example, to 
encourage governmental interference rather than limit it. Hayek, however, goes too far 
in his dislike of natural rights. He denies the natural foundation of rights, arguing, “What 
exactly is to be included in that bundle of rights that we call 'property', especially where 
land is concerned, what other rights the protected sphere is to include, what contracts the 
state is to enforce, are all issues in which only experience will show what is the most
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expedient arrangement. There is nothing 'natural' in any particular definition of rights of
this kind ” (158). Hayek here is partially right and partially wrong. Certainly an
understanding of human nature will never tell us with any exactness what kinds of 
property we should protect, nor will it allow us to limit precisely what is included in the 
private sphere. However, the sciences of human nature do provide us with certain basic 
guidelines. As I argue elsewhere, property itself is a natural phenomenon (as Hayek 
seems to concede by quoting Hume) and there are property systems that are better than 
others at solving the tragedy of the commons, for example. What ought to be included in 
the private sphere can be demonstrated with some accuracy if we know what those things 
are that humans care the most about. These foundational desires should, in general, be 
left to the care of the individual rather than the government. I could go on, but the point 
is made. Hayek, in his fear of how nature has been misused, jettisons the entire concept, 
and leaves himself as a result on shaky ground.
Exactly how shaky this ground is can be seen in Hayek's brief discussion of 
natural law. Hayek sees himself as part of the natural law tradition, and this tradition he 
identifies as agreeing on “the existence of rules which are not of the deliberate making of 
any lawgiver” (237). Laws should be found rather than created. While Hayek seems to 
argue for finding rather than creating laws, his arguments for downplaying or 
suppressing nature in some cases, and for a hazy conventionalism in others, makes one 
wonder how much his conventionalist laws are actually “finding” anything or whether 
they are really simply creating laws slowly over time. If the latter, then Hayek's view 
might be more close to a sort of legal positivism, though not exactly the sort he criticizes. 
His argument for a set of grown laws that are limited by certain existing conditions
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would be stronger if he had a cohesive understanding of the natural laws of human nature 
that limit what positive law can do. What Hayek needs is a dose of nature, and that is 
precisely what I try to provide in the rest of this dissertation.
The application of evolutionary theory to arguments such as Smith's and Hayek's 
might seem at first glance a little strange. Yet actually, evolutionary theory offers a few 
important benefits. In the first place, evolutionary theory supports an understanding of 
nature that corrects Smith's lack of specificity as to exactly what this Author of Nature is, 
or how He or it operates. If the Author of Nature is some sort of blind process like 
natural selection, then we can learn more about how it operates, and our knowledge will 
help us understand how this process produces aspects of human nature like the moral 
sentiments, as well as how those sentiments work, and what their benefits might be to 
human life as a whole. Understanding how these natural laws operate can only help us 
further define what it means to be human, and further what, given that information, is the 
best way to live.
The second way in which evolutionary theory helps us is by providing a clearer 
understanding of what is actually contained within human nature. Hayek's clear 
preference for conventional laws leads to a kind of relativism based in traditionalism 
from which he has a hard time escaping. If we understand what humans are and how we 
got that way, we can correct in large part the Hayekian relativism, and replace his fear of 
nature with a view of nature that supports classical liberal ideals. Moreover, 
understanding the evolutionary roots of human nature allows us to make the argument for 
the free society even stronger than that made by Smith and Hayek. Instead of merely 
arguing that humans are more comfortable and have more to eat under commercial
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systems, we can argue that classical liberal systems provide humans with psychological 
comfort, promote individual responsibility and overall excellence, and allow for the 
fulfillment of natural human desires. In effect, we can offer moral and political 
arguments rather than merely pragmatic arguments. To be sure, Hayek offers moral and 
political arguments for a free society, but his arguments cannot be sustained on the basis 
of his conventionalism. Such arguments require that we understand the innate, 
permanent desires and inclinations of human nature and how those desires and 
inclinations affect our political systems. By providing us with a concrete theoretical 
foundation on which to develop our arguments, and by further giving us empirical 
evidence to support our claims about human nature, evolutionary theory offers both 
theoretical and practical support for Smith's and Hayek's arguments for a free society.
There are also some smaller, incidental similarities between Hayek and Smith that 
make the application of evolutionary explanations to their thought particularly attractive. 
Smith and Hayek both emphasize the way in which society spontaneously orders itself. 
Evolutionary theory focuses on the spontaneous order of biological phenomena. In both 
cases, the evolution of complexity (whether cultural or biological) occurs spontaneously. 
Smith uses the term “invisible hand,” while Hayek speaks of spontaneous order, but the 
idea is the same. Both cultural and biological change occur through the actions of 
millions of interacting events and individuals, without any broad oversight or control by 
any central force or authority. Moreover, according to Smith and Hayek (and, 
interestingly, some critics of modem biotechnology), such evolution ought to occur in 
this “blind” fashion precisely because of the complexity of the process and the intricacies 
of the many parts involved. The problem of knowledge is insurmountable in complex
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systems, and thus the only way to produce effective change that does not shock the 
system unnecessarily (whether the system be biological or cultural) is to allow the 
gradual shifting and changing to occur unconsciously.
There is a further relationship between Smith and Hayek on the one hand and 
evolutionary theory on the other. This relationship is perhaps the most important, since it 
supports the classical liberal ideals while offering a grounding for human nature. 
Evolutionary theory predicts (and studies done on humans have shown) that human 
nature will be complex and variable. While there will be consistent aspects of this 
nature, the form these aspects take in any given environment will be difficult to predict. 
Thus, what we know about human nature from the spontaneous order that is evolution 
tells us that human societies will be equally complex and difficult to control. This 
complexity supports Hayek's discussion of the problem of knowledge as foundational to 
the problem of politics while at the same time supporting the spontaneous order, which is 
(an albeit incomplete) answer to that problem of politics.
Perhaps the most important support that evolutionary theory and other sciences of 
human nature offer the classical liberal tradition is that human nature is mixed, and that 
such a mixed nature neither requires the draconian control of Hobbes, nor can it support 
the utopian visions of equality. As Smith points out in TMS, we are both naturally social 
and naturally selfish. The classical liberal regime is that regime that supports our nature 
most closely, supporting and enhancing the social and cooperative aspects of our nature 
while at the same time controlling the effects of our selfish instincts through rule of law, 
property rights, and the private sphere.
This last argument is made quite well by Steven Pinker (2002). He takes Sowell's
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Conflict o f Visions, which is essentially a reformulation of Hayek's British and French 
distinction, and argues that evolutionary theory supports the Tragic (or British) vision as 
opposed to the Utopian (or French) vision. The distinction is important since the debate 
over what kind of nature humans have has been at the core of the question of how we 
ought to live. Pinker sides with the Tragic vision, as do Sowell, Hayek, and Smith.
Siding with this particular vision means that we accept certain limitations on 
government, and accept that there will be imperfections that might be necessary for the 
stability of the overall system. Pinker highlights seven primary discoveries of 
evolutionary psychology and other fields within the human behavioral sciences that he 
sees as serious barriers to the Utopian framework. Among these are family ties, 
reciprocity, dominance and violence, ethnocentrism, heritability, self-deception, and the 
“biases of the human moral sense” (294). I will discuss many of these in the following 
chapters, and some have already been discussed by thinkers like Amhart (1998,2005) 
who argue for a kind of Darwinian conservatism. The interesting point is that even if not 
explicitly discussed, and even if the foundations for such aspects of human nature are 
fuzzy, Smith and Hayek recognized all of these facets of human life and recognized in 
them support for their arguments for the free society. What I hope to do in greater detail 
is demonstrate that classical liberalism is the regime most in line with human nature, and 
that a greater understanding of that nature can help support the work of thinkers like 
Smith and Hayek, while at the same time clarifying their thought.
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CHAPTER 4: EVOLUTIONARY RULE OF LAW
I argue in this chapter that humans are infused with a kind of rule of law in the 
form of general moral or social emotions (see Smith 1982a and Amhart 1998) that 
prevent evolutionary liberty from becoming license. I call this rule of law “internal,” and 
distinguish it from “external” rule of law discussed by Hayek and Smith. I use Smith's 
“moral sentiments” as a guide to the internal rule of law that influences other levels. I 
take Hayek's discussion of three sources of human values - nature, custom, and reason - 
as a departure point for an argument that there are rules of action on all three of these 
levels, which create patterns that help us move throughout our social environment. 
Moreover, these levels interact in important ways, with nature supporting and in some 
cases restricting the laws that can be enacted on other levels. I use evidence from the 
social and biological sciences to support Smith's, and to a certain extent Hayek's, 
understanding of internal rule of law, and show how it supports other levels of law, 
particularly customary law. I further argue that customary law will act as a buffer 
between natural and positive law. This system of interacting levels of law with a reliance 
on flexible customary law supports local liberty, which in turn allows for faster 
adaptation to local circumstances. It also provides natural support for a typically 
“conventionalist” or “traditionalist” focus on customary law.
It makes sense in any discussion of rule of law to determine what we mean by the
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term to begin with. I follow Hayek's understanding in his discussion of “The 
stratification of rules of conduct” where he lays out the “three sources of values” (1979, 
153). His discussion is not radically different from previous political thinkers who 
argued that nature, custom, and reason all influence human action. His argument for 
natural values is problematic in some ways, as I will discuss later, but his definition of 
nature as a foundation is similar in many ways to what I will argue is a kind of “internal” 
rule of law that supports external rules. He argues, “There is, of course, in the first 
instance, the solid, i.e. little changing foundation of genetically inherited, 'instinctive' 
drives which are determined by his [man's] psychological structure” (1979, 159). Thus 
nature is the most foundational and in many ways the least changeable of all three 
sources, though custom comes in close second due to the fact that customary laws are not 
chosen by the individual who, often, does not even really understand himself as 
following a set of rules, in much the same way as instinctive tendencies are often far 
from conscious. Hayek goes on to argue that it is neither nature nor reason that makes 
men good, but tradition or custom. I argue that this is overly simplistic, and that Hayek's 
aversion to natural explanations can be understood in large part as a reaction against the 
socialistic tendencies he sees as inherent in human nature. However, his is an unduly 
narrow view of human nature.
My understanding of rule of law includes the different levels of rules that guide 
human action, starting with the most basic natural inclinations and ending with the 
positive law with which most of us are familiar. I argue that these levels represent a 
movement from internal to external restrictions on human action that, as Hayek argues, 
serve mostly to provide more information about the environment rather than representing
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the coercive desires of any particular person external to the individual. Customary law 
provides a middle ground in that it is a mix of internal and external, as customs and 
traditions, or manners and mores as other thinkers call them, become internalized through 
long habituation and education over the years. Thus, as I argue later, customary law 
operates as a buffer between natural and positive law, often manipulating natural 
inclinations toward more socially acceptable outcomes, or softening the expression or 
enforcement of positive laws that go against our natural inclinations.
Obviously these levels of law are different in important ways. Natural laws tend 
to be more general inclinations that apply across the population. Just as some people 
break positive laws, so too do some people go against their natural inclinations. Some 
people, psychopaths in particular, seem to lack these natural social inclinations in the 
first place (Mealey 1995; Amhart 1998), leaving society with little other choice than to 
control them through other means, such as a natural desire for retribution, customary 
rules, or positive law. Natural laws are in one respect the least restrictive and in other 
ways the most restrictive of these levels. Natural inclinations are easily manipulated by 
custom and tradition. Many religious orders, for example, capitalize on the natural 
concern for kin, referring to other members of the congregation or order as brother or 
sister, mother and father. Yet, these natural inclinations place limits on the other levels 
of law in that they prescribe a general set of human desires that is reflected in customary 
and positive law and which prevents voluntary obedience to laws that are radically 
opposed to these natural desires.
All these levels of law are similar in that all create patterns of behavior that make 
predictions of the behavior of others more accurate, thus providing individuals with the
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knowledge that Hayek argues is at the core of classical liberal thought. All laws 
obviously limit human action in important ways, but the issue for Hayek and others is not 
necessarily the limitations on human action, but that these limitations provide predictive 
power for individuals who need knowledge to successfully cooperate with others in their 
environment.
Throughout his work Hayek discusses “...the law in the proper meaning of the 
word, as contained in such expressions as the 'rule' or 'reign of law', a 'government under 
the law', or the 'separation of powers'.” He argues that “The law will consist in purpose- 
independent rules which govern the conduct of individuals towards each other, are 
intended to apply to an unknown number of future instances, and by defining a protected 
domain of each, enable an order of actions to form itself wherein the individuals can 
make feasible plans” (86). Upon close examination we find that the innate rule of law 
fulfills Hayek's definition of external rule of law. In many cases the “laws” of empathy- 
based altruism are purpose-independent. We do not, in general, feel empathy for 
individuals because we think it will lead to a good outcome. We refrain from harming 
others in many cases not because we think that it will lead to some good, but because we 
feel somehow that it is the right thing to do. This is the essence of Hayek's argument for 
“purpose-independent” rules. In Hayek's case, rules are established to support the 
creation of a spontaneous order, not to lead to some predetermined end like economic 
equality. In the same way, the evolution of “rules” like empathy or care for close 
relatives did not evolve because they led to some specific good but because they allowed 
individuals to coexist, thus further supporting human life on both the group and 
individual level. Obviously, survival and reproduction are ends, but only in the same
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way that the creation of a spontaneous order is an end for Hayek. Both are requirements 
for life and as such must be supported. It is more specific societal-wide ends that Hayek 
argues against and which evolution in particular does not provide for.
Certainly evolutionary laws “govern the conduct of individuals towards each 
other”; that is precisely what they are meant to do. The natural moral emotions won out 
over other types of emotions in that they facilitated social endeavors (Barkow, Cosmides 
and Tooby 1992, 169,435-438). Moreover, evolutionary rules apply to “an unknown 
number of future instances,” in that they evolve over time and, having no specific end in 
mind, will apply to various circumstances. Also, as will be argued further elsewhere, 
evolved desires do in a certain way define a “protected domain” of individuals by 
creating desires that are strong enough to defy all but the most coercive control. As is 
also argued elsewhere, the human desire for care of children creates a protected sphere 
that limits the amount of coercion the state can place on reproduction. Last, the entire 
point of rule of law of all types, but especially evolutionary rule of law, is that it allows 
people and organisms to make plans. We are a variable species, but there is a certain 
human nature that allows us to predict with some success what individuals will do in 
particular situations and adapt ourselves to those situations. It is only because there is a 
human nature that we can plan anything, from having children, to how to care for those 
children, to how to provide for those children within the wider sphere of society. Human 
nature, and more specifically, a rule of law that consists in emotional responses to 
distress, etc., allows us to plan our lives with some accuracy. As Montesquieu (1989) 
points out, “if one could imagine another world than this, it would have consistent rules 
or it would be destroyed” (3). The very fact that humanity and human societies have
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survived is due to the rules that bound the actions of individuals within those 
communities, whether innate or culturally created.
In what follows I lay out Smith and Hayek's conceptions of rule of law. Both 
Smith and Hayek support an argument for the interaction of various levels of law that is 
best accomplished through the slow, gradual change of customary law. One important 
facet of both Smith and Hayek's arguments is that the closer laws come to being 
internalized, the more free we are in that society requires less coercion and focuses more 
on voluntary obedience to norms of conduct within a framework of laws that serve as an 
adaptation to particular circumstances and the general character of a people. Because of 
their flexibility, internalized laws (whether in the form of instinctive natural laws or 
customary laws that are internalized through habitual learning) are able to reconcile 
themselves with the other desires of human nature better than external laws that rely on 
coercion. Internalized laws come closest to the ideal of liberty as voluntary obedience to 
a general framework of laws that provide us with information about our social 
environment.
Smith's Rule of Law
Smith's understanding of rule of law is quite close to the internal rule of law that 
is the result of our evolutionary past. Smith focuses on natural moral emotions that form 
the basis for other levels of law in his Theory o f Moral Sentiments (TMS). He also 
discusses the influence of custom on the moral sentiments, and the influence of the moral 
sentiments on custom.
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Smith argues in TMS for a kind of law that comes from nature, which will be 
quite similar to the kind of natural or “internal” law for which I argue later in the chapter. 
It will also bear some resemblance to Hayek's understanding of natural laws. For Smith, 
the moral sentiments are those natural feelings that regulate our actions. They are put in 
place by nature (9 ,128-130n, 76-77n), and this nature seems to have done this for the 
happiness of man and the order of society (9, 86,116, 166). The key moral sentiment for 
Smith is sympathy, which he defines as “fellow-feeling with any passion whatsoever” 
(10) and as distinguished from pity and compassion, which are fellow-feelings with grief 
and sorrow only. This sympathy, however, is given by the spectator in relation to the 
propriety of the emotions of the agent. We have less sympathy with a man prostrate with 
grief over a small loss, since such a display seems improper to us. We decide on the 
propriety or impropriety of a man's emotions and actions in accord with what we 
ourselves would feel in a similar situation. Thus, the imagination is integral to the 
development of sympathy and all the moral emotions.
We go further in determining the propriety and impropriety of our own actions or 
the actions of another when we appeal to the “impartial spectator,” who is the spectator 
who, unlike us, is not influenced by the particulars of the moment, but who judges our 
actions impartially, from a distance. How precisely we arrive at these impartial 
judgments is unclear from Smith's account, but it seems to be a combination of 
imagination, sentiments like sympathy, and reason (26, 189, 319-320). The impartial 
spectator is important for both the spectator and the agent himself as a way of judging the 
propriety of the sentiments of both parties. The spectator looks to the impartial spectator 
to determine whether the behavior of the agent deserves our approbation, while the agent
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looks to the impartial spectator and attempts to tone down his own distress or enjoyment 
to a level that can be shared by others. For, as Smith himself points out, “mankind never 
conceives... that degree of passion which naturally animates the person principally 
involved” (21). The agent meanwhile desires and requires the sympathy of those around 
him, for Smith sees such sympathy as the key bond which ties men together (86, 224), 
and which “enlivens joy and alleviates grief’ (14).
Thus, for Smith, human relations from the beginning are founded upon an 
imagination that allows us to place ourselves in the situation of another, and feelings 
which then result from such placement. These feelings are bounded by a notion of 
propriety, which seems to be limited by the feelings of the mass of mankind rather than 
by any particular natural law. The moral sentiments are therefore “naturally 
conventional,” if one can understand them in this way. They are somewhat variable in 
that they can be manipulated by custom or other human contrivances, but will be 
generally stable in that they are the feelings of most of the people most of the time, 
because they are put in place by nature. Each person's understanding seems further 
linked to some understanding of the impartial spectator or the internal equivalent, the 
“man within the breast” which seems to be our conscience, that tells us how we ought to 
act in a given situation to procure the good opinion of our fellow man.
That these sentiments form the basis for any kind of law is clear from Smith's 
own discussion of the role these sentiments and passions play in regulating human 
affairs. He argues,
All general rules are commonly denominated laws; thus the general rules which 
bodies observe in the communication of motion, are called the laws of motion.
But those general rules which our moral faculties observe in approving or 
condemning whatever sentiment or action is subjected to their examination, may
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much more justly be denominated such.... They have a greater resemblance to 
what are properly called laws, those general rules which the sovereign lays down 
to direct the conduct of his subjects. Like them they are rules to direct the free 
actions of men: they are prescribed most surely by a lawful superior, and are 
attended too with the sanction of rewards and punishments” (165-166).
The major elements of law for Smith seem to be that they must be general rules, that
guide men's actions rather than coerce them, that they are legitimately laid down, and
that rewards and punishments accompany them. If this be Smith's general conception of
law, then the moral sentiments certainly fall into the category of laws, though perhaps the
most general and most ill-defined, as he himself admits. It is for this reason that we need
custom and positive law to fill in whatever gaps there might be. However, in filling in
the gaps Smith admits that we risk distorting our natural sentiments and creating
unnatural systems that go against both the happiness of mankind and the order of society,
and even at times, virtue and justice broadly understood.
The purpose of these laws, the happiness of mankind and the order of society, are
not dissimilar to what we will see Hayek arguing is the function of law. For Hayek, the
creation of a spontaneous order relies on there being understood rules that guide men and
give them knowledge on which to base their decisions. Hayek says little about the
happiness of mankind, however, at least insofar as he seems less concerned with the
happiness of mankind per se as with the general freedom from coercion. Smith seems
concerned with the happiness of the individual, but the relationship between the
happiness of the individual and the happiness of society becomes problematic for Smith,
especially when we compare what he says in the Theory o f  Moral Sentiments with the
Wealth o f Nations. However, at the very least, Smith argues that we are naturally social,
and that nature has instilled within us moral sentiments that guide our actions with others
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and which are the basis for affection and the emotional needs of human beings.
Again, Smith sees the ultimate basis for laws in the moral sentiments. As a result 
of this, he is suspicious of moral “systems” that attempt to derive law from reason, rather 
than understanding the link between the sentiments and law. This is supported by his 
argument that positive law should arise out of natural sentiments of justice. He argues, 
“The general maxims of morality are formed, like all other general maxims, from 
experience and induction. We observe in a great variety of particular cases what pleases 
or displeases our moral faculties, what these approve and disapprove of, and by induction 
from this experience, we establish those general rules” (319). Thus, the only way in 
which we determine right from wrong is through what our moral sentiments say about 
particular experiences. We can then generalize from these experiences toward more 
universal, abstract laws, but these laws will always be in need of explication and 
application back down to particular circumstances. Smith calls these more generalized 
versions of the moral sentiments “general rules,” and argues that “When these general 
rules, indeed, have been formed, when they are universally acknowledged and 
established, by the concurring sentiments of mankind, we frequently appeal to them as to 
the standards of judgment, in debating concerning the degree of praise or blame that is 
due to certain actions of a complicated and dubious nature” (160). These general rules 
then form the basis for law, both customary and positive. In fact, one might well equate 
these general rules with customary law, since they are the internalized rules with which 
we are habituated in childhood, and which form the basis for our conformity to a 
particular society (160). Ultimately, it is important that for Smith the ultimate grounding 
of general rules of morality and moral judgments comes not from reason, but from the
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sentiments (320).
The foundation of law in our moral sentiments, and the importance of particular 
circumstances for the expression of those moral sentiments, makes the creation of any 
rationalistic system of law or morality necessarily suspect. If law is based in our moral 
sentiments, and those sentiments are the result of our reactions to particular 
circumstances, then there will be inconsistencies and conflicts between those sentiments 
and other sentiments. The fact that our moral sentiments are reactions to particular 
circumstances makes an axiomatic system of universal norms impossible to attain. Smith 
focuses on a system of generalized laws that arise from the aggregation of particular 
experiences, and “when those different beneficent affections happen to draw different 
ways, to determine by any precise rules in what cases we ought to comply with the one, 
and in what with the other, is, perhaps, altogether impossible” (226). The reconciliation 
of these conflicts “must be left altogether to the decision of the man within the breast, the 
supposed impartial spectator, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct” (226-227).
Thus, the impartial spectator, or that ability of mankind to draw away from one's own 
interests in a particular case and judge of his own sentiments and those of others, is a first 
step toward a prudential jurisprudence that takes both general rules derived from human 
moral sentiments and the particulars of time and place into account. Such a 
jurisprudence is necessarily more complicated and less precise than an abstract system 
based solely on reason, but it will be more true to human life and the nature on which 
that life is based.
For Smith then, the role of positive law is an uncertain one. Though positive law 
deserves the “greatest authority” it is also the most liable to go against the natural
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sentiments though it is based on them (341). He points out that “Every system of 
positive law may be regarded as a more or less imperfect attempt towards a system of 
natural jurisprudence, or towards an enumeration of the particular rules of justice” (340). 
The general rules arising from the moral sentiments need to be enforced, lest every man 
be a judge in his own case (340), and they must therefore be outlined and made into law 
that can be enforced. However, in the process of creating law we must be somewhat 
careful not to move too far away from our natural moral sentiments, or at least we must 
be aware why we are moving away from them when necessary. Because the moral 
sentiments are somewhat changeable depending on mood and situation (157), and tend to 
be “loose and inaccurate” (174, 327), they will often require a separate enforcement 
mechanism through the power of the commonwealth.
The primary danger of the “man of system,” or he who desires a rational system 
of law, is that such systems tend to go against the moral sentiments and lead to 
unfortunate tendencies. As he points out, “Sometimes what is called the constitution of 
the state, that is, the interest of the government; sometimes the interest of particular 
orders of men who tyrannize the government, warp the positive laws of the country from 
what natural justice would prescribe” (340-341). He further argues that positive law is, 
at least from what we can learn from existing states, incapable of precisely coinciding 
with natural justice (340). To some extent, this is due to the conflict between man's 
moral sentiments and certain natural outcomes, especially in the case of capitalistic 
systems. Hayek points out a similar trend, and it is important to take a slight detour to 
explain this apparent inconsistency.
Smith makes the claim at one point that the laws of nature differ from the laws of
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man as derived from our moral sentiments, and yet these sentiments are put in place by 
nature. This conflict is especially true in the case of distribution of “prosperity and 
adversity” (167), whereby we feel that one's moral character ought to play a role in his 
success, even if his effort does not demand such an outcome. He points out that 
“...human laws, the consequences of human sentiments, forfeit the life and the estate of 
the industrious and cautious traitor” (168). Thus, our natural sentiments tend to favor 
virtue over industry (at least when they are at odds with one another), and Smith seems 
ambivalent about the wisdom of such a course. It seems obvious then that for Smith, the 
basis of laws in the moral sentiments can, at times, be somewhat at odds with the basis of 
capitalistic, industrial society. It is unclear, however, at least from this discussion, what 
the alternative is. Smith seems to argue that there needs to be a separation between these 
two different laws when he says, “The rules which [nature] follows are fit for her, those 
which [man] follows for him: but both are calculated to promote the same great end, the 
order of the world, and the perfection and happiness of human nature” (168). Yet it is 
unclear how this separation between the natural outcome of industry and the natural 
human desire to reward virtue ought to be reconciled in human law.
This is, perhaps, part and parcel of what is often termed the “Adam Smith 
problem,” or the connection between his arguments for industry in the Wealth o f Nations 
and his arguments for moral sentiments in TMS. It should be pointed out that both these 
laws, however, seem to support the happiness of mankind as Smith points out, in that the 
natural moral sentiments reward virtue and thus prevent men from taking advantage of 
each other, at least insofar as their weak enforcement mechanisms allow. Yet, the natural 
rewards of industry even apart from virtue lead to civilization and the comfortable relief
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of man's estate (to use Bacon's phrase)'. Thus, the two may necessarily be in a kind of 
uncomfortable coexistence, whereby the natural sentiments of man control vice at the 
level of individual discourse, while the course of nature provides for mankind as a whole 
by rewarding industry. Perhaps the key then is to generally support the industry of man 
unless it be attached to gross deceit, fraud, or other dishonest methods of gaining wealth 
that go against what is necessary to the preservation of the state. The role of positive law 
is narrowly defined as preventing force or fraud. It is left to the moral sentiments to 
handle less obvious improprieties and misdemeanors, or more generally, any social 
interactions that fall outside of the definition of force and fraud.
Getting back to Smith's overall theory of law, his understanding of law seems to 
agree with Hayek's in that there exists a problem of knowledge regarding the particulars 
of time and place that prevents “men of systems” from creating a useful rational 
framework of law: “Some general, even systematical, idea of the perfection of policy and 
law, may no doubt be necessary for directing the views of the statesman. But to insist 
upon establishing, and upon establishing all at once, and in spite of all opposition, every 
thing which that idea may seem to require, must often be the highest degree of 
arrogance” (234).
The answer to this problem might be to rely on customary law rather than positive 
law. Smith seems to support such a move. As he points out in the section on custom in 
TMS, “the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation, are founded on the 
strongest and most vigorous passions of human nature; and though they may be
1 This is related to the tension Hayek points out between the free society and the just society. The latter 
necessarily interferes with the existence o f the former since it requires continual manipulation o f the 
market, thus preventing free association between individuals. The enforcement o f virtue or justice 
must, for both Smith and Hayek, be left to the informal social realm.
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somewhat warpt, cannot be entirely perverted” (200). Though custom can certainly warp 
our moral sentiments to a certain extent, it will generally be in line with those sentiments, 
and can often enhance them, as Smith points out: “When custom and fashion coincide 
with the natural principles of right and wrong, they heighten the delicacy of our 
sentiments, and increase our abhorrence for every thing which approaches to evil” (200).
I will go into more detail concerning how customary law can operate as a buffer between 
our natural inclinations and positive laws later in this chapter.
Hayek's Rule of Law
Hayek, in line with all classical liberal thinkers, distinguishes between liberty and 
license. For Hayek, rule of law is integral to liberty, and provides the framework for 
action that makes liberty possible. In this section I explain Hayek's understanding of rule 
of law, both as an external framework in which individuals make decisions, and as the 
internal framework of rules, norms, manners, and mores that support the external 
framework. While Hayek is much less focused on the natural basis for moral actions 
than Smith, he does offer a kind of internal rule of law in the form of habituation and 
education that forms a link between the innate moral emotions and rationally constructed 
positive law.
For Hayek, rule of law is an answer to the problem of knowledge. As he points 
out throughout his work (1994, 80-81; 1979, 133-135; 1948/1980, 77-91; 1960, 156-159; 
and elsewhere), knowledge is necessarily dispersed among many people in different
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circumstances, and any one individual's knowledge will necessarily be incomplete. For 
this reason, he supports spontaneous order rather than top-down control. It is also for 
this reason that rule of law becomes absolutely necessary for liberty. Rule o f law 
provides, for Hayek, a framework of abstract, general rules that do nothing more than 
improve the individual's ability to predict how others will behave. For Hayek, “The 
ideal type of law... provides merely additional information to be taken into account in the 
decision of the actor” (150). Rule of law is a way of increasing individuals' knowledge, 
especially in the realm of predicting the behavior of other, often unknown, individuals.
In The Road to Serfdom, his most accessible work, Hayek argues that at heart rule of law 
means that “government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced 
beforehand -  rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority 
will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on 
the basis of this knowledge” (80). Again, the central role of knowledge and decision­
making, as opposed to any direct moral arguments, is obvious.
Freedom for Hayek is completely dependent on a proper understanding of rule of 
law. His definitions of freedom revolve around being generally free from the will of 
another within a framework of abstract rules that provide guidance without unnecessarily 
restricting the ends toward which we aim. He argues in the Constitution o f  Liberty that 
“...freedom does mean and can mean only that what we may do is not dependent on the 
approval of any person or authority and is limited only by the same abstract rules that 
apply equally to all” (1960, 155). He argues a few pages earlier that “The conception of 
freedom under the law that is the chief concern of this book rests on the contention that 
when we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules laid down irrespective of their
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application to us, we are not subject to another man's will and are therefore free” (153).
His general idea of the rule of law is not much different from the traditional 
understanding of rule of law as distinguished from rule of men, whereby the laws apply 
equally to everyone. As Hayek states, “the rules must apply to those who lay them down 
and those who apply them -  that is, to the government as well as the governed -  and that 
nobody has the power to grant exceptions” (155). Hayek distinguishes between rule of 
law and arbitrary government, which distinguishes him in some ways from previous 
thinkers. In the first place, his emphasis on epistemological concerns rather than 
morality or justice is relatively unheard of outside of the classical liberal tradition. 
Second, Hayek, like most modems, eschews talk of ultimate ends of government, instead 
focusing on the ways in which government operates: “The distinction we have drawn 
before between the creation of a permanent framework of laws within which the 
productive activity is guided by individual decisions and the direction of economic 
activity by a central authority is thus really a particular case of the more general 
distinction between the Rule of Law and arbitrary government” (1994, 81). Hayek's 
ultimate point is that the former is more in line with the common good than the latter, but 
he focuses on the proximate mechanisms, not the intentions of the rulers. Indeed, one of 
Hayek's primary arguments is that good intentions (such as social equality) often lead us 
toward despotism. Thus, instead of rooting his idea of good government in the intentions 
of the rulers, Hayek roots it in the methods by which government acts.
Hayek's approach to law differs as well from the legal positivism of Hobbes in 
that he focuses on nomos, or customary law, rather than thesis, or rationally constructed 
positive law. For Hayek, the rule of law is understood as the rule of a particular kind of
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law, nomos. Nomos is the customary law of a people, sometimes called common law, a 
kind of law that deals with the actions of individuals toward one another (sometimes 
called private law) rather than governmental organization (public law), which Hayek 
terms “thesis.” Nomos differs from thesis not only in the origin of the laws, but also in 
their content. Nomos is primarily concerned with what Hayek terms “rules of just 
conduct” (127), while thesis, or measures of government, or “particular ends of 
authority” (120), or commands (126), is generally concerned with actions that produce a 
specific end, like taxation. The proper end of taxation is providing necessary revenue for 
governmental operation. The proper end of the nomos is no particular end, but the 
creation of a spontaneous order in which many individuals interact according to known 
rules while pursuing their own ends. As Hayek points out, the distinction is not perfect. 
He argues, “A statute (thesis) passed by a legislature may have all the attributes of a 
nomos, and is likely to have them if deliberately modeled after the nomos. But it need 
not, and in most of the cases where legislation is wanted it cannot have this character” 
(127). One of the primary differences between nomos and thesis is that “a rule of 
conduct [nomos] cannot be 'carried out' or 'executed' as one carries out an instruction....
A rule of conduct merely limits the range of permitted action and usually does not 
determine a particular action; and what it prescribes is never accomplished but remains a 
standing obligation on all” (127). Thus, nomos and thesis differ in their origins (custom 
vs. legislation), their purpose (creation of a framework for action vs. execution of a 
particular task), and their form (generalized rules rather than direct commands).
Hayek's primary concern is with nomos, and particularly with preventing thesis 
from encroaching on nomos or the customary order, as well as preventing thesis from
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interfering with nomos through positive laws passed for particular social ends, such as 
social equality. These concerns are best left to the spontaneous order, not legislated 
mandates. However, this list of types of law is not exhaustive. For Hayek there is at 
least one more important level at which law operates, and this level tends to support 
customary law or nomos.
The third level of law for Hayek is one of natural values, similar in some ways to 
Smith's moral sentiments but which he sees as often at odds with customary law rather 
than supporting it. Hayek is less clear than Smith on the connection between innate or 
natural “internal” rules like the moral emotions and this greater, external framework. 
Hayek, following in the footsteps of Burke, generally eschews discussions of natural 
rights, or of natural inclinations in general. In fact, he argues that much of external rule 
of law is an attempt to control innate traits that are maladaptive in large commercial 
societies: “From that stage [that of small bands of hunter-gatherers] practically all 
advance had to be achieved by infringing or repressing some of the innate rules and 
replacing them by new ones which made the co-ordination of activities of larger groups 
possible” (1979,161). I discuss why his view here is flawed later in the chapter, while I 
contend at the same time that his rejection of natural desires as support for a liberal 
system does not contradict the overall argument that evolutionary theory supports his 
conception of rule of law.
Perhaps Hayek's best statement on internal rules of conduct occurs in The 
Constitution o f  Liberty: “We understand one another and get along with one another, are 
able to act successfully on our plans, because, most of the time, members of our 
civilization conform to unconscious patterns of conduct, show a regularity in their
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actions that is not the result of commands or coercion, often not even of any conscious 
adherence to known rules, but of firmly established habits and traditions” (1960, 62). 
These “unconscious patterns of conduct” are differentiated from Smith's moral 
sentiments largely because Hayek attributes them to tradition and custom, rather than 
nature. Thus, one primary difference between Smith and Hayek is the origin of the 
internalized rules that they see as so important. Hayek relies on traditional laws that are 
internalized through habituation, while Smith concentrates on innate moral sentiments 
that all humans share. Moreover, Smith's moral sentiments are more generalized 
emotions, while the unconscious rules Hayek refers to seem to be somewhat more 
specific manners and mores -  actual rules rather than impulses rooted in sympathy.
These traditions and customs that become internalized through habituation and education 
form the basis for Hayek's preference for customary rules and norms over positive law.
A healthy society will always rely more on voluntary submission to rules rather than the 
coercive power of the state, and this voluntary submission is gained through the gradual 
evolution of customary laws rather than the implementation of rationalistic positive law. 
Hayek similarly argues, “freedom has never worked without deeply ingrained moral 
beliefs and that coercion can be reduced to a minimum only where individuals can be 
expected as a rule to conform voluntarily to certain principles” (1960, 62).
Hayek's emphasis on tradition or customary norms rather than positive laws is 
understandable given his suspicion of centralized, powerful government, and his 
argument for the voluntary obedience of a people that is at the core of classical liberal 
theories. His preference for tradition rather than nature has roots that are less clear. This 
preference seems to be rooted in large part in Hayek's distrust of innate emotions like
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Smith's moral sentiments, which he seems to see as supporting socialistic projects (a 
point which, as we saw above, Smith also recognizes). As he argues in a series of 
lectures titled Knowledge, Evolution, and Society, “In a sense, we are all socialists. We 
are still governed by feelings that are based on what was necessary in the small group of 
known people among whom each had to aim at fulfilling the needs of persons he knew.... 
Our instincts still tell us to strive to serve the known needs of known people and that our 
pleasure in life is derived from the consciousness that we follow a set of common 
purposes with people whom we know and who share our environment” (1983,41). He 
goes on to say that “Our whole modem society, based on far-ranging division of labour, 
is, however, essentially dependent on two factors that conflict with our natural instincts” 
(42). The first, he argues, is that modem commercial societies rely on the ability to serve 
the common good while following the “impersonal signals of the market.” The second 
factor is that “for this purpose we can follow our own individual aims with freely chosen 
associates and are not bound to serve the concrete ends of the group into which we were 
bom” (42). Certainly there is an extent to which the emotions required in a small, closely 
related, tight-knit hunter-gatherer society are not the same as those which dominate in a 
large, commercial society.
Hayek seems to underestimate the fact that even in large-scale commercial 
societies, people generally seek to create smaller communities of neighborhoods, 
families, and other networks in which these “socialistic” tendencies are necessary. He 
also seems to overestimate the sociality of these emotions when he argues that rationally 
constructed societies are connected to “the feeling that one ought not to work for one's 
individual aims but will feel the supreme elation that a person can experience only if he
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joins with his known fellows in the pursuit of some known, common purpose” (ibid), or 
that “what we call the natural instincts are precisely the instincts which we adopted 
during our experience in a small bands of a few dozen people, a society where everybody 
knew his fellow members, where everybody served the same purpose” (55).
Certainly humans are naturally disposed to cooperate, as evidence in the rest of 
this chapter suggests. However, it is not so clear that this is the only motivator for most 
humans, and commonsense experience of the world tells us that often we struggle 
between cooperation and defection, between our social emotions and our individualistic 
impulses. Hayek tends to ignore the naturally individualistic side of human nature that 
makes the market so successful to begin with, focusing instead on the socialistic side of 
human nature. Why is it that the spontaneous order, so little understood, works so well? 
It seems that it does in large part because humans do naturally desire to pursue their own 
ends and act with views toward both the good of their neighbors and the profit motive. 
Certainly, socialistic societies can manipulate and foster the social impulses of man, just 
as capitalistic thinkers rely on the individualistic side. But, as I will argue throughout 
this dissertation, it is only in a liberal society with rule of law, private property and a 
private sphere that both of these impulses in human nature find their most complete 
fulfillment. Modem liberal societies channel our individualistic impulses into the 
market, promoting competition on a scale that would not be possible if it were 
consciously controlled, while at the same time allowing for the existence of small 
communities, neighborhoods, and families that support the socialistic impulses of human 
nature and in which those impulses can thrive without interfering with the impersonal 
market mechanism.
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Hayek's desire to disprove socialism leads him to overestimate some parts of 
human nature while underestimating other parts. This helps explain why he shifts away 
from natural moral sentiments, unlike his predecessor Smith. He argues, “I think we all 
know that it is more pleasant to know that one works for the needs of one's immediate 
familiar environment or for a common purpose with our known fellows rather than 
pursue alone one's individual ends, that is, to pursue one's own profit irrespective of what 
one's immediate neighbors do” (42). This statement demonstrates the Hayekian problem. 
On the one hand, he seems to argue that our natural impulses make us inherently 
socialistic, while the liberal society requires the vanquishing of this nature. Yet 
elsewhere, especially in the Constitution o f Liberty, he argues for local liberties and the 
creation of small communities that rely on self-governance rather than centralized 
control. Liberal society does not and should not promote a simple-minded pursuance of 
“one's own profit irrespective of what one's immediate neighbors do.” In fact, it is in 
large part the complexity of the liberal system, one in which small communities 
cooperate consciously to promote the well-being of the group while at the same time 
participating somewhat unconsciously in the greater market, that allows the spontaneous 
order to flourish.
It is generally the habit of philosophers to attack most strongly that which they 
see as the greatest danger, and perhaps this is Hayek's problem. In attempting to prove 
that socialist societies are less efficient and antithetical to human liberty properly 
understood, he finds socialism in human nature and argues that we must overcome that 
nature as a result. He focuses instead on tradition and custom at the expense of the 
natural moral sentiments. Yet, without basing these traditions and customs on anything
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other than the unconscious creation of man, he becomes a mere conventionalist, one who 
has a hard time making moral judgments about those societies. It is perhaps as a result of 
this that Hayek's argument overall tends to be based on efficiency rather than morality.
He rarely makes normative claims, pointing out instead that capitalism simply works 
better than the alternative. Even leaving aside his problematic conventionalism, the 
biggest problem with his rejection of nature is that it is rooted in an oversimplification of 
human nature that tends to undermine his own argument. It is well-known that humans 
are both individualistic and social, and that even in hunter-gatherer societies, there are 
frequently times when the good of the individual conflicts with the good of the group, 
and it is not always that the group-good wins out (Lee 1993; Shostak 1983). By focusing 
on human nature as it actually is, Hayek could have derived valuable support for liberal 
institutions while basing his philosophy on more solid ground than merely conventional 
truths.
Another reason behind his dislike of natural explanations for political phenomena 
lies in what he sees as the rejection of custom by sociobiologists. In his discussion of 
“The errors of sociobiology” (1979), he takes issue with a comment by a sociobiologist 
that there are only two sources of values -  either innate (genetically determined) or 
rationally constructed. This is obviously untrue, and much of the argument in this 
chapter is that there are at least three levels of values, all of which work together (and 
sometimes against one another) to produce a kind of order. Hayek's criticism is therefore 
valid. He argues, “Culture is neither natural nor artificial, neither genetically 
transmitted nor rationally designed’ (155). However, the overlooking of custom by 
sociobiology hardly refutes the positive arguments of that field. Indeed, many modem
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sociobiologists study on the close interaction between genes and culture, pointing out the 
genetic roots of customary law, as well as the influence of behavior on genetic evolution 
(Jablonka and Lamb 2006; Wilson 1998; Richerson and Boyd 2006; Ridley 2004).
What Hayek ignores in general is that many of the laws present in advanced 
cultures are those that support these natural or innate tendencies. Certainly there is a 
certain amount of channeling of “primitive” desires that needs to occur. However, laws 
that support child-care, family, property rights, marriage, and other evolutionarily 
important goods exist in roughly the same form as they do in hunter-gatherer societies.
At the very least, however different the forms, the intent is the same: to preserve the 
family, protect parent-child relationships, protect some understanding of a private sphere, 
and in general to create a framework in which our natural cooperative instincts can 
flourish without unnecessary coercion.
Despite Hayek's rejection of nature, his argument is still compatible with an 
argument basing classical liberal institutions on natural grounds. The importance of 
custom and tradition is recognized in evolutionary explanations; and custom, as I will 
argue later in this chapter, actually provides an important buffer between natural and 
positive laws, operating as a way of preserving flexibility in human action. Moreover, 
the similarities between Hayek's cultural evolution and biological evolution are obvious, 
and the two not unsurprisingly interact in important ways. Understanding how the two 
interact requires that we accept that cultural evolution is impacted by natural desires and 
impulses, and that these natural desires form the basis from which we then adapt to our 
environments. Much of the variation in human cultures is “shallow” variation of means, 
rather than variation in the ends of culture itself. Understanding these universal ends
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provides support for Hayek's arguments for tradition and customary law. Both Hayek 
and Smith share a focus on internalized rules of conduct, whatever their origin. These 
internalized rules provide an alternative to rationally constructed positive law.
Hayek's understanding of the importance of customary law draws heavily from 
an evolutionary conception of law as gradually evolved through a long process of 
selective retention and rejection of rules and norms that operate as an adaptation to local 
circumstances (1960, 57). For Hayek the best laws serve as adaptations to time and place 
that occur over time, allowing human sentiments themselves to adapt to the rules and 
norms, and allows both to be internalized together, thus limiting external coercion.
Hayek distinguishes between the rationally constructed positive law favored by the 
French tradition and the gradually evolved customary law (or common law) favored by 
the British. For Hayek much of the benefit of customary law comes from its non-rational 
character, whereby law is not trusted to the wisdom of one man, or even to the wisdom of 
one generation, but is entrusted to the collective wisdom of numerous generations and 
individuals who are acting only semi-consciously. The good and the bad is then sorted 
out by a natural process of retention of beneficial laws and rejection of those that do not 
work, generally unaided by rational human contemplation. Such a system is superior to 
others because it is gradual, allows for innovation without the dangers of radical changes, 
and takes advantage of the cooperative endeavors of many individuals whose combined 
knowledge of particular circumstances is much greater than the knowledge any one man 
can have, however wise.
There are three primaiy benefits of customary law for Hayek. The first is that 
such law secures voluntary obedience rather than requiring coercion and that voluntary
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obedience to the laws is one of the primary facets of a free society. As he points out, 
“There probably never has existed a genuine belief in freedom, and there has certainly 
been no successful attempt to operate a free society, without a genuine reverence for 
grown institutions, for customs and habits and 'all those securities of liberty which arise 
from regulation of long prescription and ancient ways'” (61). Such customary rules tie a 
people together, creating a love of law and of country that makes much coercive force 
unnecessary. These customary rules, moreover, are internalized at a young age and thus 
coexist next to more instinctive rules of conduct, and it is left up to the individual how to 
deal with conflicts between the two, rather than repressing one for fear of the punitive 
power wielded by positive laws.
The second benefit of customary law for Hayek is that such law allows for 
gradual innovation by individuals who believe that change is worth the social 
consequences that follow. Just as in biological evolution, in customary or cultural 
evolution, variation is needed for adaptation to occur. There is no evolution of either sort 
unless there exists the variation on which selective pressures can act. Hayek argues that 
it is, in fact, often “desirable that rules should be observed only in most instances and that 
the individual should be able to transgress them when it seems to him worthwhile to 
incur the odium which this will cause” (63). In the case of positive law, such 
transgressions do not lead to innovation. Any breaking of the law is punished, and the 
law continues to stand. In customary law, the breaking of the law leads to social 
consequences that can be dealt with by brave individuals who see the need for innovation 
at that particular time. This variation then acts to gradually change the law being broken 
itself, either reforming the law or making the punishment less severe over time, assuming
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that other individuals, understanding the benefits of the original transgression, follow 
suit. Should society “agree” that such a transgression is not in the best interest of society, 
the rule will continue to stand, and the original transgressor will reap the consequences of 
disobedience. This system allows for significantly more variation than positive law, 
whereby the law can be changed only by the rational decision of the legislator, and 
whereby the punishments are often much more coercive then mere social disapproval, 
thus making innovation less possible, and changes to the law sudden rather than gradual.
The third and final benefit of customary law for Hayek is related to the first two 
in that such law allows for gradual variation and experimentation without the shock of 
sudden changes occasioned by positive law. Again as we see in biological evolution, 
macromutations (or mutations that result in large changes to an organism) are rarely 
beneficial to the organism, and in fact are usually fatal (Futuyma 1998, 680). The same 
can be said for cultural evolution. Gradual small changes allow individuals to 
experiment with different combinations of customs and traditions while preserving the 
stability of the law that is necessary for voluntary obedience. Positive law, when it is 
changed, is necessarily changed all at once, which leads to an instability of law that is 
undesirable, and which can result in unforeseen consequences in the same way that 
drastic changes to an organism's DNA often lead to unexpected results. Thus, positive 
law is both less flexible than customary law and therefore more unstable in that when it is 
changed it must be changed all at once.
Hayek's last major argument for customary law is that what it means to be human 
comes from these gradually evolved moral rules rather than from reason or from instinct 
(1960, 62; 1979,166-167). Our instincts, he points out, are usually shared by animals on
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some level, and the coercive force of positive law brings out little more than our fear of 
punishment, again something we share with other animals. Human cooperative 
endeavors, on the other hand, are based around a framework of customary laws that rely 
neither on “base” instincts nor on fear, but on the attachments of a people to each other, 
and the cooperation which habitual obedience to unspoken rules of conduct allows.
Hayek makes the argument clear when he says, “We understand one another and get 
along with one another, are able to act successfully on our plans, because, most of the 
time, members of our civilization conform to unconscious patterns of conduct, show a 
regularity in their actions that is not the result of commands or coercion, often not even 
of any conscious adherence to known rules, but of firmly established habits and 
traditions” (62). Thus, the flourishing cooperation that is one of the hallmarks of the 
human species is the result, not of instinct or positive law, but to the human ability to 
internalize habitual norms of conduct. As I argue later, however, customary law provides 
a buffer between natural law and positive law that tends to moderate the effects of both.
Hayek's overall point is that free society is not possible without customary laws 
and traditions which bind a people together, creating a framework for action that permits 
some gradual innovation while at the same time maintaining the predictability and lack 
of coercion that arises from voluntary obedience to habituated and internalized norms of 
conduct. While Smith bases his thought on the moral sentiments and Hayek bases his on 
customary norms of behavior, both agree that what allows human societies to flourish is 
rarely positive law, but more internalized levels of law that comes from a combination of 
nature and habit, instinct and tradition. Customary law secures the voluntary obedience 
of a people, and provides the necessary framework for action which is integral to free
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society. As I will discuss later in the chapter, customary law tends to support natural 
instincts, and provides a valuable middle ground between natural law and the more 
coercive, less flexible positive law. The existence of natural human instincts that lead to 
strong desires requires that legislation be carefully adapted to human nature. Since it is 
unlikely that any human has the requisite knowledge to achieve such an adaptation, the 
best way to achieve the adaptation of law to human nature and to particular 
circumstances is to trust in the gradual change of customary laws. That we have a human 
nature that creates an internal rule of law is the subject of the next section.
Evolutionary Rule of Law
Evolutionary law is generally most concerned with internal rule of law -  that is, 
the innate impulses and desires that control our actions and set up an emotional 
framework in which we operate. However, it is also true that these internal rules support 
the creation of external rules. All human societies have, in addition to universal moral 
emotions, more generalized, abstract, and somewhat consciously understood laws and 
rules that act as the more filled-out expression of those moral emotions. Just as parental 
care is an innate desire in humans, so all societies are concerned in some ways with 
written or unwritten rules that formalize aspects of that parental love. In the following, I 
will lay out evidence from evolutionary psychology, game theory, and experimental 
economics which supports the idea that humans have innate moral emotions that guide 
their actions. I then argue that these moral emotions provide the basis for external rules 
and laws that further formalize the framework and help adapt those moral emotions to the
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particular cultural and environmental circumstances. I conclude by arguing that the 
interplay between this internal rule of law and external rule of law supports Hayek and 
Smith's arguments for customary law over strict positive law (though obviously some 
positive laws are necessary). I also argue that such customary law supports local liberties 
and self-rule, another facet of classical liberal theory.
Obviously to a certain extent any innate tendencies or desires can be understood 
as a kind of rule of law, since all of them provide a framework in which we act. Here I 
discuss those innate tendencies that have evolutionary import and which bear on how 
men treat each other in social situations. The sociality of these innate tendencies is 
important since rule of law is, inherently, the answer to the problem of sociality. Thus, 
determining whether there are innate rules or dispositions or tendencies that guide our 
social interactions provides support for the concept of an internal rule of law. More 
particularly, my concept of an internal rule of law focuses on those instances in which 
humans in social situations act within a framework of general rules supported by moral 
emotions demonstrating a concern for both oneself and the others in the social situation.
There is ample evidence from evolutionary psychology, experimental economics, 
and cognitive neuroscience that humans have innate tendencies, especially in social 
situations. Cosmides and Tooby's research on cheater-detection is probably the best 
known research that argues that humans have adapted responses to social contracts. 
Cosmides and Tooby argue that humans are better at selection tasks that involve 
detecting those who are breaking social rules than at other kinds of logically equivalent 
tasks (Cosmides and Tooby 1992, 163-228). While there are questions regarding this 
research, most commonly concerning its assumption of “massive modularity” (Hagen
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2005,162), there is ample evidence from other areas of the study of human behavior that 
demonstrate that however modular the brain, humans are naturally concerned with and 
attentive to the rules and regulations of social conduct.
Evidence from the ultimatum game (Camerer 2003; Sanfey et al. 2003; Nowak et 
al. 2000; Henrich, 2000) suggests that we have emotional responses to unfair divisions of 
goods that can be recorded with the use of fMRI and other tools of neuroeconomics and 
neuroscience. The logic underlying the ultimatum game comes from rational choice 
theory, which predicts that players should accept any division of resources since any 
division, even extremely unfair ones, leaves players somewhat better off than before. For 
example, in a game in which $100 is to be split between two players, the player accepting 
the offer should accept any split, from one cent to the full amount, since rationally, even 
one cent is better than nothing at all. What research finds, however, is that humans are 
often more concerned with the fairness of a proposal, and will reject obviously unfair 
proposals even if  it means losing money. Moreover, evidence suggests that players 
understand this tendency, and generally make fair offers even when it might be rational 
to make an unfair one. Sanfey et al. (2003) look at the role of emotion in decision 
making, arguing that humans have both rational and emotional reactions to unfair 
proposals. The authors found that, as is usual in ultimatum games, players accepted fair 
proposals, and acceptance decreases as proposals become less even. They further note 
that the area of the brain that seems primarily concerned is that of the anterior insula, a 
part of the brain usually associated with emotional response. This agrees with players' 
own understanding of why they reject unfair offers, which they usually argue is the result 
of anger at being offered obviously unfair proposals. Nowak et al. (2000) argue for an
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evolutionary rationale behind the apparently irrational response of those playing the 
game. In their case, they offer the possibility that humans, naturally concerned about 
their reputation, will be concerned with appearing either unfair or as accepting of low 
offers. In either case, those who make low offers and those who accept low offers, the 
damage to reputation would be clear as the first are avoided for being unjust participants, 
while the latter may be sought out by unjust participants as being easy targets.
There does seem to be some cross-cultural variation in these patterns. As Henrich 
(2000) points out, there seems to be a difference between Westernized societies and less 
industrialized societies. In his study with the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon, 
Henrich found that most participants accepted even unfair offers, and expected the 
proposers to make unfair offers, while the proposers expected the accepters to accept 
almost any offers. The mean for industrialized societies hovered around fifty percent for 
most offers, while the mean for the Machiguenga was closer to 25%. However, it is at 
least somewhat important that there were very few extremely unfair offers (such as those 
less than 10%) among any of the groups, which seems to demonstrate some 
understanding that those kinds of offers will be rejected. While what is seen as a fair 
offer may change based on different societies, there are still very few extremely unfair 
offers made, and even fewer accepted. Moreover, there may be some complicating 
factors in the study in question, since the exchanges use money with traditional hunter- 
gatherers for whom monetary exchange may be relatively new. Perhaps research done 
with more traditional modes of exchange (food, for example) would elicit similar 
patterns to Western countries. Camerer (2003) summarizes the cultural variation seen in 
many games as generally corresponding to the pattern of “primitive groups behav[ing]
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self-interestedly” while “subjects in developed countries do not” (467). However, the 
evidence from such disparate societies as Los Angeles, Tokyo, Jerusalem, and 
Yogyakarta all demonstrate similar patterns, with few offers falling too far short of 50%. 
It would be interesting to see if there is a baseline of self-interestedness below which few 
societies fall. It would also be important to determine how environmental pressures 
(relative scarcity, for example) influence our preferences for sharing with others.
Further evidence for an innate rule of law is demonstrated by reactions to 
particular formulations of the trolley dilemma. Josh Greene et al. (2001) hooked subjects 
up to fMRI machines to determine which part of the brain lights up when subjects were 
asked about hypothetical situations. In one version of the dilemma, a trolley is out of 
control and is heading down a track on which five people sit. The subjects have the 
choice of letting the trolley hit the group, or shifting the trolley to another track with the 
push of a button -  a track which contains a solitary man. Most people choose to sacrifice 
the one man for the sake of the five people. However, the case becomes more 
complicated when, instead of simply pushing a button, the dilemma involves pushing a 
large man onto the tracks in order to stop the trolley. The cases are logically equivalent, 
but in the second case the emotional control centers light up and fewer people opt to 
sacrifice the one for the five. The formulation of the trolley dilemma involving physical 
violence is more “emotionally salient” than the alternative. Moreover, the decision is not 
made by a rational part of the brain that decides that for some reason pushing a man over 
is qualitatively different from switching the tracks. The decision is made by the 
emotional part of the brain, which for whatever reason, feels that pushing someone over a 
bridge, even to save five children, is qualitatively different from flicking a switch.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
Insofar as one can generalize, this study might support a general human disinclination for 
physical violence which can, of course, be overcome by habituation and training (as the 
case of soldiers attests).
The proximate grounding for these various emotional reactions to social 
situations and dilemmas can be found in research on mirror neurons, which also seem to 
support a kind of Smithian “impartial spectator,” or at least the ability to imagine oneself 
in the position of another. Ferrari et al. (2003), demonstrate that when monkeys see 
another monkey eating, the same neurons light up as when the monkey himself is eating. 
Other research (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004) hypothesizes that these neurons may be 
extremely important to human communication, as they allow us to place ourselves 
(almost literally) in the position of the other, much as Smith hypothesizes in The Theory 
o f Moral Sentiments. Other researchers (Williams, et al. 2001) have considered the 
possible relationship between the malfunction of mirror neurons and autism. Autism is a 
particularly interesting disorder from the perspective of innate laws, since autistics have a 
hard time relating to other people and understanding emotional cues. They seem 
incapable of true moral sentiments in the Smithian sense, and do not seem able to imitate 
other humans (291). An inability to imitate other humans, especially from a young age, 
may make it difficult to pull up the “impartial spectator,” in large part because such an 
impartial spectator is based largely on what we understand others to be thinking of us, 
which is, in turn, based largely on what we ourselves feel in a specific situation. Without 
moral emotions of our own, it is difficult if not impossible to speculate as to the moral 
emotions of others.
This partial literature review supports the idea that humans have an innate set of
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laws that regulate social situations. Whether it is the innate sense of justice evidenced in 
the ultimatum game, the emotional morality we see in the trolley dilemma, the 
enforcement mechanisms evident in our propensity for gossip, or the Smithian spectator 
we see in studies with mirror-neurons, humans are wired for social interaction and there 
are innate rules that guide those social interactions. These rules are laws just as 
customary and positive laws are laws. They fulfill Smith's definition in that they are 
“rules to direct the free actions of men: they are prescribed most surely by a lawful 
superior, and are attended too with the sanction of rewards and punishments” (1982a, 
166). We have the option to not follow these social guides, and some people do not. 
However, there are consequences, rewards and punishments, that attend these rules. This 
innate rule of law also corresponds to what Hayek saw as the best kind of law -  law 
where the consequences are both foreseeable and avoidable (1960, 206-209). We know 
what happens when we break social rules, and with this knowledge comes the ability to 
avoid those consequences. As I will argue further in the next section, the fact that there 
are innate rules that guide human interactions and that these rules are both internally and 
externally enforced supports a classical liberal conception of rule of law. In particular, 
the interactions between natural, customary, and positive law support the classical liberal 
argument for customary law as an important way of allowing these levels of laws to shift 
together to provide flexibility and adaptive ability in new and changing circumstances.
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An Evolutionary Argument for the Primacy of Customary Law
I argue in the following that evolutionary rule of law supports the classical liberal 
reliance on customary law, in large part because customary law acts as a flexible but 
stable intermediary between the less flexible levels of positive and natural law. Natural 
law is general, and while there is evidence that there are evolved tendencies in the human 
race that are environmentally dependent (such as certain genes turning off and on in the 
presence of certain environmental triggers) much of natural law must be general in order 
to deal with varied environments. Customary law fills in the gaps, growing out of natural 
law to better adapt the population to its particular environment, both cultural and 
physical. Montesquieu argued that one set of laws could hardly fit a different society, 
presumably because the understanding is that those laws are particular reactions to 
particular environmental influences. Customary law, as a gradual process, has a good 
chance of gradually, without undue shock, changing and adapting the cultural practices 
of a people to the environment.
Positive law, on the other hand, can be quite problematic, as we saw in both 
Smith and Hayek's discussions. Because it often attempts to create particular outcomes 
with necessarily limited knowledge, it tends to disrupt the spontaneous order that occurs 
when customary law and natural law move together. If law is little more than an 
adaptation allowing people to live in harmony with both each other and the environment, 
surely there can be little good in uprooting the customary traditions of a people, or worse, 
going against the natural law which frames those traditions, yet this is what positive law 
often attempts to do. Just as in biological evolution, macromutations of the law will
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more often do harm than good, primarily because such large-scale changes have the 
potential to damage the entire spontaneous order that rests on this web of laws.
For Hayek, legislation becomes problematic when it ceases to grow out of natural 
and customary roots, and becomes a renegade seedling of its own, divorced from the 
solid grounding of the parent plant. When positive law seeks a specific end, it departs 
from the natural and customary framework, which due to the diverse ends of humanity, is 
necessarily a framework rather than a linear path to an end. Once positive law departs, 
pushing human action toward a certain end (such as distributive justice, an example 
Hayek uses often), it often betrays natural and customary law along the way since the 
rational construction of law is limited by a lack of knowledge of particulars which 
include human nature and the way it interacts with custom. Thus, just as we look with 
some suspicion on attempts to change human evolution radically through biomedical 
enhancement, surely we ought to look askance at attempting to radically change our 
cultural evolution without thought of possible consequences in areas we hardly 
considered.
Obviously, some positive laws are necessary because humans have diverse 
interests which often conflict. There are, however, always ways of channeling those 
diverse interests into paths which are good for the group. Humans have been living in 
social groups (albeit primitive ones) for hundreds of thousands of years. If family life, 
ambition, or nepotism or any of the other numerous moral emotions and innate internal 
laws had nothing beneficial to offer society, either those innate rules or society would be 
gone by this point in our evolution. One must strive not to eradicate such human 
behaviors, but instead to take the beneficial aspects of human nature and use them to the
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fullest while attempting to control, as far as possible, the negative effects of nepotism, 
selfishness, and other human behaviors. It is best to control negative consequences of 
natural human behaviors, not to suppress the behaviors themselves.
Constructing society in line with general human desires as evolved (including 
liberty and justice) will require fewer positive laws and coercion because such a life is 
more natural for humans. Plato's Republic and other utopian societies necessitate lying 
to the public, censorship, and other strict social control mechanisms primarily because 
these systems are contrary to innate human behavioral tendencies. The more natural the 
system, the more the natural laws support the positive law. Montesquieu argues in his 
Spirit o f  the Laws for just such a moderate balancing act (1989, 494-518). The more a 
system like The Republic creates positive laws which go against human nature, the more 
coercive the system will become, because the result is essentially two competing systems 
of laws, one natural, the other positive and coercive.
Ideally, governmental systems would be set up with our innate evolutionary
desires as the most basic, and most controlling level of law2. Cultural norms and social
laws would follow in importance, since they are more flexible than natural laws, but also
have the opportunity of evolving in line with human nature over the ages. Last comes
the positive laws necessary to restrict those human desires which specifically make social
life dangerous. Preventing coercion of some individuals by others may require positive
laws to supplement natural and customary laws, especially in large societies where
inhabitants are strangers. Positive laws ought to be generally in line with the other two
levels, and ought to be the least restrictive of all, since the social and natural laws provide
2 Unfortunately, there is what appears to be a natural human tendency to prefer positive law to less direct 
forms o f legislating, which probably derives from the simple fact that it is easier to understand direct 
causes than indirect ones.
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enough control that more coercion is superfluous. Montesquieu (1989) and Hayek (1979, 
159-160) argue for such a nested hierarchy of laws. The main point is that rule of law is 
consistent with evolutionary liberty, with the coercion of positive laws minimized as 
much as possible, and society relying primarily on social norms and instinctual and 
emotional cues like Smith's moral sentiments to ensure proper social behavior.
As we can see from Hayek's treatment of customary law, it can operate as a useful 
buffer between two, less flexible, types of law. The consequences of breaking customary 
law are less stringent than for breaking positive law, which allows for a certain amount of 
innovation that can allow societies to adapt, over time, to new environmental pressures.
At the same time, custom can be used, as Smith pointed out, as a way of heightening, or 
in some cases, deadening, our natural moral sentiments. In the following section, I will 
present the case for customary law as a sort of middle ground between natural law and 
positive law that allows human societies to adapt to their environments, that is a less 
coercive form of law than positive law, and that avoids the upheaval often associated 
with positive law that radically conflicts with human nature.
Customary law, as was briefly mentioned above, is less coercive than positive 
law. As Hayek points out, customary law allows one to break it without incurring any 
serious penalties other than the social disapproval that is a powerful but not prohibitively 
powerful force against innovation (1960, 63). Choosing to break customary law allows 
one to innovate when it seems necessary. Positive law, because it restricts innovation 
with specific punitive measures that tend to discourage all innovation, should generally 
be restricted to preventing force and fraud. Customary law, because it is more flexible 
than positive law, can be expanded to include a much larger set of rules that guide us
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through the intricacies of social interaction. Innovation and faster adaptation to changing 
environmental circumstances can be promoted by combining strict, limited positive laws 
with a more flexible, though much broader, set of customary laws. The interaction 
between the two results in a spontaneous order. This flexibility allows society to adapt 
gradually to new circumstances as individuals choose whether to risk societal 
disapproval by breaking customary laws, but also provides a stable grounding below that 
of the strict positive laws, since societal disapproval will, in many cases, prevent people 
from innovating. Moreover, since customary law grows out of our natural inclinations, it 
rests on a more permanent foundation that reflects the constant adaptation of natural law 
to particular environments.
The strength of natural law seems to be reflected in the strength of customary 
laws. Those customary laws that support important natural laws seem to be those which 
are most universal and which breaking seems to produce the most social disapproval. 
Customary law can be seen in many cases as a way of filling out the very general natural 
moral emotions. The case of incest is a good one here, in that incest avoidance seems to 
be natural in our species and in all closely related mammalian species (Amhart 1998, 32; 
Pinker 2002, 436), and is universally reflected in customary laws, though how custom 
deals with incest avoidance will vary from society to society. At least in our society, the 
social disapproval for breaking customary rules about incest is great, and such 
disapproval is unlikely to be reduced through cultural selection pressures due to its strong 
foundation in natural law.
Customary law also represents an important middle ground between natural and 
positive laws in terms of the internalization of laws. Customary law is less coercive than
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positive law not only because people can risk society's disapproval in cases they deem 
important, but also because it is a more internalized form of law that is often put in place 
by habituation and education early on. The more internalized a form of law, the more 
individuals see their actions as arising from their own voluntary choice rather than a fear 
of punishment. In addition, a more internalized, less conscious form of law like 
customary law can, through habituation, be brought into line with natural laws in a way 
that is not possible to do in a rational, conscious way. Customary laws are more capable 
than positive laws of moderating undesirable natural laws or of finding ways to make 
those natural laws work for the community rather than against it, in large part due to their 
nature as gradually constructed and executed largely unconscious laws.
A further reason for the supporting customary law rather than positive law is that 
customary law tends to allow change without radical upheaval. When the kibbutzim of 
Israel decided to go against human nature and customary law and raise children 
communally, the negative consequences were obvious within a generation (see Tiger and 
Shepher 1975; Amhart 1998; and Pinker 2002) and the change was eventually reversed, 
resulting in much consternation and conflict within the community. As Smith points out 
(219-223, 229, 237, 292), we naturally care for those closest to us and this natural 
preference is reflected in customary laws that support family life and parental care. 
Trusting (in general) the customary traditions of a community helps to prevent upheaval 
by allowing gradual change within the framework of natural laws while at the same time 
preserving the respect for the laws that is necessary to a regime based on voluntary 
obedience to those laws.
Last, and perhaps most important, is that customary laws are a response to
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information about the environment that allows for adaptation to the environment while 
preserving variation within the system. As Chisholm (1999) points out, “organisms are 
seen as having evolved a hierarchy of mechanisms or processes for responding to 
(tracking) environmental changes” (63). These mechanisms include what Chisholm calls 
social intelligence (at the summit), which is what allows for the creation of both 
customary and positive laws, and then moves down into “anatomical, physiological, 
endocrine, and developmental mechanisms for responding to somewhat slower, more 
pervasive change” (ibid.). This hierarchy of mechanisms is supported by phenotypic 
plasticity, which is essentially the ability of an organism to change in response to 
environmental pressure. This plasticity, seen at both the individual and the social levels, 
preserves important variation. In the case of customary law, as we saw above, 
individuals have the option to risk social disapproval in pursuing alternative strategies. 
Such strategies will, presumably, undergo selection in the same way that genetic 
mutations undergo selection. The key for both levels of evolution is preserving the 
variation that allows evolutionary change to take place.
Understanding the ways these different levels of law interact helps us understand 
how cultural and political change occurs. When one level of law is at intense odds with 
another, one will have to change in response. Natural laws are less capable of change 
than customary laws. Positive laws are less capable of subtle change than customary 
laws due to their rationally constructed nature. Thus, customary law allows the different 
levels to adapt to one another and the environment without the negative consequences of 
continually changing positive laws.
As I have argued above, there is an innate rule of law in humans that supports the
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other levels of law in human social life. Innate rule of law interacts with both customary 
law and positive law to produce a spontaneous order in which individuals have the 
knowledge necessary to make decisions about their actions in a particular environment, 
while still maintaining freedom. These different levels of law ideally support voluntary 
obedience to the law by focusing on customary law as the most broad form of law, while 
positive law is, in general, restricted to preventing force and fraud. These different rules 
of law support the classical liberal understanding of law as a broad framework that 
supports spontaneous order and the voluntary obedience to laws that is at the heart of 
classical liberal thought.
Moreover, the best type of law is that which grows out of our natural desires. 
Customary law, because it is gradually grown out of the customs and manners of a 
people, is more likely (generally speaking) than positive law to be in line with natural 
human desires, and will generally have fewer undesired side-effects. The gradual growth 
of customary law out of the interaction of natural human desires and environmental 
influences is an important example of what I will call in the rest of the dissertation 
“natural conventionalism.” In the case of rule of law, the laws that many argue are 
purely conventional, or in other words, man-made, actually arise out of the natural needs 
and desires of humans. These laws are supported and continue because they tend to help 
humans survive and reproduce in social organizations. In this way, what is conventional 
is actually natural, or at least the result of a natural process. I will argue in subsequent 
chapters that private property and the private sphere are examples of naturally grown 
institutions that have emerged from our nature as social primates. One of the interesting 
side-effects of understanding evolutionary theory is that it helps to eradicate the too-often
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cited differences between nature and nurture, and nature and convention. If man has a 
nature, then his nature will influence convention.
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CHAPTER 5: EVOLUTION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
Property, especially private property, is one of classical liberalism's most 
important institutions. It also happens to be an institution that comes under frequent 
attack. The following chapter attempts to lay out the evidence for the “naturalness” of 
private property and property rights in general. I start by laying out Smith and Hayek's 
conceptions of private property, as well as describing the reasons they give for its 
importance. Next I move to what I call the “evolutionary” argument, which is really 
simply evidence from primates, studies in children, cross-cultural research, and other 
disparate fields showing that the ability to control certain objects or territories (which is 
what we essentially mean by property) is natural, universal, and innate. Besides 
demonstrating the universality of property concerns, I also hope to demonstrate the 
importance of property rights for a free society, which will lead into the next chapter on 
the private sphere. I use the term “property” to refer to possessions in general, which can 
include land, objects, or simply wealth. I consider property to be anything that one has 
an exclusive right to, one that allows us to prevent other men from using the resource in 
question. This definition does not, however, include people, since ownership of people is 
incompatible with a free society.
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Smith's Understanding of the Origins and Benefits of Property
Adam Smith does not attempt a broad philosophical justification of property. His 
approach is primarily historical. He discusses how property is acquired and the origins 
of laws concerning property in various types of societies. He does, however, combine 
his historical analysis with his moral teachings in the Theory o f  Moral Sentiments in an 
attempt to provide moral justification for various kinds of appropriation and transfer of 
property.
Property rights and regulations depend on the state society is in at the time.
Smith argues that there are four states through which societies pass: Hunters, Shepherds, 
Agriculture, and Commerce. Not only does what is considered property shift from age to 
age, but so do the various ways in which property rights are established. In the age of 
hunters, there is little to be stolen, and therefore property laws are almost nonexistent. 
Once the society shifts to herding, for the first time theft becomes a real and serious 
danger to the livelihood of the property owner. “In this state many more laws and 
regulations must take place; theft and robbery being easily committed, will of 
consequence be punished with the utmost rigour” (1982b, 16). Once agriculture becomes 
the dominant mode of life, there are fewer opportunities for theft, but more to be stolen.
In this case, “The laws therefore tho perhaps not so rigorous will be of a far greater 
number than amongst a nation of shepherds” (ibid). As a general conclusion, he points 
out that, “The more improved any society is and the greater length the severall means of
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supporting the inhabitants are carried, the greater will be the number of their laws and 
regulations necessary to maintain justice, and prevent infringements of the right of 
property” (ibid). Property law naturally becomes more complicated the more complex 
the society, since there will be greater and greater objects that fall under the umbrella of 
protected property, as well as many more people to be protected from.
The ways in which property may be acquired are five according to Smith:
’’There are five causes from whence property may have its occasion. 1st, Occupation, by 
which we get any thing into our power that was not the property of another before. — 
2dly, Tradition, by which property is voluntarily transferred from one to an other. 3dly, 
Accession, by which the property of any part that adheres to a subject and seems to be of 
small consequences as compared to it, or to be a part of it, goes to the proprieter of the 
principall, as the milk or young of beasts. -- 4thly, Prescription or Usacapio, by which a 
thing that has been for a long time out of the right owners possession and in the 
possession of an other, passes in right to the latter. — 5thly, Succession, by which the 
nearest kin or the testamentary heir has a right of property to what was left him by the 
testator” (14).
Occupation and accession are the two “original methods of acquiring property” 
(27). The others all involve voluntary transfer either between the living or between the 
dead and the living. Occupation and accession, however, both involve taking something 
that is still “in the commons” and claiming a right to it. It is these two therefore that 
require the most extensive justification. Smith justifies the method of occupation by 
appealing to the impartial spectator, who played a large role in TMS. For Smith, rather 
than relying on some sort of complicated analytic justificatory mechanism, he relies on
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the common-sense sentiments of the impartial spectator. “The reasonable expectation 
therefore which the first possessor furnishes is the ground on which the right of property 
is acquired by occupation” (17). The impartial spectator views that a person has a right 
to a particular object when he himself “enters into his thoughts and concurrs in his 
opinion that he may form a reasonable expectation of using the fruit or whatever it is in 
what manner he pleases” (17). The impartial spectator's agreement is based on the 
reasonableness of the act given the circumstances and various other claims. Smith's 
justification does not provide us with a hard and fast rule by which we can always judge 
in every case. It instead relies on the reasonableness of a man's actions as determined by 
the spectator who, while feeling with the man in question, is also somewhat distanced 
from the agent's particular passions and prejudices.
The right of accession is also based in the moral sentiments, most particularly the 
sentiment of impropriety. Just as we feel it would be improper to take fruit from a man 
who has collected it, so we also deem it an impropriety that the milk of a sheep owned by 
a man should remain in the commons while the sheep itself does not. Again, Smith relies 
on our moral sentiments or our intuitions about what constitutes right property rather 
than providing a coherent system of justification. Accession varies in particular societies 
as the types of property vary. There is little concern in pastoral societies with accession, 
with the exception of the offspring and produce of animals owned. The case gets more 
complicated once private property in land is introduced (28). Once private ownership in 
land is introduced, problems such as mineral rights, water rights, and ownership of trees 
and stones come into being, requiring much more complex legislation that often cannot 
be determined solely by relying on the impartial spectator. Smith does argue that the
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primary case in which there is difficulty determining accession is in the case where “the 
accession is the property of a different person from the proprietor of the subject” (as 
when “one builds a house on another man's grounds”) (29). This is one of the first cases 
where one determines, not the whole right to both land and house, but a partial right in 
one or the other. Either the house owner pays rent or recompense to the landowner, or 
the reverse. Smith’s account of property is therefore partially natural and partially 
conventional. Property itself is based in a natural human desire and supported by the 
natural moral sentiments. Yet as the complexity of a society grows, the conventions 
associated with those natural desires for property become more and more complicated. 
Both the root and the growth of the conventional norms are natural, even while the 
specific form of laws regarding property might be decided by convention.
The other three methods of acquiring ownership rely on voluntary transfer and 
thus need only be justified insofar as contracts between individuals need to be justified. 
Smith sees property rights in general as coming originally from a gradual growth, though 
he does seem to recognize the importance of labor in creating property rights, therefore 
following Locke and, to a certain extent, Hume. He argues in the WN in a section on 
apprenticeship that “The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the 
original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable” (138). 
This section is somewhat difficult to understand in conjunction with Smith's U ,  where 
we see him argue that property is justified by the approbation of the impartial spectator
9
and where he argues that in hunting societies, “In most cases... property was conceived to 
commence when the subject comes into the power of the captor” (18). In the case of 
hunting a hare, for example, such possession requires a good deal of labor. In the case of
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plucking an apple, the labor seems much less, and Smith's argument for labor as the basis 
for property in the WN does not seem to be bome out in LJ.
Smith's discussion in the WN on the labor theory of value may be related to his 
argument that labor is the original foundation of all property. The apparent inconsistency 
between WN and U  on the origins of property may not be an inconsistency at all, 
however. It is possible, though Smith does not seem to lay this out, that the impropriety 
the spectator sees when a man is deprived of something he possesses comes from a 
natural human sentiment that what a man possesses or has placed labor into becomes, 
properly, his property. Thus, the moral sentiments of the spectator may simply be a way 
of underscoring the importance of labor in property acquisition. Ultimately, however, 
the importance of original acquisition is minimized since it occurs in rare cases in the 
commercial world. Most property is acquired through transfer after the original 
parceling out of land (1982b, 22). As Smith points out, “The first origin of private 
property [by which Smith seems to mean private property in land, rather than private 
property in general] would probably be mens taking themselves to fixt habitations and 
living together in cities, which would probably be the case in every improved society” 
(ibid). It is after this parceling out occurs that the other methods of acquisition become 
more important. Tradition, prescription, and succession can only become possible once 
original acquisition has been justified and is considered relatively stable.
I will now move into his discussion of the benefits of private property, especially 
in land. While Smith is perhaps more ambivalent on the benefits of private property 
ownership than some classical liberals, he generally believes that the acquisition of 
property, especially great property, becomes a source of benefit for society, in large part
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through the famed “invisible hand.”
Despite the wealth generated by ownership, the most foundational good deriving 
from property is that to protect property man gradually builds up systems of justice and 
civil government: “The acquisition of valuable and extensive property, therefore, 
necessarily requires the establishment of civil government” (1981, 710). The 
relationship between property and civil government arises in large part due to natural 
forces in human nature. The poor envy the rich, whose avarice and ambition further 
create inequality that further breeds envy. As Smith points out, “Wherever there is great 
property, there is great inequality” (ibid.). This inequality, breeding resentment, leads 
the rich to require a system of justice through which they can defend their property from 
the encroachments of the poor. Hunters have little need for civil government because 
they lack extensive property: “Among nations of hunters, as there is scarce any property, 
or at least none that exceeds the value of two or three days labour; so there is seldom any 
established magistrate or any regular administration of justice” (1981, 709). The 
argument regarding property and civil government becomes a kind of chicken-and-egg 
problem in that it becomes unclear precisely which needs to come first. He points out,
“It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable 
property, which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many successive 
generations, can sleep a single night in security” (710). Extensive property requires civil 
government for its protection, but civil government requires property as an impetus for 
its formation.
Smith's answer to this apparent paradox is a rejection of the contract theory of 
Locke and Hobbes. He argues instead for a gradual growth of both property and civil
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government together. As each system becomes more complex, the other system 
necessarily grows with it. Thus, civil government is not based on some contract at some 
particular point in time, but grows up out of the complex interplay of a people moving 
through various stages of growth, with new properties being added to the existing 
system, and therefore requiring new laws and regulations and therefore new powers of 
government. Smith argues that “...the necessity of civil government gradually grows up 
with the acquisition of valuable property, so the principal causes which naturally 
introduce subordination gradually grow up with the growth of that valuable property” 
(710; see U  201-205, 207-208,228 for similar arguments). The importance of property 
for civil government is seen in Smith's first page of LJ, where he argues that “The first 
and chief design of every system of government is to maintain justice; to prevent the 
members of a society from incroaching on one anothers property, or siezing what is not 
their own. The design here is to give each one the secure and peacable possession of his 
own property” (5). Thus Smith follows Locke (1988) in arguing for the centrality of 
property in the creation of civil government, but offers a more organic view of the 
relationship than the contractual theory set forth by Locke.
Once civil government has been established, there are numerous benefits that 
property offers the state. One of these is that property leads the rich to spread out their 
wealth: “They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the 
necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal 
portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, 
advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species” 
(1982b, 184-185). Because the rich cannot in reality consume much more of the
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necessary goods of life than the poor, they must do something with their excess wealth. 
Very often, the baubles on which they spend their wealth have the side-effect of 
providing the poor with work. The poor then “derive from his luxury and caprice, that 
share of the necessaries of life, which they would in vain have expected from his 
humanity and justice” (184). This argument is by now familiar to most of us, but it is no 
less true now. The large property owner or even the simply very wealthy man 
necessarily spends much money that provides the sustenance of numerous servants, 
tradesmen, farmers, and others. Without inequality of property we would certainly be 
more equal, but it would be an equality of poverty rather than an equality of wealth. 
Moreover, the desire for wealth (and property in general, not simply land) is beneficial in 
that it is a natural desire that prompts “men to cultivate the ground, to build houses, to 
found cities and commonwealths, and to invent and improve all the sciences and arts, 
which ennoble and embellish human life...” (183). The desire for wealth leads to 
civilization, and the possession of wealth supports that civilization by spreading that 
wealth to the less fortunate.
Further, property promotes general abundance in that it supports Smith's division 
of labor. Smith's arguments for division of labor in the WN depend in large part on the 
existence of property rights. In order for division of labor to operate, one must have 
something with which to exchange for the goods of another. Whatever this something is, 
one's ability to trade with it requires that one owns it, either through occupation or 
accession or various forms of transfer. Without ownership, the basis for division of labor 
becomes meaningless, since one would have no right to anything, and we would 
necessarily return to a kind of state of nature where everything is in the commons and
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everyone provides everything for himself. Thus, property is at the root of division of 
labor, which Smith sees as the foundation for much of what makes commercial society 
successful at providing for the wants of man.
Property also creates its own dangers, however. It breeds inequality and provides 
an important motive for harming others. It seems clear from Smith's treatment, however, 
that property, though associated with costs of its own, creates the conditions for 
abundance, and therefore for the comfort of the entire society. Smith is less sanguine 
about the motives of the wealthy than Hayek, as we will see later, but his argument for 
the invisible hand demonstrates that even in the midst of the vice and luxury of the 
wealthy there exists unintentional virtue. We are confronted with a problem in Smith 
then, which is that while he sees the acquisition of wealth to be a necessary component of 
the comfort of mankind in general, he also sees it having a negative impact on the 
individuals who possess it. I will deal with this issue at length in the chapter on 
“Evolution and Regimes of Excellence,” but for now I will simply argue that Smith's 
understanding seems to be a simplistic one, perhaps intentionally simplified for rhetorical 
purposes.
It should be noted briefly that Smith's arguments for property are not limited to 
private property. There are situations in which common property will be more beneficial 
or less dangerous than private ownership. These situations may be few and far between, 
but communal ownership is not rejected out of hand. As Smith argues, “By the severall 
methods above mentioned property would in time be extended to allmost every subject. 
Yet there are still some things which must continue common by the rules of equity” 
(1982b, 23). The navigation of rivers, for example, and water fountains by the road,
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should be left in the commons. Thus, the privatization of property does not necessarily 
extend inevitably to all objects.
Overall, Smith seems to see private property as growing out of the natural human 
desires that, moreover, we share with other animals. Smith argues that animals share 
much the same desires as we do, but that animals are not capable of formalizing their 
desire for property in any way that benefits individuals and the group. He argues, “The 
effects of those different geniuses and talents, for want of the power or disposition to 
barter and exchange, cannot be brought into a common stock, and do not in the least 
contribute to the better accommodation and conveniency of the species” (1981, 30). 
Because man has the capability to use civil government to formalize his desires for 
property, such property can contribute to the increase of wealth of the whole population.
Hayek and the Origin and Benefits of Property
Hayek follows Smith in that his discussion of the origin of property focuses on 
the gradual and contextual growth of property rights. Hayek is, like Smith, less 
concerned with some theological or contractual basis for property than with the gradual 
growth of property rights out of particular circumstances. This gradual growth 
necessarily makes the foundations of property rights less clear, but what we lack in 
clarity we gain in realism. Hayek's concern with the origin of institutions is never 
terribly deep, but we do see him here referring to anthropological and historical data on 
historical rights in an attempt to determine how such rights must have originated. He 
argues that, “With respect to some objects, the notion of individual property must have
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appeared very early, and the first hand-crafted tools are perhaps an appropriate example” 
(1988, 30). Further, “Modem anthropology confirms the fact that 'private property 
appears very definitely on primitive levels' and that 'the roots of property as a legal 
principle which determines the physical relationships between man and his 
environmental setting, natural and artificial, are the very prerequisite of any ordered 
action in the cultural sense'” (1960,140). However, “The extension and refinement of 
the concept of property were... necessarily gradual processes that are hardly completed 
even today” (1988, 30). Even understanding the foundations of property in our primitive 
past does little to help us understand how those rights work out in a larger commercial 
society. Hayek argues that the ultimate reason for the origination of property rights was 
“Probably the need to keep a workable holding intact,” which “gradually led from group 
ownership to individual property in land” (1988, 31). However, this original justification 
holds little relevance for why property rights are important in commercial societies. For 
Hayek, the importance of property rights is similar to Smith's: “The crucial point is that 
the prior development of several property is indispensable for the development of 
trading, and thereby for the formation of larger coherent and cooperating structures, and 
for the appearance of those signals we call prices” (ibid.). This is similar to the implicit 
argument in Smith that property rights are necessary for institutions like the division of 
labor. The ultimate point is that property rights sustain systems of cooperation between 
unknown individuals. Just as with Hayek's argument for rule of law, property rights 
create a framework in which cooperation can occur: “Yet somehow, however slowly, 
however marked by setbacks, orderly cooperation was extended, and common concrete 
ends were replaced by general, end-independent abstract rules of conduct” (ibid.). Such
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cooperation is required for the creation of a free society.
While Hayek does not spend time laying out the different ways in which 
acquisition of property is legitimate, he does refer to succession or inheritance in various 
places, suggesting that he finds it more important or at least more interesting than other 
forms of acquisition. Hayek spends more time justifying succession or inheritance than 
Smith does, probably due to the fact that inheritance came under attack in socialistic 
systems, while it was largely accepted in Smith's time. His arguments are similar to what 
I will argue in the section on evolution and property, in that the concepts of family and of 
property are closely linked. For Hayek, the desire to help kin is a natural phenomenon 
that is better incorporated into the social framework than pushed out. We need to 
“recognize that belonging to a particular family is part of the individual personality, that 
society is made up as much of families as of individuals and that the transmission of the 
heritage of civilization within the family is as important a tool in man's striving toward 
better things as is the heredity of beneficial physical attributes” (1960, 90). Furthermore, 
inheritance operates as “an inducement for [property's] accumulation” (91). Perhaps 
most importantly, preventing individuals from passing on what they have gained in their 
lives has the effect of simply pushing them to get more creative in how they help their 
relations: “It seems certain that among the many ways in which those who have gained 
power and influence might provide for their children, the bequest of a fortune is socially 
by far the cheapest” (91). Hayek points out that the rampant nepotism and assignment of 
government offices to relatives in communist regimes is only one example of the 
unintended effects of eradicating the less damaging institution of inheritance.
For Hayek, the benefits of property to society are much more obvious than those
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we see in Smith. His primary argument is again similar to Smith's, in that property rights 
are the foundation for civil society, “...the whole system of separate enterprises, offering 
both employees and consumers sufficient alternatives to deprive each organization from 
exercising coercive power, presupposes private ownership and individual decision as to 
the use of resources” (124). The importance of private property as a way of reducing 
coercion is highlighted again when Hayek argues that “We are rarely in a position to 
carry out a coherent plan of action unless we are certain of our exclusive control of some 
material objects; and where we do not control them, it is necessary that we know who 
does if we are to collaborate with others. The recognition of property is clearly the first 
step in the delimitation of the private sphere which protects us against coercion; and it 
has long been recognized that 'a people averse to the institution of private property is 
without the first element of freedom'” (140). I will be dealing with the importance of the 
private sphere in another chapter, but it is certainly true that private property is an 
integral part of the private sphere, a sphere within which ideally government exerts little 
or no control. Thus, even while as Smith points out, property provides the impetus for 
the creation of government's powers of coercion, it also provides the limitation for those 
powers, since it creates a free sphere in which the rights of the property owner to use his 
property (and the resources coming out of that property) as he sees fit within general 
limits. Thus, we have another paradox of property that nonetheless makes sense when 
understood in the context of a gradual growth of property rights and governmental 
coercion: property provides the basis for governmental coercion while limiting its 
breadth and effects (while also limiting the coercion of individuals by other individuals).
One further benefit of private property occurs in Hayek's discussion of the
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wealthy. Hayek is much less ambivalent about the wealthy than Smith. Hayek, on the 
other hand, sees much of the creative powers of civilization as arising from the leisure 
which those with extensive property and wealth can command. He argues, “The man of 
independent means is an even more important figure in a free society when he is not 
occupied with using his capital in the pursuit of material gain but uses it in the service of 
aims that bring no material return” (1960, 125). These aims include those that the market 
would not necessarily take care of on its own, including art and philanthropy. These are, 
importantly, signs of status as well as being meaningful in their own right. Smith's 
apparent belief that the wealthy never act for the well-being of the common good is not 
Hayek's. He appears to trust to some extent the wealthy to pursue more than simple 
material gain, though he by no means depends on the altruism of the rich. Hayek's 
emphasis on the benefits the wealthy provide to society stems from his concern with 
envy. Envy, while a natural human emotion, is particularly dangerous in capitalistic 
societies, where some inequalities are the necessary outcome of the system, and where 
the freedom to create those inequalities is precisely what creates abundance for all.
Hayek pleads: “If through envy we make certain exceptional kinds of life impossible, we 
shall all in the end suffer material and spiritual impoverishment” (130).
Smith seems to see the problem of envy as well, pointing out that the lowest 
peasant in Europe is better clothed and fed than an African king, even though his relative 
comfort compared to a European prince seems quite low (1982a, 23-24). However, as he 
points out in TMS, envy is often in powerful opposition to our natural sympathy toward 
the well-being or prosperity of others. As he points out continually in the TMS, envy is 
one passion that prevents us from being the impartial spectator of the conduct of others.
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He describes it as “that passion which views with malignant dislike the superiority of 
those who are really entitled to all the superiority they possess” (244). Thus, there are 
times when the peasant is incapable of understanding his absolute wealth, focusing 
instead on envying those above him. There are then, according to Smith, two conflicting 
desires in human nature. The one is the desire to admire those superior to us: “Where 
there is no envy in the case, we all take pleasure in admiring, and are, upon that account, 
naturally disposed, in our own fancies, to render complete and perfect in every respect 
the characters which, in many respects, are so very worthy of admiration” (1982a, 250). 
The other is the passion of envy, which prevents us from properly admiring the actual 
superiority of those above us. As I will argue in the chapter on “Evolution and Equality,” 
envy is a natural human emotion and one that spurs much of human progress, yet it needs 
to be channeled rather than set free. Hayek's concern about envy is an important one. It 
is perhaps the best example of a natural desire that is dangerous to a classical liberal 
society and which must be dealt with carefully. I will go into this argument more in 
depth later, as I mentioned above. For the moment, it suffices to point out that both 
Smith and Hayek see the difficulty envy presents to liberal systems. The human fixation 
on relative position rather than absolute well-being is a continual challenge to classical 
liberal institutions, especially that of private property.
One last important benefit of private property for Hayek is the effect it has on 
personal responsibility. In speaking of rent control, Hayek argues, “It has also 
contributed much toward weakening the respect for property and the sense of individual 
responsibility” (343). Hayek's general argument on rent control is less important for our 
purposes than the fact that it highlights the important connection between private
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property and personal responsibility. Private property, because it allows one to control 
resources in his possession, allows one to take risks with those resources in hopes of 
greater gain, but it also requires that individual to bear the responsibility for any failures. 
The responsibility both for one's gains and losses contributes to the psychological 
benefits of property while at the same time promoting the proper care of resources and 
responsibility for one's actions. The alternative is the well-known tragedy of the 
commons in which no one holds property, and therefore no one is held responsible for 
the depletion of communal resources. Thus, private property provides a psychological 
benefit with real-world consequences. Personal responsibility for one's actions results in 
the better stewardship of resources that might perish were they held communally.
The Origins and Benefits of Property from a Biological Perspective
The argument from anthropology and related fields ends up being quite similar to 
the arguments set forth by Smith and Hayek in the previous sections. Rather than being 
the result of contract or positive law, property rights appear to grow out of natural human 
desires as a response to particular environmental pressures. Richard Pipes (1999) has 
done an excellent job of summarizing some of the best literature concerning the natural 
and historical bases for property rights. I will spend most of the next section outlining 
and discussing his arguments, as well as dealing with other related literature on the 
natural basis for property.
There has been some effort to point out the natural basis of property in recent 
years. Amhart (2005) goes through the natural, customary, and positive roots of property
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in Darwinian Conservatism. He points to arguments made by Smith and Burke among 
others for the naturalness of private property, deriving further support from thinkers like 
Pipes, Darwin, and Westermarck. Many of these thinkers underscore the natural growth 
of property rights into customary law.
I will focus primarily on Pipes's argument. The argument has three primary foci. 
Pipes deals with the rudimentary roots of property in animals, the psychological roots of 
property in children, and then moves to an anthropological survey of property rights 
among primitive peoples. Each of these approaches is a way of confronting the argument 
that property is an inherently customary construct. Evidence from animals demonstrates 
that it is found in other species, and that it is therefore a much older instinct than 
previously thought (and therefore unlikely to be eradicated). Evidence from children 
further shows the unlikelihood that desires for property are purely socially constructed. 
Finally, anthropological evidence demonstrates that some notion of private property is 
universal across human cultures and therefore probably serves some important social 
functions in addition to probably being an innate desire. Evidence from these three fields 
should hopefully demonstrate the naturalness of property by demonstrating that the 
desire for property is deeply rooted, innate, and universal to human cultures.
Pipes deals first with acquisitiveness among animals, arguing that property in 
animals is primarily that of territory (1999, 66). He argues that maintaining distance 
from individuals of other species and from individuals of one's own species is an 
important aspect of territoriality. These distances depend in large part on what kind of 
animal we are dealing with, whether social or unsocial, whether carnivorous or 
otherwise, and other species-specific properties (69). For humans, who are social, one
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would expect close proximity to members of own species with territoriality between 
groups, and restricted access even within groups, as kin separate themselves off from the 
rest of the group. The desire to defend a set (though flexible) territory is universal 
among animals, even down to protozoa (68).
The three major functions of property (or territory as the case may be) are to 
escape predators, provide for oneself and one's young, and to breed (68). Going along 
with these primary goods, property serves an epistemological function. By focusing 
one's energies on a particular territory, an animal develops a close knowledge of the way 
that particular territory works. Predator and prey patterns, hiding places, and food caches 
all represent important information that is more easily acquired in a known territory than 
in a non-territorial system. Moreover, part of the territorial system of animals acts in 
much the same way property and rule of law works in human political systems. With a 
known territory, an animal is better able to predict what other animals (whether of his 
own species or not) will do. This predictive power thus enables the animal to make 
better choices concerning his own survival and reproduction. Thus, territory for animals 
serves to reduce uncertainty, which is much like Hayek's arguments for increasing the 
predictive power and knowledge of individuals. Thus, apart from any particular “rights” 
one might have in property, it serves a natural epistemological function in helping deal 
with the problems of knowledge all animals face.
Pipes's evidence for possessiveness in children is further support for the 
naturalness of some understanding of property rights. He points out that “toddlers are 
exceedingly possessive and learn to share as they grow up because they are taught to do 
so” (71). Possessiveness is therefore prior to altruism, as least as far as child
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development is concerned. Further, in studies of groups of children the major source of 
conflict was disagreements over toys and other possessions (74). This pattern of 
property-based aggression was present even in communistic societies like the kibbutzim. 
More than simply describing the possessive desire in children, Pipes also offers 
arguments relating to the importance of property and the possessive desire in 
psychological development. Pipes cites evidence from clinical studies of children that 
point to a continual development of acquisitiveness that starts with a special toy at the 
age of eighteen months, morphing into feelings of ownership, only developing the ability 
to share later in childhood (73). Ownership in property may be integral to the 
development of personality and individuality. A sense of ownership is integral to 
defining oneself in opposition to others. In fact, Pipes implies that in some ways a desire 
for acquisition comes prior to the ability to differentiate oneself from others, and that it is 
this desire that pushes us to differentiate ourselves from others through our differentiated 
property. If this is true, property is even more foundational to individualistic 
understandings of human nature than previously thought. Property may be at the very 
root of the individual's understanding of himself.
As Pipes argues, “the leading causes of human acquisitiveness are economic and 
biological: the need of territory and of objects with which to sustain oneself and to 
procreate” (71). Acquisitiveness is at the very root of survival and reproduction. It 
would be very strange if humans did not have the desire to acquire goods. Indeed, the 
desire to acquire goods and “own” them individually is universal across all human 
societies. Pipes's discussion of property among primitive peoples supports the evidence 
from animals and children, while demonstrating the universality of property, even among
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Ownership among primitive peoples is usually discussed in terms of individual 
ownership versus group ownership (79). Tribal ownership usually extends to territory 
and land, much like we see in animal groups, rather than to specific objects. Individual 
ownership usually extends to portable objects that the individual uses daily, which are 
often regarded as part of the individual (79). Primitive societies even assert ownership 
over intellectual property, including “songs, legends, designs, and magic incantations, 
which are believed to lose their effectiveness if learned by others” (80).
Pipes's overall discussion supports the classical liberal groundings of property. 
The primary goals of property are to preserve for individuals scarce resources, and to 
alleviate problems of knowledge. The grounds of property rights are both natural and 
customary. Property rights grow out of natural human desires, and in this way the very 
growth of these rights, though the specific form takes place conventionally, the growth 
itself is very natural. There is, then, a kind of natural conventionalism to property rights. 
This natural conventionalism supports both Hayek's and Smith's arguments for a natural, 
gradually grown institution of property.
Family and Property
There is an element of Pipes's discussion that is implicit but which ought to be 
drawn out further, and that is the connection between property and the family. I have 
noticed with interest the connection between the assault on property and the assault on 
the family, both of which tend to play some role in schemes of equality, whether Plato's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
114
Republic or the Israeli kibbutzim. The connection may be quite simple. Both property 
and family are guided in large part by “love of one's own” which is, in general, at the 
root of human nature. The two become even more intertwined when we look at the 
debates over inheritance, or the ways in which people leave their property to kin. Very 
few people will argue that family is not natural, but probably a similarly few number 
would argue that property is natural. The connection then seems to be mostly a semi­
conscious one, and there is little in the literature explaining why (or even that) the two 
tend to be fundamentally connected, especially in utopian attempts to create equality. I 
believe, however, that property is as natural as the family, or at least that it grows out of 
the same concerns expressed in preference for kin, and that in fact much of the desire for 
property and control over resources arises out of a desire to provide for one's nearest and 
dearest as well as oneself.
While humans are social creatures, they are not indiscriminately social. They 
care for kin more than for strangers, and therefore, nepotism has undoubtedly played a 
large role in human society for millenia. As Hayek's pointed out, private property serves 
as a barrier to the more damaging aspects of the nepotistic desire. In fact, both Smith and 
Hayek see inheritance as one of a few ways in which property can be legitimately 
acquired. There may then be an important link between property and family. This link 
may serve to underscore the difficulty of eradicating either institution. It may also serve 
to demonstrate the incredible complexity of human institutions, especially those 
gradually grown institutions like property. It is unlikely that an institution grown over 
thousands of years will not be inextricably connected to other important institutions.
This connectedness makes the pulling out or eradication of one institution while leaving
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others intact impossible, and generally serves to caution us against hastily uprooting any 
long-existing institution in the name of abstract goods.
Back to the main point: Property has two primary goals both for simple societies 
and for complex societies like our own. It first of all helps deal with the problem of 
scarcity and helps alleviate the tragedy of the commons, and it helps deal with the 
problem of knowledge that plagues all non-omniscient creatures. Moreover, in modem 
commercial societies, well-defined property rights help increase the predictability of 
unknown agents, while also increasing the possibility of creating relationships of trust 
between thousands of unconsciously interacting individuals. Both these concerns are 
related to the importance of control in property. Property gives us knowledge of 
particular situations and provides a certain access to restricted resources, which allows us 
to predict and control our environment. Thus, one of the important aspects of property is 
that it gives us some amount of control over external resources, and having some control 
over what happens to oneself is the core of liberty.
The growth of private property in human societies appears to approach most 
closely that hypothesized by Smith and Hayek. Instead of some mystical contract, we 
find property rights growing gradually out of the natural needs of species, becoming 
more and more specified by customary practices and the particular needs of particular 
groups, finally to become further defined by positive law. One would predict then that 
we will find many different arrangements of property among human societies, and this is 
precisely what we find. However, amidst the variation, we will find certain universal 
tendencies. Humans will desire to own property individually, and they will desire to pass 
that property onto those closest to them. Acquisition and inheritance, two of the primary
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enemies of socialist thought, seem to be deeply rooted in human nature. Not only are 
they deeply rooted, but they continue to serve important biological, economic, and social 
ends of survival, reproduction, alleviating scarcity, and promoting knowledge and 
stability, which seems to ensure that they will not be easily eradicated even if we wanted 
to.
Pipes's discussion, as well as Amhart's (2005), seems to support the ideas laid out 
by Smith and Hayek regarding the origin and benefits of property rights. Smith and 
Hayek argue that property and civil government support one another in a mutual fashion, 
that property leads the wealthy to spread out their wealth, that it supports division of 
labor, that it is indispensable for trade, that it is a barrier to the negative effects of 
nepotism, that it is a way of reducing coercion, that it helps provide goods that the market 
cannot provide, and that it fosters personal responsibility. These benefits range from the 
psychological to the economic to the societal, and they cover many facets of human life, 
from that of the individual, to the family, to the commercial society as a whole.
Property is most beneficial in supporting freedom. A free society is one in which 
individuals are free within a rule of law to make decisions about their own lives. These 
decisions, made at the individual level, help alleviate the problem of knowledge that 
confronts any attempt to centrally control the actions of many individuals. Further, a free 
society consists in the cooperation of many individuals, helped along by institutions that 
create trust between unknown actors. Finally, a free society limits the coercion of 
individuals, whether by the government or by individuals.
Property rights are integral to all these goods, and the relationship is, in many 
ways, a natural relationship. Property rights serve an epistemological purpose, providing
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individuals with the ability to predict the actions of others, with knowledge of the 
environment, and with some limited knowledge of the future. Property rights promote 
cooperation by supporting the creation of interacting systems of transfer like the price 
system that allows for unknown individuals to cooperate with one another in relative 
security. Finally, private property forms the nucleus of the private sphere. It creates a 
central core of goods that are outside the control of government or other individuals, and 
therefore it creates a sphere of control and security within which the individual can act. 
The epistemological limits of human understanding, the limits of face-to-face trust, as 
well as the dual desires for freedom and control that make free government difficult to 
achieve are all natural aspects of the human condition. Property rights are a natural 
response to these natural facets of human nature.
While there are many features of a free society, there is little doubt about why 
property rights have been central to those devoted to freedom from Locke to Hume to 
Smith to Hayek. Without property rights, a free society would crumble. There can be no 
private sphere without property, and therefore no sphere in which the individual is free 
from the control of the government.
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CHAPTER 6: EVOLUTION AND THE PRIVATE SPHERE
In this chapter I explore the connection between human nature and the private 
sphere. The private sphere is related to private property and the rule of law. The three 
are interconnected, and in many ways understanding the private sphere shows how these 
two institutions fit together.
I will look at Smith and Hayek's formulations of the private sphere. I will show 
how evolutionary theory and evidence from human nature supports a private sphere. 
Finally, I will reveal the connection between rule of law, private property and the private 
sphere. Throughout these varied discussions, I will discuss the idea of rights as a way of 
formalizing a private sphere, while bringing to light some of the difficulties inherent in 
rights language, and laying out a definition of rights that is consistent with classical 
liberalism and which takes its bearing from the “natural conventionalism” that runs 
throughout classical liberal thought.
The liberals in general, including Locke, Hobbes, Burke, and others, believe that 
the government should require as little as possible from people, as least as far as their 
formal obligations to the state are concerned. Most liberals think that other than force or 
fraud, most individual actions ought to be outside the purview of governmental scrutiny. 
Creating a sphere of private conduct into which the government cannot intrude is at the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
119
heart of classical liberal thought. At least on this understanding, the institutions of rule 
of law and private property are merely barriers around or preservatives of this private 
sphere. Locke describes property as a fence to our self-preservation (1988), and in the 
larger scheme of things, property and rule of law are actually ways to preserve the 
privacy of individuals and the corresponding freedom from governmental interference.
From these desires to create a private, protected sphere comes the notion of rights. 
Most of the rights we take for granted, including the right to privacy, the right to 
property, the right of association and religious expression are merely ways of formalizing 
precisely what this private sphere ought to contain. Rights have taken on a new meaning 
in recent years. Instead of merely defining areas of human life into which government 
may not intrude except to prevent force or fraud, rights have come to mean things which 
the government ought to provide. This movement is a dangerous one, since the 
government cannot both provide certain goods and refrain from interfering with those 
goods at the same time. The understanding of rights that I will use throughout the rest of 
this chapter is one in which rights are defined as goods which the government cannot 
meddle with except to prevent force and fraud. There are difficulties and exceptions to 
this general rule, but for the moment I will be ignoring those. These rights are supported 
by rule of law when that rule of law consists of a general framework in which individuals 
understand what is included in the protected sphere, and are therefore able to better plan 
for the future with the resources at their disposal.
The private sphere is then fundamentally connected with the idea of rights. The 
private sphere may be said to consist in various rights that provide the individual with 
freedom from interference in relation to various goods and activities. These rights can be
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based either in nature, custom, or positive law. In the following I will lay out Hayek's 
and Smith's formulations of rights. Smith argues for some kinds of natural rights, while 
Hayek argues for customary rights. In the section on evolutionary support for a private 
sphere, I will lay out the support for rights that we get from nature, though I am hesitant 
to use the term natural rights, primarily because the use of the term “rights” has become 
loaded and confusing, and ultimately it seems safest to say that rights are human 
constructs that nevertheless are founded on and supported by the nature of man. They 
are therefore neither relativistic nor merely conventional. It is this idea of rights as 
rooted in nature but formalized by convention that is meant by the phrase “natural 
conventionalism” that I will use throughout the following chapter.
Smith's Private Sphere
Smith does not use the term “private sphere” in any of his works, nor does he use 
the term “rights” in either TMS or WN. His discussion of rights is exclusively contained 
in his U ,  which is again that work where he makes the connection between TMS and WN 
most obvious. It is also the work most particularly concerned with law and government, 
and therefore the discussion of rights fits well, though their absence from his other works 
is worth pondering. His discussion of rights in U i s  extensive. He deals with five main 
types of rights including acquired rights, natural rights, perfect rights, personal rights, 
and real rights. The latter two are merely types of acquired rights, and have to do with 
the right to pursue grievances or reclaim property.
He follows Hutchinson and Puffendorf when he argues, “Perfect rights are those
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which we have a title to demand and if refused to compel an other to perform. What they 
call imperfect rights are those which correspond to those duties which ought to be 
performed to us by others but which we have no title to compel them to perform” (9). 
Smith uses the example of a beggar, who has an imperfect right to our charity. We ought 
to help him, but we cannot be coerced into doing so. “Imperfect rights,” according to 
Smith, “refer to distributive justice” (9). While imperfect rights may be related to things 
that are moral, natural, and good, it is not government's job to enforce these actions. 
Perfect rights have to do with commutative justice, and it is these which we will be 
focusing on, since they are the basis for all law. These perfect rights are those rights 
which we can defend using the coercive force of government. These perfect rights also 
make up a large part of the private sphere properly understood. The private sphere 
according to Smith's formulation can be said to consist in those perfect rights that we 
have the right to defend with coercive force.
Smith discusses natural rights as a form of perfect rights, though there does not 
seem to be any reason that there might be natural yet imperfect rights. In fact, Smith's 
discussion of the moral sentiments and the role of benevolence (1982a, 235-237) would 
seem to support the idea that there are many natural yet imperfect rights. However, 
government has a role only in perfect rights, and thus these perfect rights are Smith's 
primary concern. He opens his discussion arguing, “Now we may observe that the 
original of the greatest part of what are called natural rights {or those which are 
competent to a man merely as a man} need not be explained. That a man has received an 
injury when he is wounded or hurt any way is evident to reason....” (1982b, 13). He 
further argues that “The object of Justice is the security from injury, and it is the
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foundation of civil government” (1982b, 398). If rights are based on ways in which we 
can be injured in our body or our reputation, and prevention of such injury is the basis for 
civil government, then we see the integral connection between the existence of rights and 
the existence of government. We must have some kind of rights if government is to 
wield the coercive power necessary to prevent injury to those rights. If we do not have a 
right to our body, for example, then there can be no basis other than mere whim for a 
government to use coercive force to protect our bodies from other people. Thus, rights 
are at the root of legitimate civil government for Smith.
Smith's formulation of rights is useful in that he distinguishes between the rights 
of man as man and the rights of man as a member of various groups. The rights of man 
as man can be called natural rights, and Smith uses this language often. But, these rights 
can also include so-called acquired rights like that of property that, while natural, are not 
connected integrally to man. Thus, there can be imperfect natural rights, and perfect 
acquired rights. In his use of the term natural rights, Smith distinguishes himself from 
other classical liberals like Burke and-Hayek, both of whom avoid using the phrase 
natural rights, in large part due to the misuse of the phrase by the French revolutionaries 
and socialist thinkers. The rights of man as a member of a group include rights of 
members of families, and those conferred on citizens of a particular country, such as the 
right to vote. The latter rights are conventional, though one might argue that even these 
rights are rooted in human desires (the desire for participation in the political process, for 
example). The former rights, those of man as man, are the foundational rights that we 
are concerned with, and it is generally these rights which are at the heart of the private 
sphere (though the private sphere can be expanded to include the rights of men as a
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member of a group and often is, as in the case of the family). Smith describes the rights 
of man as man in U \  “We shall consider in the first place those rights that belong to a 
man as a man, as they are generally most simple and easily understood, and generally can 
be considered without respect to any other condition. A man merely as a man may be 
injured in three respects, either 1st, in his person; or 2dly, in his reputation; or 3dly, in his 
estate” (1982b, 8). Smith moves on to expand each of these three categories. The 
natural rights concerning man's body include “the right to free commerce, and the right to 
freedom in marriage,” and infringements on these rights are, according to Smith, 
“evidently incroachments on the right one has to the free use of his person and in a word 
to do what he has a mind when it does not prove detrimentall to any other person” (8). 
This formulation is similar to Mill's later discussion of the harm principle (Mill, 1975). 
These natural rights are the natural basis for Smith's arguments for free markets. Men 
should be generally free to dispose of the goods of his body as he sees fit. The only 
limits on these generalized rights seem to be to prevent harm to others. Obviously, the 
question then becomes how we define detriment to another person, which question Smith 
ignores for the moment.
Smith argues that “These rights which a man has to the preservation of his body 
and reputation from injury are called natural” (399). It is interesting that while property 
is a right of man as man, Smith does not define it as a natural right. The right to property 
is an acquired right, but one that is so foundational as to make it almost natural in origin. 
The right to property is the first obvious case of natural conventionalism in Smith's rights 
argument. The right to property, presumably because it does not relate to something 
inherently connected to man (such as his person or his reputation), cannot be a natural
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right. Property, however, is so foundational a right, as we saw in Smith's discussion in 
the chapter above on property, that it is necessary for the foundation of government. In 
fact, property might be called a naturally acquired right, in that the right naturally grows 
as civilization becomes more and more complex. We have already discussed the five 
ways in which Smith sees the right to property as being acquired, and all of these seem to 
come from natural relations of man to the objects he uses or come from natural properties 
of the objects themselves, and it is therefore natural that government should formalize the 
rules relating to these natural relations and properties over time. Property as acquired is 
thus not to be understood as merely conventional. It is acquired only insofar as it is not 
present in man from birth. The very acquisition of property itself is a natural 
phenomenon.
As would be expected, there is an important relationship between law and rights. 
For Smith, crimes are defined as infringements on natural or acquired rights. Rights limit 
the criminal laws that are passed, since if one does not have a right to something there 
can be no infringement on it (1982b, 105). “Crimes are of two sorts, either 1st, such as 
are an infringement of our natural rights, and affect either our person in killing, maiming, 
beating, or mutilating our body... Or, 2dly, they affect our acquired rights, and are an 
attack upon our property, by robbery, theft, larceny, etc.” (ibid.). Criminal law is related 
to the rights we have which are, in turn, related back to natural desires.
Punishment for crimes, which are all infringements on natural or acquired rights, 
comes from our natural moral sentiments, primarily resentment (1982b, 105). The 
severity of a punishment depends on the resentment the observers feel toward the 
perpetrator. As Smith points out, murder, being the worst crime possible, attaches to it
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the greatest resentment of the spectator (1982,476). Thus, those who murder are 
punished with the most severe punishments, which is in accordance to our natural moral 
sentiments.
For Smith, the rights we have seem to be defined in a backward manner. Our 
rights are linked to sentiments of mankind. We feel resentment when someone is injured. 
The strength of this resentment forms the basis for punishment of those who injure 
others. That we desire to punish offenders leads to the formalizing of a right to self­
protection or freedom from attack of others. We do not feel resentment because our 
rights have been injured. We have rights because we feel resentment when we are 
injured.
This justification for rights is close to what evolutionary theory predicts. The 
only difference is that from evolutionary theory we can predict what the moral 
sentiments will be (and what is ultimately at the root of those sentiments) and how they 
will affect our understanding of what rights make up the private sphere. If the moral 
sentiments are ultimately rooted in survival and reproduction, offenses that threaten 
survival and reproduction will create more resentment than other kinds of offenses.
Smith takes his cues solely from the moral sentiments, and the kinds of resentment we 
feel toward particular injuries to our person or property. He is thus in the realm of 
greater speculation and uncertainty, since these sentiments are somewhat variable and 
may be corrupted. Evolutionary theory allows us to understand the logic behind the 
moral sentiments which places us on more solid ground in our attempt to determine the 
relationship between those sentiments and rights.
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Hayek's Private Sphere
Hayek is both more clear than Smith on precisely how the private sphere operates 
and its general utility in a system of liberty, and also less clear about the foundations of 
the rights that make up that protected sphere. Hayek's major concern, as usual, is the 
creation of a general framework for action. The private sphere is integral to a basic 
framework for actions where individuals fill in the blanks according to their 
circumstances. The creation of a general framework for action is related again to the 
epistemological concerns that are at the heart of Hayek's overall theories. His discussion 
of the role of the lawmaker makes this explicit: “In most circumstances, however, it will 
better serve his purposes if he gives merely general instructions about the kinds of 
actions to be performed or the ends to be achieved at certain times, and leaves it to the 
different individuals to fill in the details according to circumstances” (1960,150). In the 
creation of a general framework, the legislator will necessarily leave out a great many 
areas of life that then become an area of protected action for individuals. Government 
needs to only to prohibit force or fraud. Generally, however, the classical liberal ideal is 
that what is not explicitly illegal becomes part of the extended protected sphere of 
individual action.
As pointed out above, the general rules which create the negative space that 
becomes the private sphere serve an important epistemological function for individuals.
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Hayek argues, “The chief function of rules of just conduct is thus to tell each what he 
can count upon, what material objects or services he can use for his purposes, and what is 
the range of actions open to him” (1976, 37). All of these are connected in some way to 
the idea of a private sphere. The rules that one can count upon and the objects one can 
use for his purposes are connected to rights like property. Hayek makes the connection 
to the protected private sphere explicit, arguing, “The rules of just conduct thus delimit 
protected domains not by directly assigning particular things to particular persons, but by 
making it possible to derive from ascertainable facts to whom particular things belong” 
(1976, 37). In the case of private property, the government does not say, “this house 
belongs to Jim.” What it does say is that if Jim acquired this house through a certain 
legitimate range of actions, then he owns that house. A set of if-then rules protects the 
private sphere of individuals by making many actions possible rather than having to rely 
on a specific dictate of government. Again, “What rules of just conduct in fact do is to 
say under what conditions his or that action will be within the range of the permissible; 
but they leave it to the individuals under these rules to create their own protected domain. 
Or, in legal terms, the rules do not confer rights on particular persons, but lay down the 
conditions under which such rights can be acquired” (38).
Individuals need the freedom of a private sphere of protected actions and goods to 
plan ahead for the future, but they also need that sphere more obviously to protect 
themselves from the daily assaults of other individuals. Hayek's epistemological 
argument is linked to his moral argument against coercion. Hayek even defines coercion 
in terms of data and information, arguing that “Since coercion is the control of the 
essential data of an individual's action by another, it can be prevented only by enabling
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the individual to secure for himself some private sphere where he is protected against 
such interference” (1960, 139). Thus, the private sphere gives individuals the 
information they need about their environment to make decisions, while at the same time 
denying that information to others who would use it to the individual's disadvantage.
Moreover, the very concept of a private sphere or a distinction between public 
and private (though this distinction is by no means perfect, as is discussed below) is 
necessary to understanding precisely what coercion is. If we have no understanding of a 
private good, there can be no way of arguing against the interference of the government 
in our most private moments. Hayek agrees, arguing, “Coercion not only would exist but 
would be much more common if no such protected sphere existed. Only in a society that 
has already attempted to prevent coercion by some demarcation of a protected sphere can 
a concept like 'arbitrary interference' have a definite meaning” (139). The existence of a 
private sphere is absolutely necessary if we are to be able to recognize and defend 
ourselves against interference in our lives.
Hayek resists defining in detail what kinds of rights ought to be included in the 
private sphere, in part because such a sphere will change subtly depending on the kind of 
society one is in, but more importantly because defining the protected sphere in too 
definite terms eradicates the flexibility necessary to protect some rights that may be ill- 
defined. The founders debated this point when discussing the Bill of Rights, with 
Hamilton and Madison pointing out that the Constitution is set up in such a way as to 
create a private sphere, and also that there exists the danger of those rights that are not 
included in a bill of rights being absorbed back into the public sphere (Hamilton and 
Madison 1961, 579-581).
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Hayek nevertheless attempts to give us a rough sketch of what that private sphere 
ought to include at the simplest level: “We cannot enumerate here all the rights or 
protected interests which serve to secure to the legal person a known sphere of 
unimpeded action... [T]he recognition of a protected individual sphere has in times of 
freedom normally included a right to privacy and secrecy, the conception that a man's 
house is his castle and that nobody has a right even to take cognizance of his activities 
within it” (1960, 142). He acknowledges that due to the nature of the private sphere, it 
may be necessary to formalize some of these rights, even though an informal system may 
provide more flexibility. Certainly, enumerating precisely what is to be included in a bill 
of rights is troublesome.
Part of the problem of enumerating the rights within a private sphere comes back 
to the problem of knowledge. We do not know enough to fix once and for all the rights 
that exist within the private sphere. We need to know quite a bit about human nature, 
how individuals interact within a given society, the kinds of stresses and pressures of 
commerce and other individual relationships before we determine that such and such a 
set of rights are to be permanently included or excluded from the private sphere. Such a 
lack of knowledge tends to support the classical liberal idea that we try to make the 
sphere as large as possible by limiting individual action only as it includes force and 
fraud. Hayek makes this point: “Nor would it be desirable to have the particular contents 
of a man's private sphere fixed once and for all. If people are to make the best use of 
their knowledge and capacities and foresight, it is desirable that they themselves have 
some voice in the determination of what will be included in their personal protected 
sphere” (140). Generally speaking, actions between consenting adults, including
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contracts, relationships, and other forms of private behavior, should be generally left 
alone. This provides the widest arena in which individuals can act using their particular 
knowledge.
There are, however, limits on how protected the protected sphere actually is. 
Hayek underscores these limitations by arguing that how other people feel about our 
actions should not be an adequate reason for interference in one's private affairs. There 
is a limit to the sphere of privacy. For Hayek, “[the aim of the protected sphere] cannot 
be to protect people against all actions by other that may be harmful to them but only to 
keep certain of the data of their actions from the control of others” (145). An offensive 
comment does not count as an injury to us or an infringement on our rights or protected 
sphere. As Hayek points out, “In particular, the pleasure or pain that may be caused by 
the knowledge of other people's actions should never be regarded as a legitimate cause 
for coercion” (145).
In fact, the success of the private sphere in general means that there will be some 
overlap between protected spheres, for there are very few if any behaviors or actions that 
have no effect on other people. Thus, the theory of the private sphere insists that we are 
protected only against force and fraud, and that we ignore smaller infringements on our 
rights with the understanding that other people are similarly ignoring irritating things that 
we do. How we may feel about an individual's actions within his protected sphere is 
irrelevant to whether or not he has the freedom to do those things, provided of course that 
he is not engaging in force or fraud.
Moreover, protecting the private sphere does not mean that what we do in our 
private lives is to be ignored completely by those around us. Protecting the private
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sphere merely means that the government cannot step in and prevent us from doing 
certain things, nor can our neighbor forcibly prevent us from taking certain actions. This 
says nothing about social disapproval. Here Hayek differs from Mill, who argued against 
even social disapproval as too great an infringement on our liberty (Mill, 1975). Hayek 
and Smith both seem to agree that social disapproval is a necessary part of a free society, 
and plays a valuable role in the preservation of the mores and manners that tie a people 
together. If I decide to do something that the law does not prohibit, no one can forcibly 
make me stop, but my neighbors may have something to say about it, and I may decide 
that the brunt of neighborly gossip, scorn, or ostracism is more than I am willing to deal 
with. Such disapproval is not an infringement on our protected sphere, but is merely one 
more piece of information that we add to the pile when calculating the pros and cons of a 
particular action.
Like most of Hayek's philosophy, his discussion of the private sphere is more 
factual than it is philosophical. While his defense of the private sphere is excellent, his 
argument for the origin of the rights that make up the private sphere is essentially 
nonexistent. In fact, his argument for a widely defined private sphere could be construed 
as an attempt to deal with the relativism inherent in his doctrine. If we cannot tell what 
rights are more important than others, or which might be universally important, we 
should define the private sphere as broadly as possible to leave room for all these 
uncertainties. Yet, it seems clear, as we see from Smith's account, that some rights are 
more important than others. We feel more resentment toward someone who stabs us than 
toward someone who steals our pen, and the sentiments of the impartial observer agree 
with our own. Hayek would have us treat these two actions as infringements on our
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private sphere, and while I am sure that he would argue that the punishment ought to be 
higher for the stabber than for the thief, he cannot offer any reason why this might be so 
other than the argument that it has always been this way. Smith at least ties these 
differences to human nature and the natural moral sentiments that we all share, though he 
does not tell us where these sentiments come from.
What both Smith and Hayek lack is a comprehensive account of the origin and 
relative strengths of the rights that make up the private sphere. By focusing on the 
origins of these rights, and the origins of the sentiments that make us respect these rights 
and that form the foundation for these rights, we can form a more accurate picture of the 
private sphere. We can also form a more comprehensive justification of the private 
sphere. By arguing that these rights are not merely conventional rights but human goods 
that are important to humans across time and cultures, we provide a stronger defense than 
mere convention, and make the argument for liberty within rule of law that much 
stronger.
The Evolutionary Private Sphere
As we can see from Smith and Hayek's understandings of rights and their relation 
to the private sphere, the latter is essentially an all-encompassing idea that includes ideas 
of limited government, prevention of force and fraud, and the importance of rule of law.
I argue in the next section that a broadly defined private sphere is the best way to satisfy 
individual desires. Amhart argues that “the good is the desirable” and that “human ethics 
is natural insofar as it satisfies natural human desires” (1998, 6, 29). However, as
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Amhart points out, there are many desires contained in human nature, some of which 
conflict. Prudence is necessary to determine how best to fulfill the most important 
desires that form the basis for a complete life (1-2). Prudence, simply, is the application 
of principles to the knowledge of particulars, or the application of theory to practice.
This application requires the knowledge of both theory and the particulars of practice in 
order to create the best outcome. I argue that allowing individuals the freedom to make 
decisions in most areas of their life allows for the most pmdent outcomes, since 
individuals will be those with the best knowledge of their particular situations, their own 
desires and the ranking of those desires, as well as their particular talents and aptitudes. 
Thus, the individual liberty contained in the private sphere allows for the prudential 
action of individuals, and creates the best system in which humans can attempt to create a 
complete human life.
As I will argue, the private sphere in evolutionary terms is framed by natural 
human desires. Amhart (1998) lists twenty major desires of humans. These desires 
“direct and limit the social variability of human beings as adapted to diverse ecological 
circumstances” (36). These desires limit what societies are capable of, and “....every 
human society must have rules for the proper expression of [these] desire[s]” (31). These 
desires include a complete life, parental care, sexual identity, sexual mating, familial 
bonding, friendship, social ranking, justice as reciprocity, political rule, war, health, 
beauty, wealth, speech, practical habituation, practical reasoning, practical arts, aesthetic 
pleasure, religious understanding, and intellectual understanding (36). Insofar as these 
are in fact natural desires that form the basis for individual action, they also, to a certain 
extent, form the basis for a private sphere. It could be predicted that if these goods are
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the most important to human life, and if these goods can be attained most efficiently 
through individual action rather than through governmental control, that humans will 
generally desire freedom in these areas of life.
All of these goods are private goods (in that they are the function of an individual 
rather than a particular group) that have more or less important political impacts. 
Something like beauty may have little or no real effect on political goods (though of 
course we are aware of cases where the effect of beauty on world affairs is great) but the 
rest of these goods all have an effect on politics, from the great impacts of the desire for 
war to the smaller but more cumulative effects of desires like those for practical 
habituation or parental care. The intertwining of the private sphere with the public is 
made clear by Pinker again in his discussion of the basis of different ethical positions. 
Moral judgments can be framed in three different ways, with reference to the autonomy 
of the individual, the well-being of the community, or a sense of holiness usually 
attached to a divinity of some sort. Pinker points out that while different groups tend to 
highlight one of these viewpoints at the expense of the others, in fact researchers now 
view these “moral spheres not as arbitrary cultural variants but as universal mental 
faculties with different evolutionary origins and functions” (272). The anger one feels 
when one's rights have been violated is an “other-condemning” emotion that has its roots 
in cheater-detection, while disgust, an other-condemning emotion with roots in the 
sphere of divinity, “evolved from a system for avoiding biological contaminants like 
disease and spoilage” (ibid).
Thus, no matter how much Western philosophers try to argue for a strict private 
sphere, there is really no strict demarcation between the public and the private, at least in
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most people's minds. What makes most sense is to take a look at what works best for 
both the individual and the community, and attempt to protect those goods that benefit 
both. Family life is such a good, as is private property.
While there is no strict theoretical distinction between the private and the public, 
it makes sense to delimit a private, albeit permeable sphere that is outside the realm of 
governmental interference except in cases of force or fraud, but which is not outside the 
realm of social condemnation. In the following I will take a look at the case of the 
kibbutz, and demonstrate that where the private sphere is essentially done away with, it is 
gradually replaced. Where the family is annihilated it will grow back, and with it a 
private sphere wherein individuals and their close relations make decisions on how to 
live that impact themselves and the community, which will promote a spontaneous order 
that supports cooperation between unknown individuals.
Livelihood and the Family
Niles Eldridge argues that “organisms do two -  and only two -  kinds of things. 
They (1) engage in matter/energy transfer processes that enable them to differentiate and 
develop from a fertilized zygote, grow to adulthood and maintain the soma. And they (2) 
reproduce” (Scher and Rauscher, 2003; 93). Admittedly, humans do these two things in 
a much more complex way than any other organism. However, in reality, survival and 
reproduction are at the heart of the evolutionary game, and how well an individual 
accomplishes both of these tasks will determine what, if any, genetic legacy he or she 
leaves behind. The relationship between the evolutionary goods of survival and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
136
reproduction and the classical liberal institution of the private sphere may not be as 
obvious as other connections, such as the human desire for private property. Indeed, it 
might be argued that the best way to foster survival and reproduction of individuals is to 
let the state take care of each of these aspects of human life. Some would argue that this 
is precisely what the welfare state attempts to do.
Yet, when looked at more closely, taking into account the lessons learned from 
Smith and Hayek, and taking into consideration the predictions and evidence from 
evolutionary theory and related fields, it seems more and more obvious that in most areas 
of survival and reproduction, leaving individuals to their own devices is probably best.
In the following I have chosen two goods, that of livelihood and that of family life, as 
goods that are best left to individual choice and actions, and in which the dangers of state 
interference are obvious. I approach these two goods from the perspective of morality, 
politics, and epistemology, and such an approach could easily be used on other 
“evolutionary goods” that we might want to include in the private sphere. I have chosen 
livelihood and family life because these two aspects of human life are integral to both the 
survival and reproduction of individual humans.
Livelihood and the Private Sphere
In the case of livelihood, it seems obvious that how an individual earns his living 
is intimately connected with his survival, as well as with the quality of that survival.
Even the phrase “to earn a living” suggests how closely issues of employment and 
choices of livelihood impact the overall lives and survival of individuals. In the
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following I offer some evidence from various fields that the choice of livelihood ought to 
be left primarily to individuals. I also offer some predictions from evolutionary theory 
that have yet to be tested and which might be interesting subjects for future research.
I will start with the practical or epistemological arguments for freedom in choice 
of employment. The basic practical argument is that it is impossible to know what each 
person needs and wants at any given point in time, as well as impossible to know the 
talents and aptitudes of each particular person, or what the demands for those talents 
might be at any particular point in time.
A central authority does not have enough knowledge of time and place, of 
particular circumstances, to make complete and efficient decisions using resources 
effectively. This truth about human knowledge is perhaps the most true when it comes to 
choice of livelihood. In The Republic, Socrates argues that each individual soul should 
be investigated and ranked in terms of bronze, silver, or gold. Such a ranking will 
determine the individual's place in society and what he or she is best cut out to do. 
Socrates's very definition of justice in The Republic is doing that for which one is most 
fit (Plato 1968,433a-b).
Such a ranking system is confronted at the very beginning with an 
insurmountable problem of knowledge. First, humans are complex, and individuals often 
have more than one talent in the same way that each has more than one deficiency. 
Second, how will such an end be determined? What type of test will determine the state 
of one’s soul? Such a test would have to take into account individual temperament, 
talents, physical strengths and weaknesses, present and future longings and myriad other 
factors, and then such a test would have to rank these things in order, to determine which
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talent should be fostered at the expense of others. Obviously, the individual has more 
access to this knowledge than anyone else, and is therefore best able to rank his desires 
and talents in a way most productive for himself and society. Giving the individual 
power over his future leads to greater efficiency, as each individual makes decisions in 
accord with what he understands of himself and his surroundings.
Some evolutionary theorists have underscored the importance of human potential 
or human flourishing as an outgrowth of the complexity of human nature. Amhart uses 
the term “desire” (1998), Chisholm uses the term “capabilities” (1999), following 
Nussbaum, and Wilson (Scher and Rauscher, 2003) uses the term “human potential.” In 
all these cases, these uses are a way of defining and categorizing the many innate and 
sometimes conflicting desires in human nature.
Chisholm (1999) discusses human nature in terms of capabilities. Humans as 
humans have a range of capabilities, all of which should be present in some form for a 
complete human life to result. The question for political thinkers then becomes whether 
we should help these capabilities along. Chisholm seems to argue that we should. The 
question then shifts to a question of how best to provide for and encourage these 
capabilities. Taking Hayek's arguments from epistemology seriously, the best and most 
efficient way to help humans live up to their capabilities is to provide a general sphere of 
freedom in which wealth is maximized, and where individuals are free to choose their 
mate, their job, their neighborhood, their habits and hobbies, their religion, and their 
friends, all while protected against serious accidents and emergencies by a very basic 
safety net provided by the state . This very basic safety net will be supplemented by the 
safety nets provided by family and friends, as well as by private philanthropic agencies.
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Chisholm himself argues that “Perhaps the most basic of all human capabilities is the 
freedom to pursue alternative futures” (234), and that “The capability to achieve a good 
human life includes the freedom to do so” (Chisholm 1999,238). If human freedom is 
necessarily connected to the capabilities that make up a complete human life, then we 
must provide that freedom or risk thwarting those human capabilities.
Amhart (1998) and other thinkers who take an Aristotelian view of human life 
appeal to human flourishing to make a similar argument. In Amhart's case, prudence or 
practical wisdom is at the heart of his argument for a “Darwinian natural right.” Amhart 
argues that there are natural human desires that limit what we can do; yet, these 
limitations can be combined more or less effectively by the use of practical reason. 
Human flourishing then will be the result of knowledge of these eternal facets of human 
nature, combined with the knowledge of the particular circumstances of an individual 
human life in which these desires take concrete shape. Practical wisdom results when an 
individual has made good decisions regarding how to fulfill her various desires in a 
comprehensive, complete way. This task is impossible for anyone but the individual.
There is not a single evolutionary theorist with whom I am familiar who argues 
that the complexity of human nature dictates a simplistic, “one size fits all” attitude in 
any policy arena. Instead, those thinkers who take both human nature and politics 
seriously tend to emphasize the importance of pmdence or practical wisdom in human 
life. It is no accident that prudence or practical wisdom is at the heart of classical liberal 
philosophy as well. Thinkers like Burke have even been accused of relativism in their 
efforts to emphasize the importance of flexible action and prudential foresight in political 
life. In fact, some have argued that the exercise of practical wisdom is “a human being's
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unique excellence,” and that such wisdom is “the virtue that achieves, integrates, and 
unifies all the other ends that constitute human flourishing” (Rasmussen and Den Uyl 
2005, 275).This unification cannot occur through other-directed actions, but must occur 
within the individual, who has more knowledge (though hardly complete knowledge) of 
his own internal nature and the external conditions surrounding him. Thus, at least in 
this area, there is a perfect match-up between the flexible, complex, yet permanent nature 
discussed by the evolutionary theorist and the prudential reflection and individual action 
proposed by the classical liberal.
As a result of the problem of knowledge that results from a complex human 
nature, there are implications for group fitness and adaptation as well. Individual 
freedom in livelihood allows for faster adaptation of the group and the individual to 
changing environmental pressures. This adaptation is cultural, not genetic, and has been 
discussed by thinkers like Hayek (1960), who argues for “The Creative Powers of a Free 
Civilization” as an advantage of increasing liberty. Giving the individual autonomy in 
where and when to work allows the individual a greater range of freedom to innovate and 
circumvent environmental barriers. In societies where humans are becoming more 
dependent on fewer resources, it is especially important for the fitness of society in 
general that we allow individuals to experiment freely. The incredible progress of the 
last hundred years must be attributed largely to allowing individuals free rein to work on 
a chosen problem of society that they feel uniquely qualified to address. No central 
authority can make a more accurate match.
In fact, one benefit of the market system is that it gives individuals the necessary 
information about wages, workdays, and so on, so that they can make decisions that are
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in line with their own preferences and situations. Such knowledge, meanwhile, helps in 
the creation of a spontaneous order, thus controlling the number of individuals in a given 
profession, for example, without governmental control. Such a system is not only more 
efficient than centralized control, but is also more compatible with the natural human 
desire for freedom. As Rubin points out, “The mobility that capitalism created also 
allows individuals to move within society to find a congenial life style, and geographic 
mobility within a given political jurisdiction is relatively easy and is apparently 
becoming easier” (Rubin 2002,184).
The second important reason for human freedom in livelihood is that whenever 
one is confronted with a mixed human nature, one is also confronted with the problem of 
understanding the motives behind those who wish to control the lives of others. Thanks 
to a complex and variable human nature (Amhart 1998; Buss 2005; Hrdy 1999; Konner 
2002; Rubin 2002), humans have desires for both freedom and domination. The natural 
human desire for status makes it difficult to trust people. While humans are social, they 
also have individualistic tendencies that make the socialistic communalism impossible to 
sustain. Rubin points out the problem of envy in human life, which makes trusting the 
motives of those who wish to control aspects of our lives dangerous. Human envy stems 
in part from the problem of relative fitness, which will be discussed in a later chapter. It 
also stems from the hierarchical tendencies in human nature (Cummins 2005). The 
desire for status makes us particularly sensitive to the position of others, meaning that we 
are particularly concerned with those above us. Rubin points out that those who are poor 
and low-status are at greater risk for a variety of illnesses and early death. Helping the 
poor escape their poverty seems to be a worthwhile goal. Yet Rubin points out that how
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we do it can have different effects on individual liberty.
Rubin argues that we should increase the incomes of the poor, not decrease the 
incomes of the rich (2002, 111). One of the motivations of income redistribution that 
Rubin fears is that of envy. In the first place, he points out that “a desire for freedom is 
an evolutionarily very old characteristic of humans, and throughout most of human 
existence, most humans (or, at least, most males) have been quite free” (2002, 113). This 
natural desire for freedom is complicated because humans also have a desire to dominate 
over other individuals. Individuals desire to be both free and dominant. Obviously, in a 
group these desires are not compatible. These dual desires, for freedom for oneself and 
domination over others, makes regimes of freedom particularly vulnerable to gradual 
erosion. The desire for envy has been a particularly troublesome desire in regimes based 
on liberty.
The third primary argument for freedom in terms of livelihood is a psychological 
argument having to do with personal responsibility. The argument is roughly as follows. 
Humans who have the choice of what they want to do are more likely to choose 
occupations that are in line with their own natural talents and aptitudes and are thus more 
likely to be content. Further, because they have chosen their particular job in some way, 
they are more likely to be responsible for their actions and to feel a personal 
responsibility for the outcome of their work.
Hayek, in The Constitution o f  Liberty, focuses on individual responsibility as the 
basis for a free state. From an evolutionary perspective, individual responsibility is not 
only necessary for a free state, but is also one of the main reasons for a free state as well. 
Individuals are generally the key unit of selection in natural selection (Sober 1984,184-
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208). While group selection may have been important in particular times and 
circumstances (and may have played a role in the evolution of altruistic behavior) 
(Wilson and Sober, 1994) it is generally the individual on whom selection acts. While 
inclusive fitness, or the fitness of an individual that takes into account those closely 
related to her, is an important concept, much of the literature in kin selection is devoted 
to understanding not only how sharing genes leads to cooperation, but also how not 
sharing enough genes can lead to conflicting desires. From an evolutionary perspective, 
the individual is the only one with a one-hundred-percent stake in his survival. Even 
close kin do not feel this pull as strongly, as Robert Wright humorously points out in his 
discussion of the evolutionary origin of parent-child conflicts of interest (1994).
That the individual is the person primarily concerned in his own survival is not a 
new concept in political philosophy; classical liberals argue against absolute power with 
the claim that the individual is the only one with a complete stake in his own survival. 
This does not mean that individuals will always make the best decisions from an 
evolutionary perspective. If everyone were equally good at surviving and reproducing, 
there would be no differential survival and reproduction on which natural selection can 
act. Natural selection presupposes that there will be differences on which selection forces 
can act. However, the question from a political perspective is whether to allow those 
differences to be the result of individual trial and failure, or whether to let the 
government control the individual's actions, thus taking responsibility for success or 
failure out of the individual's hands. If there is ignorance about particular human traits 
and desires, and if the motivations of those who attempt to control our choices in 
livelihood are at best unclear, and if the individual is ultimately the person most
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interested in his own survival and reproduction, it makes sense to allow the individual the 
freedom and responsibility for his own survival and reproduction.
An evolutionary theory of occupation might shed some light on the failure of 
particular governmental and societal interventions in employment. Tiger and Shepher's 
discussion of patterns of employment in the kibbutz is illuminating. While equality 
between the sexes was an important principle within the kibbutz, the de facto situation 
continually highlighted sex-differences in the type of work pursued. Men were more 
likely to hold high ranking posts within the kibbutz, and were seen significantly less 
often in service positions, such as daycare and nursing. Tiger and Shepher conclude that, 
“Whatever the personal processes are, they cause a significantly asymmetrical division of 
labor that fails to manifest the ideology of the kibbutz founders” (116). Evolutionary 
theory would predict just such a discrepancy. In fact, there has been research done on the 
effect of sex differences on occupational choice. Barash and Lipton (2001) argue that 
there are natural differences between the sexes, and that these differences will affect the 
kinds the occupations men and women choose. If there are stable sex-differences caused 
by selection pressures, then attempting to control employment in the name of equality 
seems unlikely to be successful. On the other hand, this is also no argument for forcing 
people into sex-defined occupations, since Tiger and Shepher's evidence demonstrates 
that while sex-differentiation in jobs was still high in the kibbutz, some women did find 
the typically male jobs interesting and satisfying. Ultimately, evidence that shows sex- 
differentiation in employment should lead to policies that support freedom of choice in 
employment. Because of individual differences, governmental intervention in 
employment will tend to make people less satisfied than if they were allowed freedom in
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this area, since individuals are the only ones with the knowledge of their particular 
aptitudes and desires. Sex-differences are simply one of the most obvious causes of the 
individual differences that influences occupational decisions.
Politically speaking, there is one other, more abstract, reason for allowing 
freedom in employment. Because of the central nature that occupation plays in most 
people's lives, it will be strongly linked to other important aspects of individual life. This 
increases the chances of unintentional side-effects that could occur if government 
attempts to control too closely what jobs people take. Occupation is linked to numerous 
other human goods, like mate-choice, status, friendship, political rule, and intellectual 
and practical reasoning. Controlling occupation thus has the effect of controlling one's 
status, the people one meets (including potential friends and mates), as well as more 
abstract goods like intellectual curiosity. Just as we will see the unintentional effects of 
governmental control over reproduction, there are probably also unintentional effects of 
governmental control over employment that go beyond mere economic inefficiency.
Perhaps the overarching lesson from evolutionary theory is that individuals are 
important. Rubin argues that “Humans are individualistic. Because of frequency 
dependent selection and perhaps for other reasons, we are different from each other and 
have different preferences. Evolution will not generate the same sets of genes or 
preferences for everyone. Human individuality is important, and political ideologies or 
theories that assume everyone to be the same will invariably create much human misery” 
(2002, 183). If, in fact, individuals are important, and individual lives and potentials are 
foundational to what it means to be human, then it makes sense to allow those individual 
lives and potentials to unfold along the lines deemed most fit by those individuals
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themselves. A large part of this freedom will take place in the area of freedom of 
occupation, since the occupation we choose is at the heart of most human lives.
Evolutionary theory can offer us some predictions for future study of employment 
as an important part of the private sphere. Some of these predictions follow. Humans 
will desire more rather than less freedom in cases regarding freedom of livelihood.
When humans have more freedom to choose their employment, they will be more 
satisfied and happier. As job satisfaction increases, humans will have more of a sense of 
responsibility to their employers, and there will probably be a corresponding increase in 
productivity. Freedom of choice in employment will speed up economic growth and 
productivity. Freedom of choice in livelihood will promote the creation of a stable, 
spontaneous order, with individuals looking to wages and other indicators to make 
judgments in absence of complex information. A regime in which individuals have 
freedom from governmental coercion in employment will be more stable than other 
regimes, since more human desires are satisfied in the former than the latter.
Obviously, there are many barriers to absolute free choice in livelihood. Physical 
and mental ability, particular talents, economic resources and education, and physical 
barriers such as distance all prevent some of us from doing what we would ideally like to 
be doing. There may be ways around some of these barriers, and others may be 
impassable. I argue only for limiting one particular barrier, that of governmental 
coercion.
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Reproduction and the Private Sphere
The second major area of human life that needs to be included in the private 
sphere is that of family life. Hayek notes that, “so far as the family is concerned, there 
exists a curious contrast between the esteem most people profess for the institution and 
their dislike of the fact that being bom into a particular family should confer on a person 
special advantages” (1960, 89). Utopians attempt to strip family life from human life 
primarily to equalize opportunities for offspring. The desire to control family life for 
particular political ends is a desire that we see everywhere from Plato's Republic to the 
present-day kibbutzim. Control of family life by the state is confronted with the same 
basic problems at the outset as control of livelihood, but these problems are perhaps even 
stronger because of the foundational nature of the family in human life.
The first problem in controlling the family is the problem of knowledge. Parents 
as primary care-givers and genetic relatives have more intimate knowledge of the 
particular circumstances of a child than the state could ever have. Children each have 
different temperaments, even within the same family, and these differing temperaments 
mean that parents will have to treat each child uniquely. It is only in this particular 
circumstance that abstention from a general rule of law will be permitted. Treating every 
child exactly the same will result in shy children becoming more shy, or dominant 
children becoming more dominant, or artistic children never getting the chance to 
experiment with art. Evolutionary theory predicts that parents, with their intimate 
knowledge of the environment and the temperament of their child, have the capacity to
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raise their children in a way the state never could, since the state lacks both knowledge of 
the child and knowledge of the environment.
Further than simple knowledge of the children involved, individuals have variable 
desires depending on their time of life, their economic situation, their relationship with 
kin, their relationship with their spouse and so on. These desires make central control 
over individual lives extremely difficult to sustain. As Hrdy (1999), Konner (2002), 
Amhart (1998), and Pinker (2002) point out, much of what characterizes the human 
species is an adaptive adaptability. While this adaptability makes it difficult to predict 
what any given individual will do in any specific situation, we can make general 
predictions about patterns of behavior across cultures. The problem is that for 
centralized control we need to be able to predict how individuals will react to particular 
situations. Those who desire to change human nature through societal control will often 
be surprised by the unintended consequences of such control. There are natural desires 
that limit what is possible. Moreover, such natural desires make individual action and 
choice a better alternative than governmental control. More than this, the desires 
associated with family and reproduction are so strong that they ought to be left within the 
private sphere, with governmental action limited to preventing force or fraud between 
individuals.
The second major problem with state control of reproduction is the problem of the 
motivations behind such control. While in the case of the kibbutzim, control over child- 
rearing is handed over to the community voluntarily in the name of equality of the sexes, 
such control has typically not been handed over voluntarily, and the motives of the 
individuals involved have often been less than beneficent. Sarah Hrdy (1999) discusses
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numerous examples of the control that is often exerted over reproduction, particularly 
female reproduction. Male control over female reproduction is seen in almost every 
species of primates, and often takes the form of infanticide by rivals (in langurs and 
humans, for example). Hrdy speculates that “the behavior of infanticidal men is 
homologous to that of their primate cousins in only the most general sense. They are 
motivated to strive for status, to compete for access to females, to avoid investing in 
unrelated infants, to adopt patterns of behavior more likely to enhance than decrease 
long-term inclusive fitness. The specific similarities, then, are merely analogous 
solutions to common problems these variously endowed animals confront” (1999, 244). 
These behaviors can take the form of fathers protecting and caring for their children, or 
they can take the form of rape, infanticide, spousal and child abuse, and various more 
subtle forms of male control over female reproduction that range from foot binding to 
veils to seclusion. Even in the Oneida community, where individuals were bound by an 
ideology of equality, the founder, John Noyes, reserved the right to initiate young virgins 
prior to their marriage (Amhart 1998, 95).
Even in societies like Oneida that are devoted to equality between the sexes, there 
will be an incredible interest in controlling reproduction. If the motives for control over 
female reproduction are so great, and the outcomes often dangerous to female autonomy 
and the health of females and their children, it certainly seems best to support a system in 
which women and men are both protected from force and fraud in their reproductive 
endeavors, while preventing government from interfering in reproduction and family life 
in general.
Even in the case of kin, the motives for control over reproduction are often not in
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the individual's best interest. Hrdy discusses cases in which parental interests differ from 
the interests of the child, pointing out that “In the West, such conflicts have tended to be 
over education, inheritances, career decisions, social or sexual choices. Parental 
preferences rarely place infants in mortal peril. Elsewhere, though, parents literally 
sacrifice children to family goals” (318). Hrdy discusses cases of infanticide where the 
child is taken from the mother by family members. In one instance, a Pakistani female 
twin is separated from her brother and bottle-fed while her sibling is nursed. The female 
infant dies shortly after from dysentary and malnutrition (1999, 318-324). Other times, 
the control is more subtle, as when the pressure of a husband and his family to bear a son 
influences maternal desires. While such familial control over reproduction is dangerous 
to female autonomy, the most we can hope to do is to prevent the most egregious acts of 
force and fraud and hope that, generally, the interests of the individual are in line with 
those of his or her family members. Any further interference by the state runs the risk of 
creating unintended consequences and possibly even further eroding the liberty the 
government is trying to preserve.
A further reason for freedom in parental care is connected to personal 
responsibility. Parents have a stake in their children's lives that the state does not have, 
by virtue of sharing genes with them. Parents have a desire to have children and children 
have a desire to be taken care of by one or two specific caregivers (Hrdy, 1999). With 
parental desire comes immense responsibility, however, and it is difficult to see how the 
state could have a greater psychological desire for a child's welfare than a parent could. 
The relative rarity of extreme abuse by natural parents is one example of the benefits of 
keeping children with parents. Abuse by step-parents and non-related caregivers is more
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common, demonstrating that when one lacks the stake in a child's life created by parental 
desire and responsibility, the results are often dangerous for the children themselves 
(Daly and Wilson, 1985).
Amhart argues that the bond between parent and child is the foundational bond 
for humans. While we expect variation in the particulars of family structure there will be 
enduring patterns of child-care that are universal across cultures. It is these universals 
that allow us to determine whether some types of family life are better than others at 
satisfying the desires of both parents and children (89). If parent-child bonding is indeed 
the primary natural bond for humans, then we would expect to find this bond at the 
center of human life, no matter what society we find ourselves in, and we would expect 
that humans would resist most serious interferences with this bond. Amhart argues that 
this is indeed the case: “The evidence from these utopian communes as well as other 
biological and anthropological evidence suggest that the parent-child bond must hold a 
central place in the organization of human desires” (89).
Amhart's discussion of the Oneida community and the Israeli kibbutzim shows 
the difficulties inherent in radically changing the parent-child bond. While people can be 
willing to sacrifice many of their natural desires to ideologically driven communities, 
Amhart points out that evidence from the kibbutzim and other utopian communities 
shows us that the sacrifice of these natural desires is painful and requires much devotion 
to the larger principles for which these desires are sacrificed (1998, 95). Moreover, the 
experience of both mothers and children in the kibbutzim suggests that in most cases the 
communal rearing of children will be too painful for mothers and children to bear (Pinker 
2002; Tiger and Shepher 1975). Tiger and Shepher argue that the primary reason that the
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communal child-rearing was not more devastating was because it occurred within a 
close-knit, small community with deeply shared values (101). One of the only facts that 
makes the kibbutz or Oneida situations tolerable is that the eradication of the family takes 
place within a voluntary community. The individuals who started these communities 
were able and willing to make great sacrifices for what they saw as a greater good. What 
becomes problematic is when such communities cease to be voluntary. As is evident 
from both Tiger and Amhart's discussions of the kibbutzim and the Oneida community, it 
is the later generations who decided that the sacrifices were not worth it and who put 
pressure on the community to change.
Hrdy (1999) also discusses the dangers of unnatural family situations, though her 
discussion is primarily from the viewpoint of the infant. She argues that “General 
patterns of attachment were proving consistent over time: insecure infants were more 
likely to become insecure children, and hence likely to become parents who produce 
insecure infants. These effects seemed to track separately from inherited differences in 
temperament and personality traits” (406). In the kibbutz, for example, infants could 
avoid becoming insecurely attached so long as they had ample access to their mothers. 
Infants who lacked such access developed the psychological problems associated with 
insecure attachment. The effects of separating parents from their children can be seen in 
children long after childhood, and can influence further generations of children. As we 
can see, family life is not merely a conventional phenomenon. Infants have natural needs 
that must be met early on. While they are flexible to a certain extent, they need at the 
very least one primary caregiver who they can attach to and count on. This natural need 
is necessary for healthy development. Similarly, mothers have natural desires to be with
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and care for their children that are extremely painful to give up. These needs eventually 
forced the kibbutzim to adopt a more lenient policy toward child-care, and were 
instrumental in the creation of “the hour of love” and other bonding practices (Tiger and 
Shepher, 1975).
One final reason for avoiding governmental control over family life is that history 
has shown the often frightening results of state interference with reproduction. Trusting 
evolutionarily important goods to others is often dangerous. In the eugenics programs of 
the early 20th century, most famous in the Supreme Court decision in Buck v. Bell, the 
state argued it had a right to prevent “degenerates” and “imbeciles” from reproducing 
(Buck v. Bell, 1927). I do not even bother mentioning the atrocities carried out in the 
name of “good genes” by the Nazis and other ideologically driven groups. If the state 
has the power to interfere with our most basic naturally-based rights, it may take 
advantage of that power in the name of the group good. In reality, parental care is 
natural and works relatively well, producing generally normal adults who are able to 
interact well with other people. We have yet to see a case of the state raising children on 
a grand scale, nor have we seen a case where state interference in reproduction on a mass 
scale has produced any benefits at all, let alone benefits that would make up for the 
intense pain and suffering caused to individuals by such interference.
The political implications of family life show that the private sphere is not 
actually private. The stability of any regime depends in part on the stability of the 
family. Some have argued that this co-dependence makes governmental interference in 
family affairs necessary. In actuality, the relationship between politics and the family 
supports an argument for less interference with family affairs. Many argue that welfare
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legislation makes it easier for fathers and mothers to split, which in turn leaves children 
more vulnerable to the effects of outsiders, including stepparents and significant others. 
As we saw in the case of the kibbutz and the one-child policy in China, there are 
unintended consequences of legislation, especially in areas concerning reproduction and 
the family, where natural desires and instincts run deep. In the case of China's one-child 
policy, parents reacted to legislation limiting their reproductive potential by eliminating 
daughters. The desire for sons over daughters is a natural desire rooted in reproductive 
competition and highly contingent on status within society (Hrdy, 1999). Failing to take 
this preference for sons into account, China is now faced with a serious female shortage 
that could have far-reaching effects on society and politics. The natural desires of 
women to see more of their children moderated the ideals of the kibbutz, gradually 
moving the community away from pure socialistic equality and toward a community 
where the nuclear family becomes central to the society (Tiger and Shepher, 1972). In 
each case, community and governmental interference with reproduction leads to 
unforeseen political consequences that at the very least create tensions within the 
community and at the worst create instability that can last for generations.
As we see from evidence from evolutionary theory (Pinker 2002; Hrdy 1999; 
Konner 2002; Chisholm 1999) the parent-child relationship is at the heart of the 
communal and cooperative relationships that make up the state. Classical liberal 
philosophers show the same concern for familial relationships. Burke (1987) saw the 
family as at the heart of the “little platoon” that forms central ties between people in a 
society (41). Smith points out the dangers of desires for universal benevolence, arguing 
that there are natural spheres of concern for humans, and that the parent-child bond is at
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the center (1982a, 219-227). Evolutionary thinkers like Pinker argue that a respect for 
the family is at the heart of the tragic vision of human nature that is at the basis of 
classical liberal ideology.
The centrality of the family to the state has been seen in recent statistics regarding 
the relationship between monogamous marriage and stability. Hrdy points out that “In 
industrialized countries, disadvantages to fatherless families include economic hardship, 
reduced status, and generally declining prospects. Costs to children are measurable in 
poorer school performance, higher rates of delinquency for boys, and early pregnancies 
for girls. In foraging societies fatherless children are more likely to die” (1999,235). 
Moreover, living with people who are not closely related can be dangerous to children. 
Hrdy argues that evolution supported a strategy in which individuals pay less attention to 
children who are unlikely to be kin -- “the equivalent of emotional earplugs” (1999, 237). 
If we are not likely to care as much about the children of other people as we care about 
our own, shifting the responsibility of childcare over to the community or the state will 
generally result in less care for a child rather than more. All of this has political 
implications. I would predict that regimes in which the most natural desires of 
individuals are threatened or controlled tend to be relatively unstable. In the case of the 
kibbutzim, we see a gradual shift in ideals. In the case of the Oneida society, the 
frustration of natural desires was a large part of the ultimate collapse of the society.
Thus, societies need to pay close attention to the basic desires of humans, and one of the 
best ways to make sure that the varied desires within human nature are fulfilled in a 
comprehensive way is to leave people alone to fulfill those desires for themselves.
While the family and freedom of livelihood are only two of the important rights
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that make up the private sphere, the logic that applies to these two goods can be applied 
to other goods like freedom of religion, freedom of movement, and freedom of 
commerce. Information from evolutionary theory and the principles behind evolutionary 
psychology will help define further hypotheses for testing, including human desires for 
freedom in other realms such as those regarding the basis goods of life such as access to 
food, water, and other material goods, and self-defense and other evolutionarily obvious 
goods. It may be possible to come up with empirical support for many different areas of 
the private sphere that go beyond mere arguments from expediency. In fact, 
understanding evolutionary psychology or psychology in general will help to further 
define the private sphere in increasingly more specific terms, though we must remember 
Hayek's warning to not define the sphere too completely, or too finally. We must 
maintain the flexibility within the private sphere that will allow for freedom as 
circumstances change. But at the very least we can use our knowledge of human nature 
to determine those aspects of human life that are best left out of the realm of 
governmental interference due to reasons as diverse as practical efficiency or moral 
theory. We can use our understanding of human nature to determine what ought to be 
free from governmental interference.
It is important to remember that just as there is a slippery slope once government 
starts interfering in certain aspects of human life that leads to more interference in other 
areas, there is a corresponding slippery slope once it comes to arguments for liberty in 
those areas. An argument for keeping government out of family life, for example, soon 
extends to those areas that are related to family life, such as employment, inheritance, 
and so on. Similarly, an argument for freedom in choice of livelihood will naturally
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extend into an argument for freedom in investment, mobility, and even association. The 
trick is to keep these arguments and their justifications clear in our heads during the 
legislative process, because it is typically not a tendency of government to relinquish 
control once it has been granted. We need to remember the many different justifications 
for liberty in various aspects of human life in order to defend ourselves against 
governmental interference in those areas of life, even when the motive is beneficent.
The Evolutionary Foundations of Rights
One important contribution of evolutionary thinking is in its usefulness in helping 
to understand the idea of rights. Rights have typically been understood as either 
conventional or natural, which tends to polarize discussion of rights in dangerous ways. 
Hayek's dislike of rights language, especially natural rights language, follows Burke, 
who saw the devastation wrought during the French Revolution in the name of natural 
rights. The flip side of the coin, however, is that by making rights purely conventional, 
we have a hard time criticizing governments that do not provide what we see as 
necessary rights. Further, purely conventional rights are for all practical purposes given 
by government, and can be, presumably, taken away.
The answer of Burke, and to a certain extent Hayek, is to argue for prescriptive or 
customary rights that have their basis in centuries of gradual cultural evolution. By this 
understanding, rights are handed down from one generation to the next and are dependent 
on the social order itself, but not on government per se. This gradually evolved 
understanding of rights is an improvement over purely conventional rights, but still
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misses some of the force, as well as almost all of the foundation traditionally entailed in 
natural rights.
Evolutionary theory offers a stronger formulation of Burkean/Hayekian rights that 
follows Smith closely. Evolutionary theory in fact supports a kind of natural 
conventionalism of rights, whereby rights are based in nature but formalized through 
customary and cultural institutions and law. There is, then, no such thing as a purely 
natural right, since, as Burke pointed out, such rights are meaningless outside the 
particular customary framework in which they operate. There are, of course, purely 
customary rights, such as the right of citizens in a republic to vote. Such a right is given 
by the government and can be taken away for various reasons (some more legitimate than 
others). The kinds of rights that I am interested in using to define the private sphere are 
not these customary rights, but the naturally grown rights that develop out of the natural 
desires of humans. While the formulations of these rights may be customary, their 
development is natural and probably inevitable given human desires. It is these rights at 
a minimum that should be protected from the coercion of both government and other 
individuals. This is not to say, of course, that other rights are not important or do not 
need to be protected. All these naturally conventional rights give us is the minimum 
private sphere that should be protected given human nature. Two of these rights are 
livelihood and family life, and a third, discussed in a previous chapter, is property. A 
more broad definition of the private sphere is probably best, but at the very least we 
should try to prevent governmental intervention in livelihood, family life, and private 
property.
This understanding of rights as arising out of the natural desires of humans helps
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to clarify one of the problems liberalism has faced in its use of rights language since 
Locke. Locke (1988) wants to argue for inalienable rights that all humans share, but he 
has to base this inalienability on God, because otherwise it is unclear how to determine 
which desires would lead to inalienable rights and which should be controlled by the 
state. Hobbes (1996) has a similar problem, though he eschews talk of God for the most 
part, and bases his desires on the desire for self-preservation. It is unclear from each of 
these discussions, however, where these desires come from and how they ought to 
translate into political life.
An evolutionary understanding of rights as based in the shared desires of humans, 
and as making up a protected sphere that helps humans to reach their diverse (but 
ultimately shared) potentials is a much more stable formulation of rights than Locke's 
dubious God, or Hobbes's relativistic passions. These naturally conventional rights help 
to define the minimum private sphere in a way that is flexible without being relativistic. 
Perhaps even more importantly, just as we see in Smith the movement from the natural 
right to one's body to freedom in marriage and commerce, these naturally grown rights 
can be extrapolated to other, less obvious parts of human life. We see this in Smith's 
discussion of the gradual growth of property rights; in each case, the more and more 
formalized property rights are not merely conventional -  they are the outgrowth of 
natural human desires that develop in ever more complex ways within a spontaneous 
order.
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Defining the Private Sphere
One of the major problems in liberal political philosophy is defining the limit of 
governmental power. Another way of putting this is to define what exactly should be 
encompassed by the private sphere of individuals. Do we include material property in 
this sphere but nothing else? Do we include family life, but exclude private property? 
Philosophers and theorists typically define the sphere, but in a relatively arbitrary or 
vague way. In order to determine what to include in the private sphere of individuals, we 
need to understand what is universally important to humans. Evolutionary liberty defines 
the sphere in terms of universal human desires and needs. It also offers an ultimate 
explanation that explains the moral and practical worth of particular types of freedom in 
relatively specific terms.
An evolutionary way of determining the private sphere is to argue that the state 
should not exert coercion except to prevent force or fraud in areas that are evolutionarily 
necessary to individual fitness, like livelihood, reproductive choice, defense, and access 
to basic needs listed above. Evolutionary theory, by helping us to better understand the 
natural desires and motivations of individuals, helps us to delineate more accurately the 
areas of human life that are best left to individual choice and action.
How much coercion is allowed in each area will often depend on the values of the 
people living in a certain society. Social norms support natural desires while providing 
society with some control over individual behavior. The social norms that have evolved 
in specific areas will often be the result of slow evolution of such norms in line with
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environmental pressures and natural inclinations. These gradually grown norms will 
support both natural human desires and the customary institutions that grow out of those 
desires.
The Growth of the Private Sphere
One last prediction that seems borne out by common sense is that if human 
desires for freedom in family life and occupation are so foundational to human life, then 
such desires should be reflected in most societies most of the time. Human nature 
should, when possible, prevent coercion in these areas by finding outlets for innate 
human desires. Most societies, for example, provide an outlet for reproductive choice 
and rearing of offspring, occupation, defense of kin, and other evolutionary goods. I 
would argue that it is in grown regimes, where the constitution and laws grow naturally 
out of the desires of the people, that there will be a private sphere, whether formally or 
informally defined. In fact, it is probably only in ideologically-based regimes, those 
founded on a particular notion of what is good for humans, that coercion by government 
in evolutionarily important goods is attempted. As we saw in the kibbutz, the desire for 
equality led to painful results in both occupation and family life. It is one of the benefits 
of the kibbutz that it is a voluntary community, where the input of members is taken 
seriously. The community had enough flexibility to gradually shift its rules and ideals so 
as to be more in line with human nature. Larger societies that are not based on voluntary 
membership, and whose laws are not made by a majority of the people, will have much 
more trouble integrating natural human desires with their own particular ideologies. So
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we should scrutinize ideologically driven policies and actions, since these are in general 
most likely to result in radical shifts and changes that frustrate natural human desires.
The struggle in the U.S. between equality and freedom is only one example of the 
struggle between ideologies.
The evolutionary argument for the private sphere, therefore, also tends to support 
a political argument for grown over founded regimes. This emphasis on gradual growth 
of institutions in a trial-and-error way may seem counterintuitive to some. It certainly 
was counterintuitive to traditional liberals like Locke and Hobbes, who looked to an 
antisocial state of nature as the basis for their political systems. However, the gradually 
grown regime has been at the center of classical liberalism's understanding of political 
life from Burke's support of customary law, to Smith's discussion of the gradual growth 
of property rights, to Hayek's understanding of the spontaneous order as the gradual 
evolution of institutions. This gradual growth further supports the natural 
conventionalism that is important for both evolutionary theory and classical liberalism.
If there is a human nature, then that nature will influence the outcome of legislation and 
governmental policies, and that influence will bear the marks of both nature and custom. 
Or, to put it another way, the customs of a grown regime are the natural outgrowths of 
the natural desires of humans working together unconsciously within the framework of a 
spontaneous order. Both evolutionary theory and classical liberalism support a kind of 
natural conventionalism in human political and social life. Most people doubt that an 
indirect, trial-and-error approach to law-making results in less suppression of natural 
human desires, but that is almost certainly the case.
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Conclusions and Summary
The evidence from evolutionary theory and human nature in general tends to 
support Smith and Hayek's arguments concerning rights and the private sphere while at 
the same time enhancing their understanding by providing a foundation for those rights 
in natural human desires. Both Smith and Hayek (but especially Smith) support a kind of 
natural conventionalism whereby legal rights grow out of the natural desires of humans. 
Smith's discussion of the natural human desires and their relationship to rights is 
mirrored by the discussions of Darwinian thinkers who argue for formulating legal and 
political institutions in accordance with natural human desires. Smith's discussion of the 
rights of man's body and the relationship to free commerce and freedom in marriage 
demonstrates how this movement from nature to custom can occur without resorting to 
complete relativism.
Hayek's argument that general rules of a private sphere serve an epistemological 
function is supported by evidence from thinkers like Amhart who argue that prudence in 
human life requires knowledge of particular circumstances. Evolutionary theory further 
supports the classical liberal argument that we cannot know and therefore cannot trust the 
motives of those who would seek to control important aspects of our lives, thanks in part 
to a complex human nature with desires for both freedom and domination.
Further, evolutionary theory helps us understand the interrelated nature of the 
private and public spheres while at the same time preserving the argument for the 
sanctity of the private sphere. According to evolutionary theorists and classical liberals, 
that sphere should be flexible but with a solid foundation based on the strongest human
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desires, such as those for family life. This flexible private sphere still allows for social 
disapproval as a way of controlling individual actions without resorting to force or fraud, 
thus fulfilling the human desire for a cohesive group.
Evolutionary theory also supports Smith and Hayek by supplementing their 
theories, telling us where the emotions that are the foundations for our rights come from, 
and this gives us the knowledge of human nature to tell us what the minimum private 
sphere might include. Finally, and most importantly, evolutionary theory predicts that 
most grown regimes will have some sort of private sphere, usually informally laid out, 
that prevents governmental meddling. In most societies throughout history, family life 
has probably been the sole concern of individuals and their kin rather than that of the 
government. It is probably only in modem, ideologically driven societies that 
governmental interference in evolutionarily important facets of human life has been 
proposed and, temporarily at least, accepted. The growth of the private sphere in grown 
societies again supports the idea of a natural conventionalism in which the conventions 
of a free society grow naturally out of natural human desires. If this kind of growth does 
in fact happen as I believe it does, it supports an argument for customary law over 
positive law, and supports the idea that in general, grown regimes will be more in line 
with human desires as evolved through natural selection. Thus, the gradual growth of 
human nature through natural selection is mimicked and influences the gradual growth of 
human institutions, much as Smith indicated.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 7:
EVOLUTIONARY BARRIERS TO REGIMES BASED ON EQUALITY
I have argued that our evolved nature makes certain kinds of freedom necessary. 
This nature also contains traits that make certain kinds of regimes difficult to sustain. 
Regimes based on equality or justice require overcoming natural human desires. 
Overcoming these natural desires requires coercion, which makes these regimes both 
painful and inefficient. In the case of regimes based on equality, there are a number of 
facets of human nature that make human equality impossible. Regimes that attempt to 
create equality other than equality under the law must overcome human nature. While 
we may wish it otherwise, the causes of inequality are inherent in our very nature.
Our evolutionary past impedes the pursuit of equality. In the first place, human 
individual differences are impossible to eradicate. These differences occur between the 
sexes, between people raised differently, between people with different genetic makeups 
and so on. In the second place, we desire status and domination, which makes a non- 
hierarchical society difficult if not impossible to achieve. We are naturally status- 
oriented, and the importance of relative fitness over absolute fitness means that we will 
be more likely to think in relative, zero-sum terms than in absolute terms. Third, kin 
selection and parental care means that we will care differently about different people, and 
that differences between people will be passed on to their children. Natural selection has
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created emotional and instinctual triggers which interfere with the utopian dream of 
equality or justice.
The Evolutionary Causes of Differences
That people are different is a truism. But it is often denied. Some have
traditionally ascribed the causes of difference solely to culture, learning, or upbringing.
That people might be different due to biological causes is anathema to those who see
equality as a primary goal. Yet, simply because something interferes with one's
cherished hopes does not make it any less true. In reality, there are important individual
differences between people, and these differences need to be taken seriously.
Figueredo et al. (2005) postulate that instead of being side-effects or “noise” from
other adaptations, personality differences might be adaptive in themselves. They further
argues that if these differences are adaptive, then
there are only four explanations for individual differences in humans: (1) 
Personality differences are heritable alternative strategies; (2) personality 
differences are 'heritable calibrations of psychological mechanisms' arising 
through fluctuation of optimal strategies over time and place; (3) individual 
differences are due to situation-dependent adaptive strategies, implying that each 
human could develop any personality traits or degree of personality traits; and (4) 
individual differences arise through ontogenetic threshold calibration. (2005, 852)
All of these theories support the idea that variation between individuals (i.e. inequalities
or differences) are supported by selection processes and that such differences may have
beneficial effects for both the individual and the group. At a very basic level, an
individual who is different from other individuals has the ability to occupy an empty
niche, thus protecting himself against often costly competition with other individuals.
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Thus, differences in individual personality may have been selected by natural selection.
The issue of ranking the desires shared by all humans leads to further individual 
differences. Amharf s (1998) discussion of twenty natural desires highlights just this 
issue. If these desires are ranked differently at different times by different individuals 
thanks to different circumstances, then we have set the stage for numerous permutations 
of individual preferences that leads to otherwise similar individuals pursuing different 
goods at different times. Rubin (2002) argues that individual differences on even just a 
few dimensions can create incredible variation. He further argues that it is precisely this 
variation that leads to the desire for freedom, since humans with different desires will 
desire the freedom to fulfill those desires (14). Even when most individuals share most 
of the same desires, the differential ranking of those desires can lead to radically different 
individuals. So even a shared human nature can lead to individual differences that are 
important to understand and take into consideration when planning our political systems.
Another primary source of differences between individuals is developmental 
flexibility, which is central to adaptation to specific environments. Evolutionary 
psychologists emphasize the importance of early plasticity and adaptive sensitivity to 
context (Bjorklund and Blasi 2005, 832). Offspring of any species need the ability to 
gauge the environment in which they find themselves, and determine quickly the kinds of 
resources that are at their disposal. Evolutionary psychologists find that children can 
change their reactions based on their particular environments, as well as use present 
environments to create long-term strategies that remain in effect even later in life (833). 
The general idea is that evolution would have selected for sensitivity to early 
environment as a way of turning on or off adaptations for particular environments.
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Evidence from adolescents shows that childhood environment influences the types of 
reproductive and survival strategies pursued as an adult. Studies show that “Children 
reared in high-stress homes with inadequate resources and harsh and rejecting parenting 
mature at a faster rather than children reared in low-stress, well-resourced homes” (ibid). 
This faster maturation can result in early menarche and early pregnancy in females, and 
more aggression in males.
Ridley (2004) discusses a case where genes interact with the environment to 
produce individuals who respond to early childhood stimuli (267). In the case of 
aggressive individuals, exposure to violent environments as a child seems to trigger 
violence as an adult, but only if certain genes are present (in this particular case, the 
monoamine oxidase A gene). In this case, one needs both the environmental stimulus 
(childhood violence) and the gene that “reacts” to that stimulus. In this way, individuals 
can become different based on the interaction between different environments and 
different genes. One can picture this kind of “switching on and off” of genes to create 
innumerable differences between individuals.
There are also innate differences between groups that are the result of differing 
selection pressures on those groups. Men and women have different reproductive 
strategies, different desires as far as parental care and occupation, and even different 
spatial, verbal, and quantitative skills (Kurland and Gualin 2005; Silverman and Choi 
2005; Rubin 2002, 10; Barash and Lipton 2002). Evolutionary psychologists have done 
extensive research on differences in male and female jealousy, which is only one 
example of the emotional differences between the sexes that arises from differing 
selective pressures each group has been under for eons (Campbell and Ellis 2005, 433-
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434). While men are never entirely certain that a particular child is theirs, women can be 
absolutely certain. Due to the pressures of child-bearing, women are typically more 
dependent on the resources provided by their mate than men are. We therefore find 
differences in jealousy between men and women. Men are more concerned with sexual 
infidelity, while women are more concerned with emotional infidelity.
As we have seen earlier, there is also evidence that men and women often choose 
different types of jobs that highlight the different capabilities of each sex. Evolutionary 
psychologists admit that “Male and female cognitive abilities are likely to be identical in 
most respects,” but we also expect them “to differ fundamentally in domains such as 
mating where the sexes have recurrently faced different adaptive problems” (Hagen 
2005, 168). While it is impossible to make a judgment on which is better, it is certain 
that the abilities of both sexes are necessary for a balanced society. Attempting to make 
women more like men or men more like women is unlikely to succeed, and will result in 
the loss of important variation within society.
One interesting cause of individual differences in humans is frequency-dependent 
selection (Figueredo et al. 2005, 868-871; Rubin 2002,11). Rubin argues that “There 
appear to be at least three types [of individuals]: selfish; cooperative; and those willing to 
incur costs to punish the selfish individuals” (12). Frequency-dependent selection 
operates off the logic that the most adaptive behavior depends on the frequency of other 
behaviors or strategies in the population. If everyone is being altruistic, it may make 
sense to take advantage of that altruism by being a cheater. However, as the number of 
cheaters increases in a population, the costs of cheating increase as its benefits decrease, 
creating a selection pressure against cheaters. In some cases, game theory predicts that
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we will end up with an evolutionary stable equilibrium between altruists (or other kinds 
of non-cheating individuals) and cheaters (Mealey 1995).
Pinker (2002) argues that frequency-dependent selection can produce variable 
strategies that can be either temporary or permanent (261). This mixture is perhaps best 
seen in cases of psychopathy. Mealey (1995) postulates two kinds of psychopaths. One 
type is psychopathic from birth, regardless of environmental influences. The second type 
consists in a predisposition for psychopathy that only obtains in certain environments 
(Pinker 2002, 261). Pinker suggests that conditional psychopaths might actually benefit 
from rehabilitative strategies or social programs that encourage intervention in seriously 
abusive homes early in a child's life, for example. “Inveterate” psychopaths, on the other 
hand, probably only respond to immediate threats to their self-interest, such as serious 
punitive threats (263). Differences between people suggest that the best goal might be a 
mix of strategies in which preventive measure are taken to protect children from abusive 
households, while a strong criminal justice system is in place to protect everyone from 
those who resort to force and fraud as their particular strategy. Either way, there is no 
one-size-fits-all strategy for dealing with the many different kinds of people out there. 
People are different, and therefore equality before the law is the only kind that is 
practically possible (and some could argue morally justified).
Rubin's (2002) discussion of frequency-dependent selection is good, and he 
concludes that such selection “also explains why human individuality is important, and 
why political ideologies or theories that assume everyone to be the same are doomed to 
failure. Humans have different genetic endowments and have different tastes, leading 
them to choose different strategies, which is an argument for heterogeneity in society.
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These differences explain why individuals want some freedom from social control” 
(Rubin 2002, 14). One advantage of free societies is that they preserve and actually take 
advantage of the differences between people. Because people are not restricted by birth 
or social class from different tasks, people are able to find the employment and lifestyle 
that best fits their particular interests and inclinations. Rubin points out the truism that 
liberal, Western societies allow for greater freedom than other societies (184), and it is 
precisely this freedom that allows these societies to reap the benefits of the myriad 
differences between individuals while at the same time fulfilling the desires that are 
universal to us all.
One obvious cause of individual difference is that the self-interest of individuals 
will differ in different circumstances. We have the capacity to sum up a particular 
situation and determine what, in this case, is in our best interest. Due to the wide variety 
of situations in which individuals will find themselves, one would expect there to be a 
plethora of behaviors. Simple self-interest in different circumstances is enough to create 
widely different individuals.
Status and Hierarchies
The third barrier to an equal or perfectly just society is dominance. Humans 
naturally fall into dominance hierarchies, as do most primates (Hrdy 1999, 110-112).
The trait of desire for dominance varies among humans just as most other personality 
traits do. Some humans will desire power more than others. Some humans care little for 
power and are more content to be ruled than to rule.
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These differential desires may come in part from differing reproductive strategies. 
Men with high status and power can have many wives, who can bear them many 
children. Stories of high status males having hundreds of children are popular in 
evolutionary literature (Hrdy 1999, 325-327). The flip side of the benefits of high status 
is that not everyone can have high status. By definition, high status means that there will 
be some in low-status positions. For those in low-status positions, reproducing at all is 
the order of the day, and they may be more concerned with simply having a family in the 
first place than in climbing to the upper echelons of society.
Such natural human dominance is demonstrated by one of the only recognized 
laws within political science, Michels's Iron Law of Oligarchy (1962), which predicts 
that in any human society, control will be held by elites. One explanation is no doubt the 
evolutionary benefits conferred on high-status individuals, but another compatible 
explanation may be simple efficiency. Fewer people can make faster decisions than 
many people.
Just as we can deal well or badly with the nepotistic part of human nature, so too 
can we deal well or badly with the dominance-seeking aspect of human nature. Liberal 
philosophers have often cited the ambitions of some men as a great danger to the liberty 
of others (Montesquieu 1989; Locke 1988; Hamilton and Madison 1961). Yet such 
ambitious individuals have much to offer the state, especially if no one else wants to rule. 
Society ought not to completely suppress ambition, forcing it to reemerge in more subtle 
forms, but ought to find ways of making ambition work for society while controlling its 
harmful effects. The failure to control dominant individuals is evident throughout world 
history, much to the detriment of the freedom and evolutionary fitness of the rest.
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Millions have died in the wake of “World Historical Individuals” (to use Hegel's phrase), 
and the liberal ideal is devoted to avoiding such unnecessary deaths. The institutional 
controls of the U.S. Constitution and the attitudes of the founders toward ambition are an 
example of embracing but controlling what we cannot change about human nature. 
Ignoring human nature sets the stage for another Stalin, an absolute leader in a 
supposedly equal society.
The ultimate causes behind the human desire for status and dominance has to do 
with its relation to survival and reproduction: “The key to understanding the impact of 
status lies in appreciating its relation to survival and reproductive success both during 
our evolutionary past and in our present lives. Status (or rank) is most frequently defined 
as priority o f access to resources in competitive situations''’ (Cummins 2005, 677).
Access to resources does not stop merely at the dominant individual. An individual's 
family is affected by his or her relative positions in society: “There is a direct 
relationship between status and inclusive fitness, where fitness is defined as the number 
of living offspring an individual has that go on to reproduce themselves...” (677). As 
Hrdy points out in the case of baboons, the daughters of high-status baboons are more 
likely to survive, and their mother's high status is passed on to them when they reach 
maturity (1999, 81-82, 334).
The proximate mechanisms behind the human desire for status are the hormones, 
particularly cortisol and the neuroendocrine system (Mazur 2005). Evolutionaiy 
psychologists argue that “Neuroendocrine reactivity... is more than a simple correlative 
response to events in the social and physical environments. It comprises a signaling 
system that informs a person (and others) of his or her current relative status” (Cummins
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2005, 680). The system is a two-way street, with hormones responding to loss of social 
status, and the hormones themselves occasioning feelings of loss of status. Evidence 
shows that “...among healthy White women, perceived social status is consistently and 
strongly related to a wide constellation of hormone-dependent health indices, including 
heart rate, sleep latency, body fat distribution, and cortisol habituation to repeated stress; 
this is true even after the contribution of objective socioeconomic status is partialed out” 
(679). Among other populations, low socio-economic status is linked to increased 
cortisol levels, a stress hormone, greater risk of death, greater stress reactions during 
confrontations, and slower recovery from these reactions (ibid.).
There is a link between the strictness of status hierarchies and lack of freedom. 
Cummins argues, “The social stability conferred by strict hierarchies... carries a cost in 
terms of individual freedom. To avoid punishment.... individuals must learn what is 
permitted, what is forbidden, and what is obligated given their place in the hierarchy, and 
they must comply with these norms” (681). The “pecking order” of hens, and the strict 
rules governing primate hierarchies, are two examples of groups in which individual 
behavior is strictly tailored to the group. Conflict breaks out when hierarchies are 
threatened, and in many cases it is probably best to obey the status quo and accept the 
loss of freedom than to challenge the hierarchy and risk death.
Hierarchies also influence people's personal preferences: “People who score high 
on measures of social dominance tend to prefer hierarchical relationships in society, 
distribution of resources based on merit, conservative ideology, military programs, and 
punitive justice policies” (Cummins 2005,682). Moreover, status differences can be 
difficult to avoid: “Even in face-to-face interactions between complete strangers, relative
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status differences emerge quickly and spontaneously” (Kenrick et al. 2005, 813). Thus, 
social position influences how we feel about ourselves, the preferences we choose, and 
our interactions with friends and strangers.
The nature of status-seeking is a dubious one. Evidence that suggests that status 
has an effect on health and well-being might suggest that we try to change society to a 
more egalitarian system. However, other evidence suggests that humans will always 
create some sort of status hierarchy. The question then becomes, what do we do about an 
aspect of human life that has consequences for health and happiness and that some 
believe is more harmful than helpful?
Yet again, the advantage of a free society becomes obvious. Societies that value 
free choice of occupation, freedom of association, and free markets allow more freedom 
of movement, larger societies, and more freedom to increase one's status. In a classical 
liberal society, one is not tied to one's place of birth, and the status of one's family is not 
necessarily passed on to future generations. Because of the large scale made possible by 
classical liberal societies, we are not restricted by the people with whom we grew up. 
Individuals have the freedom to make choices that influence their social status. This 
system seems much better than allowing the government to control everyone's status in 
the name of well-being. Moreover, it is unclear whether such control would lead to any 
tangible benefits. Higher status individuals appear in every society, no matter how 
egalitarian.
Some evolutionary psychologists have gone so far as to argue that we can 
somehow thwart our nature if we do not like its consequences. Cummins (2005) quotes 
Richard Dawkins: “'We have the power to defy the selfish genes of our birth'” (692).
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This statement is only partially true. We certainly could construct a society in which 
individuals are made equal, or as Cummins argues, “It is the dominant individuals who 
must be identified and influenced to create a 'kinder, gentler' social environment because 
it is they who wield the kind of social power that can effect true and lasting changes” 
(693). These are nice ideas, and demonstrate the kind motives of the thinkers. The issue, 
unfortunately, is not quite so simple. Identifying high-status individuals, and then trying 
to educate those individuals to be kinder and gentler, seems unlikely to produce radical 
results, partially because status and dominance shift depending on the context one finds 
oneself in. The high-status male in one situation is the low man on the totem pole in the 
next. Further, by the time educational advances have limited the cruelty of high-status 
individuals, we will already have a new set with which to deal.
What makes the most sense is a society in which individual differences are 
valued, where social mobility is high and where few if any governmental restraints are 
placed on the individual's ability to move. Freedom of movement, freedom of 
employment, and the freedom to associate and trade with whom one pleases mean that 
individuals will be free from the coercive force of other people in determining their status 
in society. This is not to say that there are no limits on what an individual can 
accomplish. There are very real limits based on education, natural abilities, and so forth. 
What matters is that no one is coercively or fraudulently prevented from bettering his 
condition.
Classical liberal societies are free from strict social hierarchies placed by caste, or 
property ownership. Moreover, in a complex system like that of most capitalistic, liberal 
societies, individuals play many roles, those of parent, spouse, employee, boss, neighbor,
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friend, volunteer, and so on. With these various relationships we increase the chances 
that where someone is low-status in one situation, they will have the opportunity to be 
high-status in the next. Moreover, now that democratic ideals have become widespread, 
the effects of high-status individuals tend to be somewhat mitigated as the traditional 
forms of high-status tend to be unacceptable in modem society. Expressions of 
dominance must be more subtle, and particularly when leaders are chosen 
democratically, those expressions of dominance will take a kinder, gentler form.
While it seems unlikely that we will radically change the fundamental dynamics 
of status and dominance-seeking in human life, we can attempt to mitigate the effects. It 
seems likely that in a free society where no one's status is permanently entrenched by 
custom or government we have the greatest chance for preventing the psychological 
effects of status and dominance. Moreover, a representative democracy under rule of law 
will provide outlets for dominant individuals while minimizing the potential for tyranny. 
What seems certain, however, is that attempting to eradicate status or preventing 
dominant individuals from expressing their dominance will require large amounts of 
coercion and will have dubious returns. Rule of law is necessary in a free society as a 
defense against dominant individuals and their ambitions. Freedom under rule of law 
provides the best outlet for ambitious, dominant individuals while preventing their 
ambitions from becoming dangerous to the system.
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Dominance and Relative Fitness
The desire for status and dominance is probably related to the importance of 
relative fitness in natural selection. Evolutionary success, while often looked at in 
absolute terms, is only really meaningful in relative terms. How well an individual is 
doing by evolutionary standards does not depend on how well he is doing relative to 
some abstract standard, but how well he is doing relative to the rest of his fellows. An 
individual's three children tells the evolutionary theorist nothing about that individual's 
success in the evolutionary game, since such success depends on whether those around 
him are having one child or ten. He is more fit than the former and less fit than the latter. 
The logic behind this should be obvious by now. After many successive generations, an 
individual who produces three offspring and whose three offspring produce three 
offspring each, and so on will be doing substantially worse in the numbers game 
compared to an individual who is producing ten children who in turn produce ten 
children each and so on. Ultimately it becomes a numbers game, and fitness is all about 
how well we reproduce our particular genetic legacy.
If those who are dominant have greater access to evolutionarily important goods, 
then one would need to be highly aware of differences in status between individuals. 
Prior to birth control, status had a direct impact on inclusive fitness, and was important 
enough that it developed with it the host of hormonal responses described above. It 
makes sense, once we understand the role of relative fitness in evolutionary terms, that 
humans would be incredibly sensitive to their relative status compared to others. The
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phenomenon of conspicuous consumption is probably based on this same sensitivity. 
Spending on what one cannot afford becomes, in effect, false advertising about one's 
relative status in society.
Unfortunately for many of us, humans are probably adapted to think in zero-sum 
terms about the costs and benefits of interactions (Wright 2000; Rubin 2002). Rubin 
argues that trade is counterintuitive to most people, since in the EEA, a gain in status 
always meant a corresponding loss of status to someone else, and material gains were 
generally small (2002,17). In the EEA, “resources and incomes were probably relatively 
fixed, with little possibility of value increasing exchange or production.... Therefore, we 
may not be well adapted to think intuitively in terms of gains from trade” (2002,21,23). 
There is, however, substantial evidence from human evolution that trade occurred early 
on and continued throughout human evolution (Ofek 2001). The natural human desire to 
trade and barter may be offset in some ways by the pressures of relative fitness and the 
zero-sum thinking that results.
Smith understood zero-sum thinking when he pointed out in WN that the poorest 
peasant in Europe is better off materially than the richest African king, but because he 
cannot see his situation in absolute terms, he has a hard time comprehending his good 
fortune (1982,23). If humans are predisposed to think of interactions in terms of relative 
gains and zero-sum terms as evidence suggests (Wright 2000,26), it may seem to require 
some wrangling to get free societies going. Certainly, the zero-sum aspects of trade may 
be counter-intuitive, but judging from the enormous success of commercial societies in 
the past hundred years or so, it seems likely that the human propensity to see things in 
zero-sum terms is not impossible to escape or sidestep.
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Even if we find it difficult to overcome our propensity to think in zero-sum terms, 
societies based on free markets can still operate effectively because of their large size and 
foundation on self-interest. The market does not require that people consciously 
cooperate with most of the people who affect each other daily. All it requires is that we 
look to our own self-interest and that of our family and friends, and make decisions that 
benefit us. We will be sensitive to gains made by others if we think they may have 
damaged our own interest, but in day-to-day life we rarely see the benefits made by the 
other person in a transaction. Either way, our proclivity for zero-sum thinking can be 
overcome in some situations, as is obvious from both Wright's (2000), Rubin's (2002), 
and Ofek's (2001) analyses.
Inclusive Fitness and Kin Selection
One final, and relatively obvious, barrier to regimes based on equality is the role 
of kin and the importance of inclusive fitness in human life. It has been argued that 
“...the behaviorist orthodoxy, particularly its unbending commitment to learning, which 
informed psychological theory during much of the twentieth century, assumed there is 
nothing inherent to genetic relatedness that precludes unrelated individuals from 
developing equally close and demanding ties” (Bumstein 2005, 528). If the attachment 
to kin and our desire to preferentially help those who are related to us is a barrier to 
equality, then it will be important to some people to minimize the innateness of these 
inclinations, and attempt to eradicate these ties. Smith, writing well before the 
behavioralist revolution, recognized the difficulty which human nature places in the way
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of theories of equal benevolence. His argument against universal benevolence closely 
tracks the ways in which humans care for those around them, starting with kin and 
moving outward, with concern gradually decreasing as relatedness and immediate 
relevance (like that of friends and neighbors) decreases (1982a, 219-227).
What Smith recognizes and what proponents of radical equality do not, is that we 
naturally care about some people more than others. This differential concern leads to 
different outcomes for different people. This pattern is seen in every primate species, 
and cultural ethnographies show the same patterns of “discrimination in favor of kin” 
(Kurland and Gaulin 2005,459). Even though some dislike of the consequences of 
kinship ties, kinship is still “one of the central organizing features of human society” 
(Kurland and Gaulin 2005, 447).
Some people even argue that kin selection may be the departure point for all our 
altruistic motivations (Hamilton 1963 and 1964). That kinship and kin selection may be 
the basis for altruistic behaviors in humans should alert us to the reverse tendency: 
Humans usually need a reason to be kind to strangers. Kinship inspires altruism 
precisely because we have a genetic incentive in the survival of our close kin. Siblings 
and parents share around fifty percent of our genes, and we are therefore more concerned 
about them than we are about an unrelated stranger, because their survival has a direct 
impact on our own genetic survival.
Obviously, we do not expect kin to cooperate indiscriminately. Some kin are 
more related than others, and no one is as related to us as ourselves (with the rare 
exception of identical twins), so we expect some differences of opinion even between 
kin, and research has borne this out (Bumstein 2005, 528-548; Wright 1994, 165-173).
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Siblings fight with each other but defend each other against strangers, and parents and 
children are in continual conflict regarding resource allocation. Yet even with parent- 
child and sibling conflict and the numerous ways in which kin make our lives miserable, 
we still care about their survival, and usually more than we care about anyone else.
Evolutionary theory would predict, and common sense tells us, that individuals 
make judgments all the time about whose needs take priority. And they decide that the 
needs of kin are more important than the needs of unrelated individuals and strangers. 
Nepotistic desires will obviously get in the way of equality in any real sense. More 
importantly, as Hayek (1960) argues, such desires will find an outlet in some way, and 
how we provide an outlet for them makes a difference in whether they can be channeled 
for the good of society or not.
While we can be taught to rank the claims of unrelated friends over those of kin, 
for example, in most cases the old adage that “blood is thicker than water” tends to hold 
true. Even if we do not particularly like our kin, we may find it incredibly difficult to cut 
ties. A society based on extreme equality would have to develop a way of dealing with 
the nepotistic impulses in human nature. We would have to prevent parents from 
passing their fortunes on to their children. We would have to somehow prevent parents 
from passing on their educational attainments and talents to their children. At the 
extreme, we would have to devise some way of preventing parents from passing their 
genetic differences onto their children.
That nepotism is natural is obvious. That it is sometimes harmful is also obvious. 
However, the effect of nepotism on a society is directly determined by how we attempt to 
deal with it. If we attempt to annihilate it altogether, it will reemerge in a dangerous
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form, while dealing with it openly and honestly and controlling its negative effects will
reap benefits for all, but not the benefit o f equality as the Utopians hope. As we saw in
the case of the kibbutzim, attempting to equalize people's situations by equalizing
parenting created suffering for both parents and children. This was in a voluntary
society. Things would be even worse in an involuntary society based on coercion.
One of the ways in which a free society protects kin relations while also
protecting society against more dangerous forms of nepotism is by protecting property
rights, and with those rights the freedom to pass down one's property by inheritance. An
evolutionary analysis of wills found a “declining disbursement with decreasing r [the
coefficient of relatedness]”, that was highly significant. Humans tend to leave their
possessions to close kin, and their propensity to leave money to an individual decreased
as level of relatedness decreased. In fact, one study shows that “spouses and children
received 92% of the average estate, leaving very little for more distant kin or
nonrelatives” (Kurland and Gaulin 2005,462). These conclusions are hardly surprising
for most of us. They do, however, tend to irk those who desire a more equal distribution
of wealth and who see inherited wealth as an evil that should be eradicated.
Hayek supports freedom of inheritance precisely because it is probably the least
dangerous way of allowing people to provide for kin:
It seems certain that among the many ways in which those who have gained 
power and influence might provide for their children, the bequest of a fortune is 
socially by far the cheapest. Without this outlet, these men would look for other 
ways of providing for their children, such as placing them in positions which 
might bring them the income and the prestige that a fortune would have done; and 
this would cause a waste of resources and an injustice much greater than is caused 
by the inheritance of property. (1960,91)
Hayek's point is clear: the human desire to care for kin more than for other people will
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not go away simply because we do not like its consequences. We must carefully weigh 
the trade-offs between the consequences of a natural human desires and the consequences 
of thwarting that desire. I argue that in most cases, the latter will be worse than the 
former.
Balancing Goods
Ultimately, the battle over equality versus liberty depends on whether one sees 
inequality as the real evil, or whether the consequences of inequality are what make 
inequality undesirable. If inequality is the worst thing for humans, then perhaps we are 
justified in taking any steps to eradicate it. If, however, it is not inequality per se, but the 
effects of that inequality that we do not like, it seems to make more sense knowing what 
we know about human psychology to try to mitigate the consequences. It seems likely 
that the best regime of which we are aware for the minimizing of these effects is one of 
freedom. Whether or not people agree with this conclusion, it is certainly true that no 
matter what, the proponents of equality will have to figure out what to do with human 
nature.
The Fundamental Problem of Equality
Apart from the evolved inclinations of humans that make regimes based on 
equality difficult if not impossible to create and sustain is a fundamental theoretical 
problem with the concept of equality itself. The term equality begs the question,
“equality of what?” Once we equalize wealth, we might move to equalize education,
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which will require equalizing parental influence, which would at the extreme require 
equalizing genetic influences. As Tocqueville (1969) foresaw, equality presents an ever- 
expanding horizon that naturally takes on continually evolving form (12, 698). Classical 
liberal societies stress one type of equality -  equality before the law -  as the most basic 
equality necessary for freedom and the one that is related most closely to governmental 
interference. Other kinds of equality actually require abolishing equality before the law, 
since other kinds of equality require treating different people differently. Freedom from 
force or fraud of other people is a much more stable concept.
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CHAPTER 8: SPENCER'S ANARCHY, EVOLUTION, AND UTOPIA
For many familiar with the classical liberal tradition, there may appear to be a 
strange omission in the discussion up to this point. I have been looking at Smith and 
Hayek as two proponents of classical liberalism who are influenced by evolutionary 
considerations (broadly construed), and it might be wondered where the most famous 
thinker who combined these two ideas is. Herbert Spencer is a well-known classical 
liberal who famously combined the ideas of biological evolution and social evolution, 
creating a theory that became known as Social Darwinism in later years.
Spencer's work is important because he moves away from the soft despotism of 
equality. His ultimate argument is for an anarchical social system that exists without 
government and in which each individual voluntarily conforms to the divinely willed law 
of equal freedom. He seems to take evolutionary themes into consideration, and seems to 
deal with the question of human nature, but his treatment of that nature as not only 
variable but progressive leads him toward a utopianism of liberty that is similar to that of 
thinkers who base their utopianism on equality or justice.
Considering Spencer allows me to locate my argument as the reasonable mean 
between two extreme positions -  the utopianism of egalitarian socialism on the one hand 
and the utopianism of Spencer's libertarian anarchism on the other. In the rest of this 
dissertation I have defended classical liberal institutions, or more succinctly, limited
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government. Limited government implies that there is a government. Spencer thought 
that ultimately we could eradicate government, leaving individuals in a state of perfect 
liberty. Both Smith and Hayek, more realistically, reject this as a possibility. Both see 
human nature as at least somewhat fixed, and see the limitations on personal liberty (or 
more appropriately, license) as being as important to the state of liberty as the areas of 
life where such limitations are not allowed. Most importantly, liberty under rule of law 
is deemed the most important, most foundational criteria for the creation of a 
spontaneous order of cooperating individuals. Spencer argues that this rule of law 
becomes completely internal, as individuals gradually adapt to their environments, 
voluntarily obeying the divine law of morality.
I will lay out Spencer's starting assumptions, focusing on how, despite his strange 
endpoint, he still fits within the classical liberal tradition. I will then move into his 
treatment of rule of law and property, as examples of his movement away from that 
tradition. I will then attempt to explain this movement in terms of his misunderstanding 
of human evolution, as well as his corresponding attachment to axiomatic and scientific 
certainty. Finally, I will end with a brief discussion of the Hegelianism inherent in his 
thought. As it turns out, Spencer has more in common with a kind of Cartesian/Baconian 
Hegelianism than he does with the more moderate, less precise, and more prudent 
thought of Smith and Hayek. Nevertheless, his arguments are important for 
understanding why, taking human nature into account, anarchy is not tenable.
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Spencerian Assumptions
What makes Spencer so interesting from a classical liberal point of view is that he 
starts with most of the same assumptions that Smith and Hayek start with in their 
movement toward limited government. Spencer emphasizes the problem of knowledge 
that is caused by the complexity of both human nature and environmental circumstances 
(1995, 7; 1978II, 11). He argues for gradual growth of a spontaneous order rather than 
governmental interference. His arguments in favor of individual activity rather than 
positive legislation are some of his most impassioned as he points out time and time 
again how even benevolently intentioned legislation has an opposite effect from the one 
intended. He discusses the importance of the moral sense in human life, following 
Hutchinson and other Scottish enlightenment thinkers who had such a profound influence 
on Smith. His argument for individual freedom is supported by an apparent concern for 
the individual as being of distinct worth apart from the group. Overall, his prescriptions 
for liberty within the existing state are similar to those of Smith and Hayek. Free trade, 
freedom of association, freedom of belief, and general governmental non-interference in 
the daily lives of citizens are all important aspects of his philosophy. All of these 
conclusions seem linked to the problem of complexity. But having postulated 
complexity as a starting point, Spencer seems willing to ignore this complexity in favor 
of axiomatic proofs of ethical conduct. The moderate Spencer analyzing the present state 
becomes transformed into the radical progressive Spencer forseeing the utopian future.
I will lay out this movement from limited government to radical anarchy using
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Spencer's treatments of private property in land and rule of law. Spencer's progressive 
utopianism has strange consequences for the typically sacrosanct classical liberal 
institutions of rule of law and private property, and in understanding how he treats these 
two institutions we can better understand how his utopianism develops.
Property Rights
Abandoning the argument for gradual growth that he claims earlier (and that 
serve Smith and Hayek so well), Spencer turns to a Lockean understanding of property 
rights as rooted in consent, and ultimately, in the Spencerian moral imperative of equity. 
While defending other kinds of property rights (like intellectual property) Spencer argues 
that the property of land is not a real right. He looks to Locke's state of nature and argues 
that “the circumstances of savage life render the principles of abstract morality 
inapplicable; for it is impossible, under ante-social conditions, to determine the rightness 
or wrongness of certain actions.... We must not expect, therefore, that the right of 
property can be satisfactorily based upon the premises afforded by such a state of 
existence” (1995,116).
Spencer criticizes Locke and similar thinkers for looking back to a state of nature 
“instead of referring forward to an ideal civilization” (1995, 114). For Spencer, ethical 
premises only apply in a perfect world, or at least are only meaningful in that perfect 
world. We need to look forward to what the ideal world says about property rather than 
looking back. The ideal world says, interestingly, that because there is no way for the 
liberty of one man in acquiring land to not infringe on the liberty of others to that same
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land, that property in land is incompatible with equity, or equal freedom. Thus, no one 
has a right to property in land, however much he may have a property in other things, 
like ideas, which do not violate this law.
Spencer attempts to alleviate the consequences of such a statement by arguing 
that land can be leased to individuals, so long as the individuals provide society with part 
of the produce of the land. The rest of the produce belongs to the individual to dispose of 
as he pleases (1995, 116). Spencer manages to avoid all the difficulties of the right of 
first possession by denying that there is any such right. Such a move is philosophically 
interesting, but probably not lauded by those who saw property in land as, in some ways 
at least, the foundational expression of private property.
What becomes unclear on Spencer's account is how leasing the land is any better 
than owning it. Since land is a finite resource, there would come a time when my right to 
lease the land would infringe on your right to lease the land. Presumably this problem is 
somewhat mitigated by the fact that because I have to give up some of my produce you 
are no worse off in resources, though this outcome is certainly not a necessary one. 
Moreover, we are faced with a problem of knowledge as we attempt to discover precisely 
how much of the produce of the land an individual must hand over to society. Spencer's 
idea sounds a lot like traditional taxation, and as such, enters into the same problems of 
value as those who try to determine a just rate of taxation. It is unclear why the Lockean 
or Smithian systems might not work as well. In Smith's system, the landowners 
generally produce more than they can consume and provide this extraneous produce to 
the society in the form of trade. In this way property ownership is gradually grown, and 
is at least as compatible with equal liberty as Spencer's own land-leasing system.
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This is perhaps as good a place as any to point out the difficulty that arises from 
Spencer's treatment of the state of nature. While he derides its use by Locke and similar 
contract thinkers, he himself reverts to the use of a kind of state of nature that is similarly 
problematic. Spencer uses a kind of state of nature as his starting point in arguing for the 
perfectibility of man, and again when arguing that evil is caused by not being adapted 
properly to the “new” environment of social life. Spencer argues that man is not yet 
adapted for social life because “he yet partially retains the characteristics that adapted 
him for an antecedent state” (1995, 58). This state is a “predatory” one, and this 
“primitive circumstances required that he should sacrifice the welfare of other beings to 
his own” (58). Spencer's predatory state of nature prior to civil society starts sounding a 
lot like the state of nature proposed by Locke, or perhaps even more so like the brutish 
state of nature of that friend of absolute sovereignty, Hobbes.
The difference lies in the fact that we do not consent our way out of Spencer's 
state of nature as we do with Locke and Hobbes. We grow our way out: such movement 
is inevitable as the gradual growth of the understanding of cause and effect allows us to 
gradually move toward a higher existence. This growth of the understanding of cause 
and effect is triggered in part by the natural result of overpopulation. As human 
populations grow, it becomes impossible to live alone. As we come together we must 
gradually adapt to society, and part of this adaptation is the increasing understanding that 
violations of the law of equal liberty result in natural consequences. The end of this 
adaptation is the eradication of government altogether. While Spencer starts with an 
anti-social predatory state of nature like Locke and Hobbes, he ends not with limited 
government or with absolute sovereignty but with social anarchy. The movement from
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anti-social anarchy to social anarchy will become more clear as we understand precisely 
what Spencer does with classical liberal institutions, such as the rule of law.
Rule of Law
Rule of law is at the heart of the classical liberal understanding of liberty. If 
individuals are to enjoy rights, liberty, and privacy, they must be prevented from taking 
advantage of each other and infringing on each other's liberty. Moreover, as Hayek 
points out, a stable rule of law makes individuals more able to make decisions about their 
lives because the actions and behaviors of other individuals are more predictable. As 
pointed out above, rule of law provides the framework in which individuals can 
cooperate.
For Spencer, on the other hand, rule of law becomes internalized. Because 
individual natures can become better adapted to society over time and therefore 
perfectible, external rule of law becomes superfluous. All that is left is an internal rule of 
law whereby individuals voluntarily obey the law of equal liberty.
Prior to this utopian anarchy, however, we do find Spencer arguing for a rule of 
law in which the government is responsible for preventing force and fraud between 
citizens. This rule of law, though a temporary one (at least in the long view of things), is 
still an important aspect of man's social life in the state. Spencer argues that it is the 
state’s function “to protect, to administer the law of equal freedom, to maintain men's 
rights...” as well as to defend the community from outside assaults (1995,241). Spencer
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defines the state as essentially “the protector,” arguing that “whenever the state begins to 
exceed its office of protector it begins to lose protective power. Not a single 
supplementary service can it attempt without producing dissent” (1995, 249). The state's 
primary role is the minimal one of preventing force and fraud, both internally and 
externally. This understanding of rule of law makes sense from a Smithian and Hayekian 
perspective, and while each promotes a larger role for the state than Spencer does, none 
of the three would be in real disagreement.
Where the argument becomes difficult is when Spencer argues for “the right to 
ignore the state”: “As a corollary to the proposition that all institutions must be 
subordinated to the law of equal freedom, we cannot choose but to admit the right of the 
citizen to adopt a condition of voluntary outlawry” (1995,185). Specifically, Spencer 
argues that a citizen can choose not to pay taxes or follow laws provided he does so in 
such a way as to not infringe on the liberty of others. If a citizen chooses to do so, he 
“loses all claim to its [government's] good offices and exposes himself to the danger of 
maltreatment” (1995,184). While this right seems like it makes sense, at least according 
to the principle of freedom of association, it nevertheless strikes at the heart of rule of 
law. Smith and Hayek would recognize the necessary freedom to leave a country whose 
laws we feel to be unjust, but the right to ignore that country's laws while living in it goes 
well beyond classical liberal freedom and enters the realm of license. It is rule of law 
that creates the framework that allows for predictability and voluntary cooperation. The 
“right” to ignore rule of law leads to its collapse.
Spencer's philosophic justification for disobedience is that the state itself is 
immoral and is in a difficult position with regard to the perfect law of morality. As
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Spencer points out, “the state employs evil weapons to subjugate evil and is alike 
contaminated by the objects with which it deals and the means by which it works. 
Morality cannot recognize it, for morality, being simply a statement of the perfect law, 
can give no countenance to anything growing out of, and living by, breaches of that law” 
(1995,186). If legislation by its very nature is not ethical, then no man can be compelled 
to follow it.
The problem here is one that plagues Spencer from the beginning to the end. He 
is far too concerned with axiomatic proofs and incontestable laws which, in the uncertain 
and variable world of human nature, all too often lead him to farcical conclusions. The 
argument that the law of morality does not apply to the state because the state is 
necessarily imperfect and the law of morality is by definition perfect is to define morality 
in such a way as to make it almost meaningless. Certainly, Spencer argues that we 
should use the law of equity to judge the rightness or wrongness of government's actions, 
but by claiming that all governmental action is in some way immoral, he blurs the line 
between proper governmental function and governmental encroachment, which is 
precisely the line that classical liberals are trying to demarcate more clearly. For 
Spencer, all government is illegitimate.
Furthermore, if individuals are allowed to “opt out” of government, including 
those laws that they feel go against the natural law of equity, one sets oneself up for a 
failure of rule of law as a principle. The ideal behind rule of law and the primary reason 
for its effectiveness is that it applies to everyone. No one can opt out. Certainly, people 
can disobey, and civil disobedience has a long history. However, that civil disobedience 
comes with the understanding that one will be punished for one's disobedience. By
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arguing that we have a right to disobey, Spencer makes what is illegal legal and brings 
the entire argument for rule of law dangerously close to incoherence. Perhaps Spencer 
means we have a natural right to ignore the government that is prior to civil society. It is 
unclear what status such a right would have within civil society, or whether such a 
concept is even meaningful. As classical liberals like Smith, Burke, and Hayek argue, 
the application of natural rights to political life without prudence is an extremely 
dangerous task. In Spencer's case, it undermines the very concept of rule of law.
The problem here is that Spencer seems to see government as both natural and 
unnatural. He argues that the “legislative authority can never be ethical -  must always be 
conventional merely” (1995,186), and yet earlier he argues, “instead of civilization 
being artificial, it is a part of nature” (1995, 60). If the state is part and parcel of 
civilization, and if progress from asocial anarchy to the state is natural and inevitable, it 
is unclear why the legislative authority associated with the state is merely conventional.
It is also unclear why the legislative authority is always unethical, apart from the 
argument that coercion is unethical. If governmental coercion is an inevitable part of the 
natural progression of man toward perfection, then why is it any less legitimate than the 
other steps along the way? Ultimately, Spencer's historicism breaks down, since he 
cannot injustice condemn one inevitable step of the process (since it is all a part of the 
Divine will) except by condemning it from a future standpoint that has no relevance for 
the present.
Nor is it clear what the status of nature is in Spencer's view. If the state is natural, 
then it is a part of nature that will be replaced by a better nature in the historical 
progression of human life. In that way, the state is conventional, because it is a human
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creation, but a conventional part of nature. This takes my natural conventionalism and 
turns it on its head. Moreover, Spencer's nature is radically variable, which undermines 
it as any sort of foundation for right or wrong. Whatever the status of government and 
nature, however, Spencer's attitude toward government is a confused one, and his 
futuristic concerns create dangers for the limited governments that we might hope to 
create today.
Ultimately, Spencer takes the classical liberal assumptions of complexity, 
variability, spontaneous order, and individual liberty and uses them to move away from 
limited government toward a utopian anarchy in which individuals act as they choose, 
but in accordance with the divine law of equal liberty. He believes that evil is eradicable, 
since he takes a kind of Socratic-scientific attitude toward evil, arguing that it is the result 
of the failure to adapt to present circumstances. The eradication of evil is part and parcel 
of his Hegelian historical progression from a kind of anti-social state of nature to a 
radically social anarchical utopia.
The Use and Abuse of Evolution
One of the primary reasons for this seemingly strange movement from classical 
liberal premises to utopian conclusions is Spencer's inadequate understanding of how 
evolution actually works. Spencer relies on a Lamarckian evolution as he discusses the 
gradual adaptation of man to his environment. Spencer argues in “Sins of the 
Legislators” that “modifications of structure, in one way or other produced, are 
inheritable” (1982, 99; see also, 1995, 371). The problem is that the inheritability of
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modifications of structures depends very much on how those modifications are produced. 
The modem understanding of genetics would teach us that, if not produced through 
genetic mutation that occurs in the germline, such modifications cannot and will not be 
passed on to offspring. This fact of non-Lamarckian evolution is one of the primary 
reasons for the general stability of human nature.
Contrary to Spencer's claim that human nature is wildly and “indefinitely” 
variable (1995, 30-36), human nature is actually quite static, in large part because even if 
an adaptation would help us survive better, we often lack the material, the genetic 
variability, necessary to so adapt. For a Lamarckian, however, humans can adapt 
whenever and wherever, because all that is necessary is for some modification to exist, 
and it will be passed on to offspring. A Lamarckian can afford to be a utopian because 
under this view, human nature is nothing more than clay in the hands of the benevolent 
philosopher. A modem Darwinian cannot afford such idealism because she knows that 
human nature will resist many kinds of change, and that this resistance can cause 
suffering. Spencer saw suffering as the inevitable outcome of progress, of the continual 
historical process of adaptation (1982,108). Modem Darwinians see suffering as the 
outcome of the suppression of natural, stable human desires. Thus, the primary departure 
point for Spencer is that he sees human nature as radically variable, while classical 
liberals see it as a permanent facet of human life.
Spencer's Lamarckianism is not wholly wrong, of course. Cultural evolution can 
be Lamarckian, to be sure. But cultural evolution is bounded and constricted by 
biological evolution, at least insofar as cultural evolution is bounded by man's innate 
desires. Thus, even the Lamarckian aspects of cultural evolution are not enough to fuel
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the continual movement toward progress that Spencer so dearly desires. Spencer is still 
limited by the permanence of a human nature that he refuses to acknowledge.
One further evolutionary confusion is that Spencer misunderstands the nature of 
adaptation. He sees the process of adaptation as a progressive process that moves 
continually to an end. “Progress,” he argues, “is not an accident, but a necessity” (1995, 
60). Once the organism becomes completely adapted to its environment, we have 
reached the end of history, or the perfection of man and the eradication of the need for 
government. What Spencer fails to see is that adaptation ends only when environmental 
change ends. Environmental change ends only when arms races between species and 
within species end, when climate ceases to change, when we fully understand parasites, 
and so on. This kind of knowledge is impossible. As a result, we are always somewhat 
maladapted to our environments. It is precisely this maladaptation that fuels the selective 
process. This process is slow and is bounded by the available variability in the species, 
but the fact that change is always occurring in the environment means that we will never 
be completely adapted to our environments. Thus, even if crime really were the result of 
failure to adapt to present environments (and, as we saw earlier, the case of psychopaths 
calls this into question) we would never get rid of it completely (1982, 108).
Spencer's misunderstanding of evolution and adaptation is not the only reason that 
he ends up at odds with the classical liberal tradition. The second reason has to do with 
the importance he places on science and the scientific method. Spencer's work is infused 
with scientific thought, and he pushes this thought to the point of scientific idealism. 
Spencer sounds Baconian in his discussion of the principles of evolution being used for 
the relief of man's estate. His use of the principles of evolution to perfect man, leading
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eventually to a free utopia, underscores the confidence he expresses in scientific theory 
and method.
Smith and Hayek lack such conviction in scientific progress. Insofar as science 
plays a role in their philosophies (which it does not, really), it is seen alongside 
everything else, as admitting of uncertainty and falling, ultimately, before the specter of 
complexity. Spencer pays lip-service to complexity, but then shows little compunction in 
settling down to derive logical proofs of man's nature and future. He ends Social Statics 
arguing that, “in virtue of the law of adaptation, our advance must be toward a state in 
which this entire satisfaction of every desire, or perfect fulfillment of individual life, 
becomes possible” (389). Spencer goes further than Bacon, however, in that he 
combines faith in the principles of science with the Panglossian belief that this is the best 
of all possible worlds. This combination leads to an optimism thoroughly detached from 
logical proof or empirical evidence. Spencer can argue that suffering is ultimately in the 
name of scientific truth which is ultimately in the service of the Divine will, which wills 
human happiness. Thus, human suffering is in the service of human happiness. Trying 
to alleviate that suffering only thwarts ultimate human happiness. Thus, instead of the 
Baconian project of man using science for the relief of man's estate, we have man using 
the rhetoric of science to excuse man's estate with the argument that it will eventually be 
relieved by the continual (scientific) progress of adaptation.
Part of the problem with Spencer's argument, apart from its overwhelming 
optimism in the face of all proof to the contrary, is again related to the problem of 
understanding adaptation. Spencer discusses the survival of the fittest at one point, 
wondering that “now that the beneficent working of the survival of the fittest has been so
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impressed on them that, much more than people in past times, they might be expected to 
hesitate before neutralizing its action -  now more than every before in the history of the 
world, are they doing all they can to further the survival of the unfittest!” (1982, 109).
The problem with using fitness here is that fitness cannot be defined in abstraction from 
the environment. What is fit in one environment is, by definition, that which helps an 
organism survive and reproduce in that environment. Fitness is a complicated concept 
and cannot be reduced to something like poverty. In fact, by Spencer's own admission, 
one thing that really irritates him is that the unfittest are those who are reproducing the 
most. His irritation with the fact that the unfit are really the most fit seems to be rooted 
in the fact that he wants to define fitness in a way that it simply refuses to be defined. If 
fitness is success at the game of survival and reproduction, one has to take a look at why 
Spencer's supposedly “unfit” are beating his “fit” at their own game.
Human life is too complex to be reduced to mere definitions. Fitness cannot be 
reduced to intelligence, or strength, or creativity, or beauty. Who survives and who does 
not is the result of numerous factors both internal and external to the individual. It is 
precisely this complexity that dooms Social Darwinism from the beginning. Spencer's 
attempt to use fitness as a tool for social change is ultimately foiled by the fact that 
evolutionary fitness can only be seen after the fact -  after we have determined who has 
survived and reproduced and who not -  and is therefore all but useless in social planning. 
Fitness is a descriptive term, not a moral term. It only tells us about who survives, not 
who should survive.
Spencer's movement away from classical liberals like Smith and Hayek is also 
related to a second aspect of his scientific worldview, which is his quest for certainty.
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Spencer's works are full of axiomatic statements and logical proofs, and his language is 
full of claims of certitude. He ends his proof for the adaptability of man with the bold 
statement: “Thus, the ultimate development of the ideal man is logically certain -  as 
certain as any conclusion in which we place the most implicit faith” (1995, 59). This is 
the conclusion of an argument with six major premises, at least two of which are 
demonstrably false.
Spencer's logical certainty and love of proofs seems to come in large part from his 
conviction that the laws of geometry have something to add to the study of man. He 
points out that “A geometrician requires that the straight lines with which he deals shall 
be veritably straight and that his circles and ellipses and parabolas shall agree with 
precise definitions.... So likewise is it with the philosophical moralist. He treats solely of 
the straight man” (1995, 53). Earlier he argues that “physical laws are characterized by 
constancy and universality and ...there is every reason to believe the like true of ethical 
ones” (1995, 48). The philosophical certitude with which Spencer creates unalterable 
laws of adaptation and natural laws of equity is directly in opposition to statements he 
makes elsewhere. He echoes Aristotle when he says, “Right regulation of the actions of 
so complex a being as man, living under conditions so complex as those presented by a 
society, evidently forms a subject matter unlikely to admit of specific statements 
throughout its entire range” (1978 II, 11). He even speaks of “judicial balancing of 
requirements and avoidance of extremes” (ibid.). He then immediately moves on to 
argue that there are two different overarching rules for adult life and immature life, the 
latter being that merit has no influence on benefits received, and in the former case, that 
merit must have an influence on benefits received (1978 II, 22). The reduction of human
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life to axiomatic rules of conduct that can generally be reduced to the truism that actions 
have consequences is simply part and parcel of the Spencerian quest for certainty.
This Cartesian obsession with certainty is at odds with the arguments he makes 
elsewhere for complexity, and even more at odds with Smith's and Hayek's 
understandings of human life. Hayek's primary argument for limited government is 
precisely the fact that certainty is impossible. Human life is characterized first and 
foremost by a problem of knowledge. We cannot know everything, and it is precisely 
this lack of knowledge that makes liberty so necessary for both the individual and the 
society. The strength of the spontaneous order is that it succeeds where human 
knowledge fails.
Smith makes a similar point. His condemnation of “men of systems” is directed 
almost completely at those who attempt to oversimplify human behavior, especially 
human ethical behavior (Smith 1982a, 233-234). Spencer moves from a Smithian 
understanding of moral sentiments, which Smith argues are necessarily vague and subject 
to corruption, to the argument that this moral sense “may still be capable of generating a 
true fundamental intuition, which can be logically unfolded into a scientific morality” 
(1995, 30). While Smith would agree that we can turn our moral sentiments into general 
rules after much experience, he would disagree with anything approaching a scientific 
morality, at least insofar as that implies any level of complete certainty.
Spencer sums up his Cartesian morality by arguing: “On each of these axiomatic 
truths it must be possible to build a series of theorems immediately bearing upon our 
daily conduct; or, inverting the thought, every act stands in a certain relationship to these 
truths, and it must be possible in some way or other to solve the problem.... When such a
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series of theorems has been elaborated and solutions have been given to such a series of 
problems, the task of the moralist is accomplished” (1995, 66,411). One cannot picture 
Smith or Hayek making any such a statement. The fact is that the argument for limited 
government rests on the uncertainty that an imperfect man faces daily. Spencer's 
rejection of both uncertainty and imperfection allows him to extend himself beyond 
limited government into an anarchic utopia.
Spencer's Hegelian Utopianism
Spencer's final state (or lack thereof) sounds more like Hegel's than Hayek's or 
Smith's. In fact, the similarities between Spencer and Hegel are almost spooky at times, 
especially when the fact that their major works on the historical perfection of man were 
written within twenty years of each other. While the mechanisms differ, each 
philosopher's understanding of the historical progression of man as the working out of 
divine will (or a similar secular process as it becomes in Spencer's later works), reaches 
an endpoint at which this progression ceases in the perfection of man. Moreover, both 
Spencer and Hegel end up with a version of perfect man that is essentially the same.
Both see the final unfolding of human freedom as consisting in the individual's voluntary 
obedience to laws of rational (and therefore moral) conduct. The only difference, and at 
heart it seems a rather minor difference, is that in Hegel's version the state is very much 
still in evidence, while in Spencer's version the state gradually disappears.
Now is, unfortunately, not the place to delve too deeply into a comparison of 
Hegel and Spencer. Suffice it to say that Spencer takes the attention given to historical
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detail in Smith and Hayek and turns it into a radical progressive historicism that 
ultimately rejects the realistic reasons for that attention to historical detail. If man is 
perfectible, we need not pay much attention to what has come before except insofar as it 
helps us understand the progression toward what will be, which will fundamentally 
change everything in its path. Smith and Hayek take history in a much more moderate 
light. They look to the past mistakes and movements of man in order to understand his 
growth certainly, but also to understand where that growth might lead, since for the 
classical liberals who understand human nature as imperfect and imperfectible, it is 
highly unlikely that history will not repeat itself. The role of classical liberal institutions 
is to guard against the most egregious aspects of that repetition (such as the despotic 
desire) while preserving individual liberty. This dual role is the primary reason why rule 
of law, private property and the private sphere are all necessary parts of the classical 
liberal regime. Evil is not simply the lack of adaptation; evil itself may be the result of 
adaptation (Mealey 1995; Amhart 1998) and must be prevented from wreaking havoc.
Spencer's Lamarckian understanding of evolution is ultimately at the root of the 
problem. Lamarckian evolution seems to be the corollary of Hegel's continual unfolding 
of the spirit of Reason. If there are no limits on the adaptability of man we can change 
man and leave government behind. Both Hayek and Smith at least implicitly recognize 
that human nature is at least as static as it is imperfect and, whether or not they 
understood the mechanisms, recognized that man is not infinitely adaptable. Man has a 
nature that is somewhat flexible, but that flexibility occurs within a nature that has a 
pattern, and this pattern is not radically mutable merely on the basis of individual 
experience in particular environments.
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Questioning Perfection
The last major question revolving around Spencer's thought is the quality of his 
utopia. A pattern many have noted among utopian societies is that very few are societies 
in which any rational person would actually want to live. Bacon's Bensalem ends up 
seeming creepy and authoritarian, Plato's Republic has numerous problems of its own, 
totalitarianism being not the least of its worries, and More's Utopia is anything but. The 
question then arises, apart from the practical considerations of Spencer's ideal, is it 
actually a worthwhile ideal at all? One would assume that an anarchical utopia would 
have at its base a liberty that goes beyond that possible under government. What we find 
instead in Spencer's utopianism is a radical conformity that makes Plato's Republic look 
permissive.
Spencer argues that “there is no safety but in entire obedience” to the ethical laws 
he has discovered (1995, 48). He argues earlier that “A universal obedience to its 
[morality's] precepts implies an ideal society” (1995, 36). This universal obedience is 
independent of the particulars of time and place and allows for no exceptions. Spencer 
rejects prudence since, for him, the certainty of the axiomatic laws of ethics derived from 
the scientific method are beyond question. Moreover, just as the laws of geometry admit 
of no exceptions, neither should the laws of ethics that Spencer models after them. This 
rejection of prudence is not only dangerous politically, but is also dangerous to 
individualism properly understood.
Spencer himself admits that by taking prudential judgments out of the equation,
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he annihilates the individual's right to judge based on his own circumstances:
“Neglecting prudential considerations in the endeavor to put society on a purely equitable 
basis will probably be demurred to as implying an entire abandonment of private 
judgment. It must be confessed that it does so” (1995,422). This “entire abandonment” 
of the individual's ability to judge for himself leads to a radical conformity that seems to 
contradict any real concern for individual freedom. In effect, Spencer's anarchical, free 
society becomes nothing more than the freedom implied by blind obedience to the 
natural law of equity. Spencer links the individual to society to the point where the 
individual seems to play almost no more role than that of a cell in an organism (1995, 
409). By the time we reach the ideal state, the individual clearly plays no real role in 
society, but only exists because the individual is necessary for society to exist. The 
individual's happiness is completely inseparable from societal happiness. The individual 
“must see that his own life can become what it should be only as fast as society becomes 
what it should be” (ibid.). Interestingly, the final state contradicts Spencer's arguments 
elsewhere that one's voluntary choice to be coerced has no relevance for the quality of 
that coercion (1982, 25). It appears that the principles of freedom that hold true in 
Spencer's present do not apply to his future.
Spencer's perfect society is achieved by “the process during which all desires 
inconsistent with the most perfect social organization are dying out and other desires 
corresponding to such an organization are being developed” (1995, 396). He claims that 
the perfect society allows for the full “unfolding” of individual nature, and this is true 
insofar as those natures are compatible with the perfect state. Spencer takes humans and 
turns them into social insects. The individuality he claims to be concerned with is
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nothing more than a redefinition of conformity. Spencer perfects man by making him 
subhuman. The individual is only important for Spencer insofar as he has the right 
desires.
Smith and Hayek see the individual as inseparable from society only insofar as 
man is naturally social and needs society. The individual is meaningful apart from 
society because the individual has a will that is, to a certain extent, separate from society. 
Part of the importance of the spontaneous order or invisible hand for both Smith and 
Hayek is that the individual's motivations and interests are assumed to not be identical 
with those of society, and yet cooperation can still occur because of the flexibility of a 
free society. Hayek's arguments for customary law and social pressure underscore the 
creative force of the individual since Hayek feels that the benefit of customary law is that 
it can be broken by those willing to reap the consequences. Innovation and flouting 
customary norms of behavior (rather than positive law) allows the individual to exert his 
individuality. It seems then, in absolute terms, that there is more real freedom for the 
individual within a free society that is bound by a framework of laws than there is in the 
radical voluntary conformity of Spencer's anarchy.
Spencer's concern for individuality is further called into question by the role 
suffering plays in his theory. On the way to Spencer's utopia, much suffering is 
occasioned and acknowledged as necessary (1995, 288-289,388). Spencer did not live 
to see the consequences of theories that allow for the breaking of eggs to make an 
omelet, but such a theory certainly undermines his professed concern for the individual. 
In the end, the individual becomes little more than a cog in the historical process that 
leads, inevitably, to the perfect society. The individual is sacrificed for the species,
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which is something no good classical liberal would be willing to allow.
There will always be an uneasy relationship between the individual and society. 
While the individual should generally not be subordinated to the good of the group, the 
welfare of the individual is always inextricably tied to the group. The classical liberal 
ideal is that which best protects both individual and group without sacrificing one to the 
other. It allows for the uneasy relationship between group and individual, allowing 
individual actions to spin out into a spontaneous order that creates a society. Because of 
the freedom involved in the spontaneous order the individual's desires do not need to be 
sacrificed for the good of the group, and the stability of the group need not be sacrificed 
for the desires of individuals. Spencer's problem is that he eventually subordinates the 
individual to the species, and eventually subordinates individualism to the good of the 
species. The plain fact of the matter is that individual desires are not always good for the 
species, and sometimes not even good for the individual.
What Spencer Got Right
For all the criticisms of Spencer that I have leveled thus far, his thought is still 
important for a few reasons. In the first place, understanding how evolutionary theory 
can be misused is important for all of us who attempt to use evidence from science to 
support claims about politics and human relationships in general. In the second place, his 
arguments for liberty in the present are excellent and generally moderate, at least in 
comparison to his vision of the future state. The Spencer who is concerned with the 
present is a thoughtful classical liberal whose overarching desire is to increase human
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In numerous essays Spencer points out the dangers inherent in governmental 
meddling in human lives. He argues in “The New Toryism” that Liberals have become 
Tories in that the primary characteristic of importance in government is whether 
government is increasing or decreasing restrictions on people's lives. The motive of the 
legislator or the manner in which that legislator is elected are irrelevant concerns (1982, 
26). In the same way, the New Tories, or the old Liberals, have taken over the traditional 
Tory role of expanding governmental power, albeit with the desire to alleviate the 
sufferings of the many. This motive, laudable as it is, is irrelevant to the larger question 
of whether people are more or less free at the end of the day to live their lives as they see 
fit.
Spencer's practical concerns include passionate pleas on behalf of black slaves, 
the ardent desire to abolish the coercive practices of the East India Company, expanded 
rights for women and children, and the continual expansion of religious freedom. While 
his primary concern is a theoretical concern with lessening the coercive force of 
government, that concern is linked inextricably to the fact that this theoretical concern 
has real impacts on individual lives. His point is made especially clear when he argues, 
“Change your idea of a bad law into a definite idea of it as an agency operating on 
people's lives, and you see that it means so much of pain, so much of illness, so much of 
mortality” (1982, 81). Governmental interference, whatever the motives, leads to 
consequences, and usually bad ones, for the individuals on whom that legislation acts.
Spencer's overall point is that paternal government not only fails to accomplish 
the goals it sets out to do, but also adds to the misery of the individuals under its care.
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Paternal government makes men worse off not only physically, but also mentally in that 
it creates a mass of individuals who are completely separated from responsibility for their 
actions, since such actions fail to have any real-world consequences. Spencer argues in 
“The Coming Slavery” that “Each generation is made less familiar with the attainment of 
desired ends by individual actions or private combinations, and more familiar with the 
attainment of them by governmental agencies” (1982, 50). The government becomes the 
benevolent despot, and free society slips into soft despotism.
Ultimately, Spencer's practical “here and now” political thought is perfectly in 
line with the thinking of Smith and Hayek and of classical liberalism in general. His 
desire to limit the coercive force of government, to limit taxation so as to allow people to 
spend their earnings as they wish, and to limit the oppression of individuals by others, as 
in the case of slavery and the East India Company, are all laudable goals well within the 
classical liberal framework. He argues for indirect action through the voluntary 
cooperation of free individuals, which is the ideal of classical liberalism thought in 
general. As a passionate and thoughtful writer the lessons he teaches are worthwhile for 
any student of the free society. It is primarily in his prognostications of the future of 
mankind that he departs from classical liberalism and gradually turns toward radical 
anarchism.
Spencer's anarchism is ultimately the final reason for finding his thought useful in 
the context of this dissertation: it represents the libertarian alternative to utopia. I have 
spoken elsewhere of the biological barriers to regimes of equality, and it makes sense to 
deal with the other extreme, the anarchical society. Interestingly, one of Spencer's major 
mistakes is to assume that human nature is radically malleable, which is precisely the
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mistake made by other kinds of utopian thinkers. In fact, one of the major contentions of 
the rest of this work is that human nature is stable, though flexible. We need government 
just as much as we need that government to be limited. Our freedom must be bounded 
by general laws that help us understand our world, predict what others will do, and plan 
for the future.
As we can see from Spencer's treatment of individual desires in the future state, 
there is a sense in which even government can be liberating. A free society allows the 
expression of many individual desires without requiring that all those individual desires 
become one and the same. And ultimately, the freedom of diverse human desires is what 
makes the human experience worthwhile. In the final analysis, Spencer's radical 
malleability of man poses a danger for his own thought. If man is really so radically 
malleable, and if human nature changes in accordance with the social circumstances in 
which it finds itself, then there is no reason other than a theoretical fondness for freedom 
not to attempt to create a socialistic state based on equality. If human nature can adapt to 
any social system, then the ultimate argument for liberty, that it fulfills human nature in a 
fundamental way, is wiped away, leaving no defense against the encroachments of 
government. The fact of the matter is that human nature is stable, and it requires both 
freedom and law. Forgetting this is to forget the most important justifications for free 
society. True freedom requires moderation.
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CHAPTER 9: EVOLUTION, LIBERTY, AND HUMAN EXCELLENCE
No one can deny the material advantages provided by a free society, though some 
question whether those advantages are spread out “fairly.” Yet most people seem to feel 
that what is materially gained by freedom is accompanied by a corresponding loss, 
whether in equality, justice, or human excellence. A free society, most argue, is also a 
capitalistic society, and capitalism leads fundamentally to the loss of higher goals, a 
conversion of life to nothing more than the pursuit of wealth and comfort. This criticism 
was leveled against the wealth-getting pursuits of the Athenians by Socrates, against 
democratic life by Tocqueville (1969), against the “last man” of liberalism by Nietzsche 
(1996), and against modem liberal capitalism by critics like Fukuyama (2006). Even 
Hayek and Smith, supposed proponents of the Free Society, have serious reservations, or 
at least do not make the positive argument that individual and societal excellence of any 
sort is best achieved in a liberal society.
What seems to be forgotten is that in every regime there will be people of more or 
less substance, some who choose comfort over greatness and vice versa. The ranking of 
types of souls is apparent in Plato's Republic, and Nietzsche's order of rank relies on the 
fact that there are different levels of humanity. What seems to goad the Utopians is that 
the great are not necessarily those who rule in a liberal society. What the Utopians want
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is the government (or ruling class or whoever) to set the standards for greatness, decide 
who is great, and then let those people rule. The liberal alternative is to allow the 
standards for greatness to be worked out within a spontaneous order, to let individuals 
decide for themselves their own paths in life, whether to greatness or comfort, and to let 
the people decide who rules (at least in liberal democracies). The argument against this 
system is that democracy, corrupted by comfortable self-preservation, chooses those least 
fit to rule, the demagogues who flatter the many. The argument against the alternative, 
however, is that even Plato seems unsure about the steps required to create a truly just 
city. Nietzsche is less uncertain (though more vague), but Nietzsche's reputation, while 
somewhat undeserved, demonstrates that most people are fundamentally uncomfortable 
with the Nietzscheian project, and would gladly choose a “low but solid” regime over 
rule by the Nietzscheian overman.
The problem ultimately seems to be one of theory and practice. Theoretically, we 
would like to have a regime in which excellence is rewarded, where individuals of 
courage and justice rule, and where the populace is devoted to high goods like 
contemplation, the arts and sciences and so on. Yet, as we know from Aristotle's 
Politics, the best regime is not identical with the best possible regime. The excellence 
we look to in theory must be compatible with human nature in practice, and there's the 
rub. Practically, we seem to find that we must either risk the creation of dangerous 
tyrannies in the name of the philosophers of the future, or we must risk the degradation 
of humanity into the “last man,” one who seeks nothing more than to be led into 
comfortable safe pastures of plenty.
Realistically, the issue is not quite so stark. I will argue that there are plenty of
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opportunities for excellence in a free society, and that in fact what modem critics like 
Fukuyama criticize about modem liberalism is more the result of its deviation from its 
classical liberal roots than the result of anything inherent in classical liberalism itself. 
Moreover, classical liberalism is, in many ways, the only practically possible regime that 
encourages human excellence, in large part because it is compatible with human nature 
and the human desires that arise from that nature. It therefore requires less coercion, is 
more stable, and allows for voluntary obedience and free choice rather than coerced 
“virtue” (if one can even call coerced virtue virtue at all). I argue then that traditional 
regimes of excellence require excessive coercion and are for this reason unlikely to be 
stable, and unlikely to achieve their ultimate purpose. Most of these regimes of 
excellence have never existed and probably never could, in large part because of their 
opposition to human nature. I argue further that the ideal liberal regime (properly 
understood) creates its own type of excellence that is more complete than the Platonic or 
Nietzscheian alternatives. I discuss both individual and societal excellence, attempting to 
define both of them broadly. In this last section, I will lay out Hayek's and Smith's 
approaches to the problem, and then discuss why their approaches fail to make the case 
strong enough. I argue that this is the result of their inattention to human nature.
I will discuss briefly the arguments Smith and Hayek make for excellence within 
a free society, and I will argue that neither Hayek nor Smith make the case for liberty and 
excellence as well as it could be made. In this section I will concentrate primarily on 
moral excellence, understood as altruism and care for one's fellow man, in large part 
because selfishness is one of the most common complaints leveled at free societies.
Smith seems to see a gulf between the natural moral sentiments and the creation of the
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great society, and Hayek seems to agree that the great society requires the repression of 
natural moral sentiments. What neither of them seem to realize is that the free society is 
in fact that society which best fulfills those natural human desires. Liberalism, properly 
construed, provides the best outlet for human nature, and human excellence properly 
understood. Classical liberalism does not require the suppression of aspects of human 
nature -  in fact, it allows for the completion of the potential within a complex human 
nature in a way that no other regime does. Both Hayek and Smith seem to rely on an 
improper understanding of human nature; nor do either seem to appreciate (though it is 
implicit in their teachings) that the reason for the great success of liberalism is that it 
fulfills some part of human nature that other regimes do not.
The Adam Smith Problem
Smith focuses an inordinate amount of attention on the selfish impulses that are at 
the heart of capitalistic society. His view of the wealthy is almost entirely one of selfish 
vanity, people who in their pursuit of baubles accidentally enrich the lives of the less 
fortunate through the invisible hand. The benefits of capitalism for Smith are almost 
entirely accidental. He never (that I know of at least) makes an argument that freedom in 
a capitalistic system makes people better. He argues in TMS that “[the rich] consume 
little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though 
they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which the propose from the 
labours of all the thousands whom they comply, be the gratification of their own vain and 
insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements”
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(1982, 184). The rich are vain, selfish, and rapacious, yet through these vices, they 
increase the comfort of everyone concerned. Smith's argument, often seen as the primary 
defense of free trade, may actually end up doing more harm than good, since it 
completely avoids many of the moral issues raised by freedom and focuses almost 
entirely on the material advantages offered. Smith's argument seems to be that we cannot 
be both comfortable and good, so we might as well be comfortable. This is not quite the 
argument many would choose to demonstrate the benefits of freedom in general and free 
trade in particular.
Smith's emphasis on the material advantages of freedom is part of what is now 
called the Adam Smith problem. Smith's version of capitalism seems to offer little to the 
individual in the way of happiness. Moreover, a free society seems to demand that we go 
against nature. As he points out in distinguishing justice from beneficence, “Though 
Nature, therefore, exhorts mankind to acts of beneficence, by the pleasing consciousness 
of deserved reward, she has not thought it necessary to guard and enforce the practice of 
it by the terrors of merited punishment in case it should be neglected” (1982, 86).
Justice, not beneficence, is the job of government and society in general. What is 
interesting is that even while Smith sees beneficence as a natural phenomenon, he seems 
to argue that a free society necessarily corrupts such phenomena. Not only does wealth 
not increase the moral character of those possessing it, but it actually perverts the moral 
sentiments, corrupting our natural judgment of right and wrong. “The disposition to 
admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful.... is... the great and most 
universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments” (1982, 61). While the 
admiration of the rich allows us to maintain the order of society, it also perverts our
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judgments, making us more sympathetic to the plight of the great and wealthy, and less 
so to the weak and poor. Moreover, “wealth and greatness are often regarded with the 
respect and admiration which are due only to wisdom and virtue” (1982,62). When 
people idolize the rich and great rather than those with real abilities and character, the 
erosion of true excellence takes place, and the beginnings of the democratic cult of 
wealth and money making begins.
For Smith then, free society requires the perversion of the natural sentiments, 
particularly the natural instinct for beneficence or altruism. What is interesting is that he 
too, like Hayek, ignores the natural roots of these desires even while he points them out 
in other places. Smith argues against universal benevolence, arguing that it is unnatural 
for man to care universally about those unconnected with him. There is an order of rank 
by which we care about people, starting with family, moving to friends, and then 
gradually encapsulating the greater community, but with benevolence becoming less and 
less powerful as one moves outward (227). He further argues, “To man [as opposed to 
God] is allotted a much humbler department, but one much more suitable to the 
weakness of his powers, and to the narrowness of his comprehension; the care of his own 
happiness, of that of his family, his friends, his country” (237). Free society then simply 
confirms these natural moral inclinations and allows these inclinations to benefit others 
inadvertently. While the existence of great wealth may pervert our natural sentiments in 
one way, it confirms and supports our natural sentiments in other ways. A free society 
can support altruism at the individual level while promoting group well-being at the 
larger level of the regime. Smith, however, does not make this connection explicit, and 
focuses far more on the selfish aspects of commercial society than on the positive. As
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we shall see in the Hayek section, this concentration on the selfish aspects of capitalistic 
society rather than the altruistic is overly simplistic, and does damage to the positive 
argument that can be made for free society.
The Friedrich Hayek Problem
Hayek makes a similar misstep in emphasizing the selfish aspects of the free society, 
in large part because he believes that the spontaneous order is purely conventional, not 
seeing that such conventionality is rooted in the nature of man. Hayek's fear of nature, 
discussed above in the chapter on rule of law, stems, I believe, from his belief that 
socialistic desires are the result of our evolutionary past, and that these natural desires are 
strong enough to uproot the classical liberal desire for freedom. Hayek's argument seems 
to be that the desire for equality is natural, while the desire for liberty is unnatural and 
thus needs a lot of help. This treatment then begs the question of why precisely liberty is 
good. If it truly does require going against our fondest and most natural and deeply 
rooted desires, what makes liberty good? Again, it seems that we have the Adam Smith 
problem all over again. Hayek argues that classical liberalism is good because it allows 
us to live comfortably, but it requires eradicating our altruistic impulses in the name of 
comfort. This is admittedly overly simplistic, since Hayek does defend in places the 
importance of liberty for responsibility and the effect of these on both the individual and 
society. Hayek's argument against altruism is not against altruism writ large, but about a 
kind of universal or general altruism that implies concern for unknown people with 
unknown needs, which is similar to Smith's “universal benevolence.”
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Hayek argues further, “altruism can extend only to the known needs of known 
other people; it cannot lead to the growth of a society which depends on our serving the 
needs of people whose very existence we have no idea” (1983, 30). Hayek argues further 
that there is a conflict between the two different levels of morality, that of learned rules 
and that of “good instincts” (1983, 31), and that we need to suppress these good instincts 
in favor of learned rules. Yet Hayek's “natural instincts” are a straw man. Our natural 
instincts no more dictate general altruism than the learned rules of behavior that are 
based off of those instincts. Moreover, even general altruism, the giving of money to 
children in Africa, for example, is not incompatible with a free society. What is 
incompatible is coercing such altruism, or forcing people to care for unknown people 
with unknown needs against their will, as, for example, the government does in the 
welfare state.
There is, in fact, nothing incompatible about our desires for justice or altruism 
and the classical liberal ideal. The only incompatibility is when we decide that we want 
the government to take care of redistributive justice or altruism for us. Then we find 
coercion rearing its head. There is nothing inconsistent about a classical liberal who 
gives half his income to carefully chosen charities every year. What becomes 
problematic is when the government chooses those charities for us. One of Tocqueville's 
comments on the Americans (1969, 68-70) is that they help themselves and their 
neighbors without requiring governmental assistance. Hayek's fear of our altruistic 
impulses is understandable given the now-prevalent belief that government exists to give 
us things, but altruism itself is not dangerous to freedom.
To be fair, Hayek seems to understand this, even while he advises controlling our
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natural impulses. In Individualism and Economic Order, he points out that true 
individualism does not require that we follow only selfish motives. Part of property 
rights, for example, is “the endeavor to make man by the pursuit of his interests 
contribute as much as possible to the needs of other men....” (1948,20). Moreover, he 
points out that true individualism does not concern only the individual, but also that 
individual's family and friends, community, and the small groups of which every 
individual is a part (23). After decrying the natural state of man as dangerous to liberal 
society, he argues that “It is part of the ordinary nature of men (and perhaps still more of 
women) and one of the main conditions of their happiness that they make the welfare of 
other people their chief aim” (1960, 78), and that “The freedom to pursue one's own aims 
is, however, as important for the most altruistic person, in whose scale of values the 
needs of other people occupy a very high place, as for any egotist” (1960, 78).
Hayek therefore sees freedom as integral to the expression of altruistic feelings, 
and he sees such feelings as natural, but still manages to argue that “we must, to a large 
extent, suppress them in order to maintain our type of society” (1983, 30). The key issue 
that Hayek does not draw out but should is that altruism is not dangerous, nor should it 
be suppressed, but that it should not be required by the government, nor should the 
failure to perform altruistic acts be punished by the state. Punishment should be 
restricted to the informal disapproval of those in our social groups. Even with Hayek's 
conflicting account of the place of altruistic impulses in a capitalistic society, he still 
makes a more forceful argument (such as it is) for the benefits of freedom for society 
than Smith does.
Hayek is also less ambiguous than Smith in his discussion of the importance of
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the wealthy. While his argument was laid out in some depth in the chapter on property, I 
will summarize briefly. He argues (1960,125) that there are goods in society that are 
best achieved through the individualistic impulses of wealthy individuals, and that in 
many cases, neither the market nor the government can provide these goods sufficiently. 
He points out, “The leadership of individuals or groups who can back their beliefs 
financially is particularly essential in the field of cultural amenities, in the fine arts, in 
education and research, in the preservation of natural beauty and historic treasures, and, 
above all, in the propagation of new ideas in politics, morals, and religion” (125). That 
individuals be allowed to use their wealth to express their beliefs about what is important 
is one of the key defenses against a tyranny of the majority, or the eventual abasement of 
man into the last man.
If by excellence we mean morality, Hayek and Smith are conflicted on the 
subject. What neither of them seem to realize, however solid their arguments elsewhere, 
is that altruism itself is not dangerous. Nor do we have to restrict our altruistic impulses 
to the world of the family, while promoting selfishness in the larger world of the market. 
Altruism is only dangerous when we allow the government to decide to whom and how 
we will be altruistic. Companies that make altruistic decisions instead of ruthless 
economic decisions do no harm to the freedom of individuals in the greater society.
What does harm is when the government uses its coercive powers to enforce altruistic 
goals. Classical liberalism, properly understood, is capable of promoting moral 
excellence in its people, as well as various other forms of excellence.
The problem for Hayek and Smith is that both seem to argue that the free society 
goes against natural instincts or sentiments, but then they find it difficult to explain the
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enormous success of such societies once established. More particularly relevant for our 
purposes here, both Smith and Hayek seem to argue that some part of a free society goes 
against the most moral impulses of human nature. Both seem to ignore the important 
argument that a free society actually fulfills human nature to a higher degree than any 
other regime.
The Coercive Force of Regimes of Excellence
Both Plato and Nietzsche's proposals to create regimes of excellence require 
incredible amounts of coercion to keep people in line, as well as dubious amounts of 
knowledge about the kinds of souls people have, the way the parts work together, and so 
on. The Nietzscheian project is somewhat less problematic, since Nietzsche does not lay 
out in any detail precisely how this regime would be ruled, only pushing for some sort of 
future in which the philosophers of the future rule in line with the natural order of rank 
and the will to power. This is admittedly overly simplified, but I am using Nietzsche as 
more of a template for an excellent regime than attempting to tackle the intricacies of his 
philosophy. Coercion seems to be absolutely necessary in Nietzsche's understanding. 
Nietzsche's desire in Human, All Too Human that individuals be assigned work based on 
their ability to suffer requires both knowledge of this ability, and the consent of those so 
assigned. This consent seems improbable at best (1996, 168). More foundationally, the 
very concept of will to power implies a coercive force. Where the will to power consists 
mainly in overcoming oneself or external, inanimate obstacles, it could be compatible 
with a free society. But, insofar as the will to power requires having power over others,
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and of forcing one's vision on others, the coercion necessary becomes dangerously great. 
As has been argued elsewhere, the need for coercion is one sign that the individuals 
involved do not want to do what is required. The need for large amounts of coercion 
generally signals that the actions required go against some part of the nature of the 
people in question. Regimes that conflict with the parts of human nature that are 
necessary to that nature will be less stable than regimes that are in line with human nature 
since the latter rely on voluntary obedience. Moreover, regimes that conflict with 
important aspects of human nature will cause suffering, since the regime will force 
humans to go against deeply rooted natural desires. The anguish of both mothers and 
children in the kibbutz is only one example of the suffering caused by societies that 
conflict with deeply rooted natural desires (Pinker, 2002, Amhart 1998, Tiger 1975).
Plato's (1968) Republic, the quintessential account of the just society, 
demonstrates the difficulty of creating a just society. Socrates, possibly ironically, 
recommends that children be taken away from their parents and their souls tested to 
determine their rank. The amount of coercion required would be incredibly large, and 
one can only imagine the suffering that would ensue in a society in which even the 
raising of children is placed in the hands of the government. Nietzsche's regime, while 
less fleshed out than Plato's, seems to obviously require some sort of force.
The biggest problem with traditional regimes of excellence, however, is that 
human nature is complex, and regimes of excellence tend to emphasize one facet of 
human nature alone. Amhart (1998) points out twenty natural desires of humans. While 
the Platonic regime might fulfill some understanding of the natural desire for justice, it 
will inevitably conflict with the desires for parental care, for familial bonding, and so on.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
224
The same argument can be made for the Nietzscheian regime. The fact that focusing any 
given society on one form of human excellence necessarily requires the suppression of 
another type, means that we will constantly be in an unstable balancing act with human 
nature warring with itself. While Amhart's list does not include a desire for freedom, one 
could argue that freedom is in many ways the meta-desire that is integral to all these 
other desires. I will go into this argument in more detail in the section on human 
potential.
How Liberty Creates Its Own Type of Excellence
Individual responsibility is at the heart of what creates excellence within a liberal 
society. Klein (2006) defines responsibility in two ways, distinguished by whether we 
are responsible to ourselves or to someone else. These two definitions are 
interconnected. Morals and policy influence each other, and by making individuals 
responsible for their actions, we can create responsible individuals (71). One of the 
primary arguments that political philosophers have made for millenia is that the setup of 
the regime influences the souls of those living in that regime. Klein's argument is hardly 
new. By changing governmental policy, we can create personal responsibility for one's 
actions. When people have to reap the consequences of their actions, they are more 
likely to be more thoughtful, more careful, and ultimately more aware about the various 
impacts their actions have on themselves and those closest to them. Hayek makes a 
similar point throughout his works.
People who reap no consequences for their actions are those who learn to act
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randomly, giving little thought to the moral status of their choices, and having little 
awareness of themselves as a conscious, rational beings. This is not surprising, since 
individuals in these circumstances tend to pay much more attention to the passions than 
to their reason, in large part because their reason does not provide them with any 
necessary connection between their actions and the natural consequences of those 
actions.
Klein points out that liberty and responsibility go hand in hand, and that for 
libertarians, liberty alone is not enough, but must come accompanied with responsibility 
for one's actions. The classical liberal ideal of liberty under rule of law is a good 
example of this connection. Liberty allows individuals to make choices about their lives, 
while rule of law ensures that those individuals are held responsible for criminal choices 
they make. Often, as Klein points out, encroachment on liberty corresponds to an 
encroachment on responsibility, the most obvious example being welfare payments. 
Redistributive taxation is an encroachment of liberty that is then used, through welfare 
payments, to further the encroachment on personal responsibility in another set of people. 
The connection is not a logically necessary one, but the two tend to be connected.
Klein sees a further connection with dignity, arguing, “Let us place dignity then 
in the footlights along with liberty and responsibility. Dignity measures a certain quality 
in the behavior of the members of the society. That quality has two aspects: first, the 
extent to which they guard their own self-respect, or preserve their own dignity, in their 
social behavior; second, the extent to which they accommodate the self-respect of others, 
or preserve the dignity of others with whom they interact” (81). A society of free and 
equal (before the law, that is) individuals is a society in which individuals respect
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themselves and therefore know how to respect others. A tree society, instead of taking 
away man's dignity by making him a slave to comfortable self-preservation, in fact gives 
man back his dignity by giving him back his rationality. It is only when a man uses his 
reason that he can be fully responsible for his actions, and it is only in a society in which 
men are held responsible for their actions that they learn to use their reason. The 
argument may sound circular, but it is at the heart of what it means to have human 
dignity properly understood. Human dignity is necessarily connected to that which is 
highest in man, and that highest part is his reason. Thus, while free societies are often 
seen as linked more to the passions than the reason, they in fact actually promote the use 
of the reason by emphasizing freedom of choice while at the same time maintaining that 
there are consequences connected to those choices.
In the same way that individual responsibility is tied to responsibility to the 
government, so individual excellence is tied to societal excellence. A society of 
individuals of varying talents, aspirations, and rankings of human desires who 
nevertheless share a sense of self-respect, responsibility and ownership of their actions, 
and recognition of both their own dignity and that of others will be an excellent society 
by almost any standard. It may lack the real heroism of the Spartans, or the imaginary 
justice of Plato's state, but it will be a society in which individual fulfillment is high, 
where people help their neighbor, and where people choose to do things for themselves 
rather than wait for someone else to do it for them. Moreover, even if such people 
display little great heroism on a day-to-day basis, the minor heroic efforts of day-to-day 
life prepare them much better for great heroism than those who have things taken care of 
for them, who reap governmental benefits without feeling that they owe any obligation in
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return. Charles Murray, an ardent classical liberal, somewhat misses the point when he 
asks and answers, “What should the government be permitted to demand of this ordinary 
person? Very little” (1997, 5). In reality, the government demands quite a lot of the 
ordinary person in a classical liberal state. That ordinary person is required to take care 
of himself, to be responsible for his actions, and to make thoughtful decisions about the 
choices he makes. Obviously, Murray is right in that the government is demanding this 
by default rather than by positive law. But in reality, the distinction is important. Hayek 
makes this point when he argues, “The necessity of finding a sphere of usefulness, an 
appropriate job, ourselves is the hardest discipline that a free society imposes on us” 
(1960). Classical liberal society demands much from the average person, but fortunately 
not more than the average person is capable of, once that person has gotten into the habit 
of being responsible for what he does. Thinking for oneself is only more difficult than 
doing what one is told if one has never been in the habit of doing it.
This utopian version of the Free Society is what Tocqueville saw in the small 
towns and rural areas of America. While he was critical of various aspects of democratic 
life, he saw the biggest danger to be the democratic urge for equality, not the American 
desire for liberty. The desire for liberty Tocqueville saw as the primary protection 
against the soft despotism of the coming welfare state. Apart lfom the arguments for 
responsibility, dignity, and other psychological benefits that in turn influence the social 
and political fabric of a regime, I will turn to the argument from human potential, as 
contained in human nature.
Amhart's (1998) discussion of the twenty desires in human nature is important to 
an understanding for why classical liberalism is good, and why it promotes a kind of
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excellence. Human nature is variable, complex, and directed toward many ends under 
different circumstances. These desires are not radically relativistic. Most people will 
have some of these desires at some point, and some, like the desire for mating, will be 
practically universal. As has been pointed out above, it is precisely this complexity that 
makes life so difficult for Utopians of the Platonic stripe. Humans care about justice, but 
they also care about themselves. As Klein (2006) argues, we are in many ways “a ship of 
selves,” but with “a single captain” (76). Sometimes these desires do not conflict. We 
can love our children and our mate, thus fulfilling the desire for monogamous 
relationships and the desire for parental care. Other times, these desires do conflict.
Either way, a society based on freedom is that “...which makes use of men in all their 
given variety and complexity, sometimes good and sometimes bad, sometimes intelligent 
and more often stupid” (Hayek 1948,12).
In utopian society, this complexity leads to an insoluble problem of knowledge 
that is at the core of Hayek's arguments against socialism. There is no way for anyone to 
know what desire is most important to a particular human at a particular time, since the 
shifting hierarchy of desires never stops shifting. One would have to understand the 
particular rank of a particular desire, what will happen in a particular person's life and so 
on. The variables are never-ending, and the ability of anyone to accurately predict what 
will be the most important desire in a person's life is impossible. So, how do we 
construct society so as to be in line with human desires if such knowledge is impossible? 
The response from folks like Hayek is that the greatest accumulation of knowledge of 
particulars is held by individuals. He argues that “The true basis of his argument is that 
nobody can know who knows best and that the only way by which we can find out is
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through a social process in which everybody is allowed to try and see what he can do” 
(1948, 15). The individual is the only one with the necessary knowledge of particulars to 
make decisions based on his own particular needs and desires, even if his knowledge is 
necessarily incomplete, and even if this knowledge dispersed among many individuals is 
never collected and concentrated in a single mind.
The problem of knowledge is only part of the argument. As pointed out above, 
one key fault of utopias like the Republic or Nietzsche's regime of the overman is that 
such visions rely on a simplistic view of human nature. One version of excellence that 
takes its bearings from Aristotle is an understanding of human excellence as the 
fulfillment of a telos or potential within human beings. This potential, however, is 
complex. Humans have many desires that need to be fulfilled to create a complete life. 
The best life then, the most excellent life, might be one where most of the desires that 
make us human are fulfilled to some degree and in a way that is compatible with the 
particulars of our specific circumstances. One can choose to be a parent, to be active in 
one's community, and to live a life devoted to intellectual inquiry. On the most material 
level, the only society likely to have enough wealth to support such multitasking is a free 
society. On a principled level, the only society that offers enough personal freedom for 
people to make these choices will be a free society. The free society then offers a way 
for individuals to fulfill their potential (as far as one can with the kind of complex nature 
we have) as they see fit, taking into account the knowledge they have of their particular 
situation, which includes the knowledge that they will ultimately be held responsible for 
the actions they take. The excellence of the liberal society properly understood may then 
be the most complete excellence humanity is capable of.
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The question then becomes, if we are really interested in creating a regime that 
fulfills the desires of human nature to the greatest extent, how do we prevent these 
desires from becoming tyrannical -  in effect, how do we prevent individuals from 
making bad decisions? How can we prevent the individual from being tyrannized over 
by his desires? The answer is not foolproof, but it relates back to responsibility. 
Certainly, individuals who have been taught that there are consequences for their actions 
and who have self-respect and a sense of self-ownership will be less likely to make bad 
decisions based on passions of the moment. Certainly, people will make bad choices, 
and they will choose to emphasize “bad” parts of their souls. But in general, people who 
are responsible and who have the self-respect that responsibility breeds, and who have 
the freedom to make choices about what kind of life they want to live will make far 
fewer mistakes than those who are coerced into a particular kind of life, or worse, those 
who have no responsibility whatsoever for their actions.
Some might argue that how we rank the desires inherent in human life is a 
fundamental problem for arguments like Amhart's. However, the issue of rank is related 
back to the problem of knowledge. The problem with ranking is that many people will 
have different rankings from their neighbors while at the same time having different 
rankings at different times of their lives. A child may rank friendship and social ranking 
quite high while at the same time completely ignoring parental care. This does not mean 
that being a parent may at some point become more important to that child than social 
rank, or that the two may not interconnect in important ways. What is important is that 
“A free society is a pluralistic society without a common hierarchy of particular ends” 
(1976, 109). As Hayek points out, “It is often made a reproach to the Great Society and
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its market order that it lacks an agreed ranking of ends. This, however, is in fact its great 
merit which makes individual freedom and all its values possible. The Great Society 
arose through the discovery that men can live together in peace and mutually benefiting 
each other without agreeing on the particular aims which they severally pursue” (109). 
Thus, the problems inherent in Amhart's list of natural desires is the same problem that 
people point out in regard to the Great Society. What appears to be a flaw, however, is in 
fact a benefit. No individual has a consistent ranking of ends, so it seems impossible and 
dangerous to expect a society to have this.
This simply demonstrates the natural basis of freedom yet again. If there are 
twenty or so natural desires that are common to all humans at some point, the liberty will 
be the “meta-desire” that holds all these desires together. To fulfill the desire for parental 
care, one must have the freedom to choose one's mate and decide when and where to 
have children. To fulfill the desire for social ranking, one must have the freedom to 
move within society, to try one's hand at various occupations, and mingle with whom one 
wishes. I could continue, but the point is obvious. In order to fulfill the potential 
contained within human nature, humans need to the freedom to rank their desires and to 
seek the ends to fulfill those desires, generally unhindered from outside interference 
except when they engage in force or fraud. Such freedom is at the heart of the classical 
liberal ideal, and such freedom is the only political good that can lead to true human 
excellence properly understood.
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CHAPTER 10:
FACTS AND VALUES, HISTORY, AND VARIATION:
THREE POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO A DARWINIAN NATURAL RIGHT
I had already planned to defend myself against charges of historicism, violating 
the fact-value distinction, and ignoring radical variation when, on rereading Strauss's 
Natural Right and History, I realized that he also deals with these primary concerns in his 
defense of natural right. His natural right is seemingly different from the “Darwinian 
natural right” (Amhart, 1998) that I ultimately defend here, but since the objections to 
both are the same, I will use his discussion to set up the arguments, and to demonstrate 
how these three objections are intertwined. While Strauss would disagree in important 
ways with the project set forth here, he would at least recognize in Darwinian natural 
right a natural right that is in some respects related to his own. My own defense of my 
argument from these three objections takes cues from Strauss, but also other modem 
thinkers who have argued for a naturalistic understanding of ethics as opposed to merely 
conventionalist or historical approaches.
Strauss notes in Natural Right and History that “the true reason why Weber 
insisted on the ethically neutral character of social science as well as of social philosophy 
was, then, not his belief in the fundamental opposition of the Is and the Ought but his 
belief that there cannot be any genuine knowledge of the Ought” (41). Weber's denial of 
the connection between facts and values is due to an implicit relativism. There is an
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inherent connection between the fact-value dichotomy and historicism. He argues, 
“Social science could avoid value judgments only by keeping strictly within the limits of 
a purely historical or 'interpretive' approach. The social scientist would have to bow 
without a murmur to the self-interpretation of his subjects” (55). This historicism is 
further underscored (and perhaps at root caused by) the variety of values with which the 
social scientist has to deal. The fact that there are various, often conflicting values, and 
that deriving values from facts often leads to outcomes unacceptable to progressive social 
scientists, the only option seems to be a radical historicism that denies the ability of the 
social scientist to understand values as separated from their own particular historical 
context. Thus, variability, historicism, and the separation of facts and values are linked. 
In the following I will deal with all three of these arguments in defending an evolutionary 
understanding of man as a kind of natural right.
In the first place, evolutionary theory is not historical, but offers an enduring 
standard by which to judge human action. Second, there is no enduring theoretical 
distinction between facts and values. The two necessarily influence one another. Last, 
the presence of variation does not lead to unresolvable conflicts of the sort postulated by 
thinkers like Weber. Variation needs to be understood properly - not as absolute 
heterogeneity, but as, to use Strauss's terminology, noetic heterogeneity, or variation 
within an order.
The basic evolutionary argument that I have made here ought to be clear by this 
point. I argue that humans have a permanent human nature that influences the ways we 
live our lives, and more importantly, that limits what politics is capable of, and which 
tends to support free government properly understood. This universal permanent human
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nature has evolved over thousands and thousands of years to produce an intelligent, 
social yet individualistic and therefore predictably variable animal. It is in this 
predictable variation that we must look for stability. If I am to base some understanding 
of natural right on evolution, I must demonstrate that the variation is not random, or 
progressive in that it annihilates what came before.
Strauss has in some ways laid out more clearly the alternatives I am attempting to 
distinguish here. He argues in Natural Right and History that “natural right claims to be 
a right that is discernible by human reason and is universally acknowledged; but history 
(including anthropology) teaches us that no such right exists; instead of the supposed 
uniformity, we find an indefinite variety of notions of right or justice” (9). According to 
this formulation then, the human nature postulated by evolutionary theory bears more 
resemblance to Strauss's depiction of natural right than his depiction of historicism.
Historicism has a long and varied history. There have been numerous historical 
thinkers who place more or less emphasis on history than nature. Burke, for example, 
understood “prescription” as the inherited rights of a people which seems to rely almost 
exclusively on history, though hints throughout his work demonstrate that nature may 
indeed be lurking in the background (1949,280-281,295, 528). Montesquieu also 
focuses on the importance of understanding a people's historical context, though he 
rejects the later historicist claim that history is progressive, or that history presents us 
with an inevitable trajectory from which we cannot escape (1989, 4-6, 8, 112-113). 
Montesquieu and Burke, while walking the line to some extent between natural right and 
historicism, still fall rather heavily on the side of natural right. Both acknowledge the 
existence of universal standards, though for various reasons these are not their primary
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concerns.
It is with Hegel that we see the fulfillment of the rejection of natural right in that 
he views history as the inevitable, progressive working out of the dialectic between 
individual and group will (Hegel 1956; See also Melzer et al. 1995). Not only are the 
truths of a particular people only true within their own particular historical context, but 
natural right as a basis for ethical considerations is thrown out. World historical 
individuals can commit innumerable atrocities, and while they may be condemned by the 
men of their time, they cannot be condemned from any other standpoint, since they are 
merely instruments in the working out of the spirit of reason. While this is an admittedly 
simplistic understanding of Hegel's philosophy, it demonstrates the key differences 
between natural right (or evolutionary natural right as I will refer to it) and the historical 
approach. Evolutionary natural right postulates that there are facets of human nature that 
are essentially permanent across time and which provide us with a standard by which to 
judge our own actions and the actions of others. Historicism eliminates those standards 
in favor of historical standards that change from time to time, from society to society. 
While evolutionary theory provides us with a standard by which we can judge other 
societies and times, historicism explicitly rejects any such standard.
As we saw above, there are certain aspects of human nature that are, to use 
Strauss' phrasing, “discernible by reason” and “universally acknowledged.” The desires 
for parental care, for private property, and for rule of law described above are protected 
desires in all but the most coercive regimes, and are understood intuitively by humans the 
world over. The important issue for my purposes is whether evolutionary natural right is 
stable enough to provide some standard for humans. The fact that evolution occurs very
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slowly at the population level, and that we share many of these key traits with our 
mammalian relatives, demonstrates that these traits are unlikely to change any time soon.
One possible argument against that stability is that human nature is unlikely to 
stay stable, especially with the advent of technologies like genetic germline enhancement 
and all the technological changes promoted by the transhumanism movement in general. 
Transhumanists claim that they would like to overcome human nature for the betterment 
of mankind and society (see Amhart 2003 for a discussion of the overall transhumanist 
project and its critics). The transhumanist argument fails to challenge evolutionary 
natural right for two reasons. In the first place, even if transhumanists succeed in 
radically changing human nature, they will not change the underlying logic of the 
evolutionary natural laws that guide our behavior. Our nature only leads to certain 
ethical rules if it remains the same kind of nature. More simply, I view natural laws as a 
set of if-then rules. In the same way that geometry argues that if an object is a square, 
then it will have four right angles and four equal sides, so too does evolutionary theory 
give us hypothetical laws. If humans are a social, intelligent species with individualistic 
tendencies, then we will have a certain predictable set of ethical guidelines. If the object 
we are speaking of is not a square, the rules for the square do not apply, but that does not 
annihilate the rule itself. In the same way, even if human nature were radically changed 
to resemble that of social insects, for example, we do not annihilate or change the natural 
law, it simply does not apply to what we call humans anymore. However, even though 
annihilating humanity does not mean that we annihilate the natural laws that govern 
intelligent social creatures, trying to radically change humanity is effectively species- 
suicide.
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Second, and perhaps more importantly, the transhumanists themselves do not 
really want to overcome human nature. As Amhart (2003) has argued persuasively, the 
most transhumanists really want to do is use technology to better fulfill already existing 
human desires. Using germline genetic technology to eliminate disease in our offspring 
or to make “superbabies” does not fundamentally change human nature. In fact, it is 
nothing more than a new way of parents ensuring that they give their children the best 
chances for survival and reproduction. If parents decided to use this technology to create 
the equivalent of sterile workers, we might wonder whether human nature is stable after 
all. Yet nowhere in the literature on transhumanism with which I am familiar does 
anyone defend such a use of new technology. Amhart's overall conclusion is a good one: 
“...the biotechnological manipulation of human life will always be limited in its technical 
means and moral ends by the adaptive complexity of human nature...” (77). The limits 
on both means and ends of transforming human nature means that, at least into the far 
forseeable future, our evolved human nature is a stable grounding for natural right.
Thus, even those who desire to radically change human nature do not pose a 
danger to natural right because, in the first place, such changes do not change the 
underlying logic that structure natural laws. Second, even those who claim to desire to 
radically change human nature do not really want to do any such thing. At least for the 
foreseeable future, human nature will continue much as it has for eons, and will continue 
to place restrictions on what we can accomplish politically. A permanent human nature 
of this sort is antithetical to the historical argument that human nature is tied to a 
particular historical milieu, and that all values are historically grounded. Values are 
grounded in the type of animal we are, which is a permanent, albeit conditional, law.
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Last, even though evolution is a historical science, it is stable enough to support a 
naturalistic ethics. The time-frames in which change occurs are extremely large, and the 
changes that occur over that time are so subtle that they will have very little influence on 
the moral desires of humans. Moreover, these desires are in large part the result of 
enduring aspects of the human condition, such as sociality and intelligence, and will 
therefore not change with the environment since they are linked to environmentally- 
independent traits that endure over time. Further, most of these traits are shared in some 
measure by our close relatives in the animal kingdom, and in some cases even in less 
closely related mammals (Hrdy 1999; Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Schubert and 
Somit 1982). The similarity between human nature and our close relatives points to an 
endurance of evolutionary natural right that goes far beyond the human life-span, or even 
the life-span of a particular culture, which tends to be the preferred time-frame of 
historicists. For all practical purposes then, evolutionary natural right is radically 
different from historicist views, and its stability has more in common with ancient 
understandings of natural right than with historically created notions of right.
The next criticism concerning the project I have laid out above is that it violates 
the naturalistic fallacy or, alternatively, the fact-value distinction. The literature on the 
fact-value distinction is extensive and would be difficult to summarize in what is simply 
a brief response. I therefore discuss three different thinkers' responses to the naturalistic 
fallacy. All of them come to the argument from the perspective of defending a 
naturalistic ethics, but all of them reject the naturalistic fallacy for different reasons and 
in different ways. I hope, therefore, that looking at their discussions offers adequate 
support for my own rejection of the naturalistic fallacy.
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One excellent discussion of the is-ought distinction is that of Casebeer in Natural 
Ethical Facts. Casebeer argues that Hume's argument poses a problem for those who 
attempt to “reason from the empirical to the normative: that in your conclusion you will 
make reference to an unexplained term (the 'ought' term) that was nowhere present in the 
(empirical) premises of the argument” (19). Casebeer goes on to discuss the similar 
argument from G.E. Moore usually called the “naturalistic fallacy,” and then uses Dewey 
and Quine to show that Moore's argument is overly simplistic and in fact relies in large 
part on a defunct analytic/synthetic distinction.
The distinction between analytic and synthetic splits statements into two 
categories. Analytic statements are those whose truth does not rely on experience for 
their proof. Simple mathematical laws are often considered examples of analytic 
statements. Synthetic statements, on the other hand, are statements that are either made 
up of two or more analytic statements, or that require some outside experience for proof 
of their truth. Some have argued that definitional statements, like the statement “all 
bachelors are unmarried” are analytic truths in the same way that logical or mathematical 
truths are analytic.
Quine rejects the analytic/synthetic distinction, arguing that the attempt to equate 
definitional truths with logical truths is problematic, since definitional truths rely on 
factors outside of logical truths. Further, as Casebeer points out, “we still have no 
criteria for distinguishing this purportedly analytic statement [concerning bachelors and 
unmarried men] from a statement that is true but only contingently so” (24). Casebeer's 
ultimate argument rests on three major critiques: definitional truths are not logical truths, 
that interchangeability and synonomy (two things meaning the same thing) do not deal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
240
with the distinction between cognitive synonomy and psychological synonomy, and that 
even logically true statements “lean heavily on the concept of a semantic rule” (25). The 
gist of most of this critique is that the distinction between analytic facts, or those truths 
which we can know a priori, without experience and synthetic facts, or facts that we 
arrive at through experience and the synthesis of other analytic facts, does not hold. It is 
clear from Casebeer's discussion of Quine that even the most basic logical truths rely 
somewhat on synthetic information that comes from outside. As Casebeer points out, “if 
moral truths weren't those that could be known a priori, then we must come to have 
knowledge of them via experience, which opens the door for a robust 
empirical/normative interaction” (27). If we cannot know moral truths without some 
experience of the world, then facts do influence values.
Casebeer moves into the support that Dewey offers those who reject the 
naturalistic fallacy. Dewey argues that habit allows us to move between means and ends, 
transforming what were previously only means into ends in themselves.
“Ends become means and means become ends. This process of transformation 
demonstrates that, according to Dewey, we do an injustice to the world if we construe 
ends as being fixed, permanent, final and out of the reach of a scientific analysis” (31). 
The importance of Dewey's analysis is that experience in the world, and knowledge of 
our own biological nature as a species, can provide important information to the moral 
realm. In Dewey's case, moral imagination allows us to “hold an end in view so as to 
ascertain the consequences of its pursuit” (30). This trial and error approach exists 
without the usual costs of actual trial and failure. The moral imagination allows one to 
move from one different end to another, based on the consequences of pursuit of those
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ends in the imagination. Habit then reinforces these choices, turning some means into 
ends (Casebeer cites the case of exercise as an example), and other ends into means to 
other, greater ends. This dynamic relationship between means and ends means that there 
will be constant interaction between the empirical and the normative, or between facts 
about our environment and values that we hold. From an evolutionary perspective, one 
of the most obvious facts about our environment consists in the set of natural desires that 
make up human nature. To say that these ought to have no impact on what we value or 
what we choose to pursue is simply absurd.
Amhart (1998) agrees in large part with Casebeer in his rejection of the 
naturalistic fallacy. Amhart denies, however, that Hume ever intended a strict separation 
between the is and the ought, instead claiming that Hume's understanding is “rooted in 
the natural social affections of human beings” (72). More important, he points out 
Capaldi's argument that “moral judgments for Hume have inter subjective objectivity in 
that they are factual judgments about the species-typical pattern of moral sentiments in 
specified circumstances” (70). Amhart further argues that “the dichotomy between is 
and ought falsely attributed to Hume was actually first formulated by Immanuel Kant” 
(73). Amhart then traces his rejection of the fact-value distinction to Hume, using 
arguments from Aristotle, Smith, the other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, and Darwin, 
as well as contemporary thinkers like Robert McShea, Masters, and James Q. Wilson to 
demonstrate that morality comes from facts about humans, including their evolutionary 
past, and cognitive evolution as moral, social animals (75).
Amhart's primary point is that the distinction between is and ought “cannot be 
maintained in moral practice, because every normative judgment presupposes a factual
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judgment about the satisfaction of human desires as a reason for the normative 
judgment” (82). Further, he points out that “the normative judgments without the factual 
judgments are empty and unconvincing” (158). Indeed, the implications here are obvious 
in that humans use values as a way of determining what the good things are to pursue. If 
we pursue an apparent good that leads to disastrous consequences for the individual, we 
must take those consequences into account as a way of evaluating our values. As has 
been discussed in the case of the kibbutzim, ignoring natural human desires led to 
consequences that were good for neither the group nor the individual. It was only after 
the consequences were made apparent that members of the kibbutz re-evaluated their 
values and attempted to moderate them so as to allow the existence of other, equally 
important values like parental love.
A third response to the naturalistic fallacy comes lfom Roger Masters. In many 
ways he approaches the issue from Strauss' perspective, arguing that the divorce of facts 
from values has been primarily a modem phenomenon, and that the ancients, most 
notably Aristotle, regarded it as a simple truth that facts about the world influence the 
good for humans. Masters goes further in arguing that modem natural science can 
support a return to this ancient naturalism (1993,118), and that in particular, evidence 
from neuroscience and other cutting-edge fields provides scientific proof, rather than 
logical arguments, against separating ought and is. Masters argues that Locke's account 
of the tabula rasa, in which there are no innate ideas, is simply incorrect. Masters points 
out that the way we process ideas or learn in the first place is dependent on innate 
preferences for one stimulus over another. These innate preferences guide how we act in 
the world and, ultimately, influence how we form value judgments. Moreover, as will be
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discussed in the section on variation, this “natural potentiality” interacts with individual 
experiences and cultural norms, education, and other external factors to produce 
variation, though that variation will always be limited by the broad framework of natural 
human desires. Thus there is an interaction between nature and culture that fails to 
support the usual “cultural construct” argument for the naturalistic fallacy. Cultures 
create significant variation in human norms and values, but they are always limited by 
the ultimate source of those values -  human nature. In this way, values are constantly 
interacting with facts from our environments, our cultures, and our nature to produce 
shifting values that nevertheless maintain broad stability over time. As Masters points 
out, “Not only are there innate ideas, but.... some of these innate ideas directly concern 
social behavior, forming the basis of our judgment of the feelings, traits, and leadership 
of others” (1993, 122). The tabula rasa is therefore incorrect, and the very way we form 
values relies on a complex interaction between values and facts, both internal and 
external.
The literature on the naturalistic fallacy is large, and I have not even attempted a 
broad literature review (see Chisholm, 1999 for an excellent review of the relevant 
literature). What I hope to demonstrate is that at the very least the routine acceptance of 
the fallacy is dubious and that naturalistic arguments cannot be simply swept aside in the 
face of questionable arguments that are often ideologically grounded. I have attempted 
to lay out the arguments of three different thinkers who all attack the naturalistic fallacy 
in different ways. It can be attacked from the perspective of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction, using the logical arguments that usually support the fallacy against it, or it 
can be attacked from a more commonsense perspective where we simply observe the
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obvious influence of facts on values in everyday life, especially those natural values that 
appear to be innate. Either way, there are good objections to a simplistic rejection of the 
idea that one can understand values through facts. At the very least, it needs to be 
replaced with a more open argument that while values cannot be deduced directly from 
facts, facts do influence values, and the interaction between the two is, in large part, what 
makes human life as variable, complex, and rich as it is.
That human life is variable is an important segue into the final objection that 
variation in human life leads one to the conclusion that there are no stable values, but that 
we are confronted with relativism as a result of the radical heterogeneity exhibited in 
human values. My response to this should be obvious by now: what appears to be radical 
heterogeneity is really patterned heterogeneity, and that the variation within human 
nature occurs in predictable ways and that, if anything, it is generally a variability of 
means rather than of ends. Just as in the case of the other objections, those who defend a 
naturalistic ethics have dealt with this objection before. The defense against radical 
variation is present in Plato and Aristotle, as well as Strauss, and more recently, Masters 
and Amhart. I will discuss the latter two authors, since they use a synthesis of ancient 
thought and modem science to demonstrate that what appears to be radical variation is, in 
fact, variation limited by natural facts that are true everywhere and always.
Masters's (1993) discussion of the fact-value distinction points to the relation 
between that distinction and variation. His argument for the interaction between natural 
facts, custom, and other environmental influences and individual experience 
demonstrates that we will often find and should expect to find substantial individual 
variation in perception and value judgments (123). As Masters points out, this variation
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is rooted in the innate ideas put in place by natural selection, and which we can observe 
through experimental research in neuroscience. These innate ideas, as I have argued 
throughout, place a limit on what values humans can hold. The case of the kibbutz is a 
good example of the limitations that are placed on human desires (Amhart 1998; Pinker 
2002; Tiger 1975). Even if we decide that equality is good, we do not have complete 
freedom to determine the means by which we achieve that equality. Raising children 
apart from their parents will have natural consequences. These natural consequences in 
turn influence our values as we struggle between maintaining two important but often 
conflicting values. Thus, part of the variation in human nature comes from the intricate 
interaction between natural desires and external influences. As was obvious from the 
numerous discussions of Smith, Hayek, and evolutionary theory in general, variation 
within human nature is often the result of conflicting desires within human nature that 
then interact with particular environmental circumstances in predictable ways.
There is also an important way in which variation is an integral part of human 
nature, in that part of being a social, intelligent creature requires the flexibility to respond 
to different environments and different collections of other social, intelligent beings. As 
I discussed in the chapter on rule of law, there are innate moral emotions that guide our 
behavior. But, as Smith argued in The Theory o f Moral Sentiments, if these emotions 
expressed themselves identically in different circumstances, they would be almost 
useless in helping us navigate our social environment. This is fundamentally the 
argument behind phenotypic plasticity (Chisholm 1999). Our plasticity comes from 
many different levels of human life as was argued elsewhere (in the rule of law chapter, 
for one), and all these levels support a broad range of variation that is nevertheless
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
246
constrained by innate and solid universal human desires.
Another source of variation comes from our natural desires themselves. As we 
have seen, there are times when self-preservation comes into conflict with the 
preservation of, for example, our children. When self-preservation and reproduction 
conflict individuals will have to decide which is more important. Hrdy's (1999) 
discussion of infanticide demonstrates that while customs of infanticide vary widely 
between cultures, the patterns are consistent across cultures, and that the variation can be 
understood as not radical variation, but as the variation that is the consequence of general 
principles of human nature attempting to adapt themselves to particular circumstances. 
Amhart's discussion (1998) of twenty natural human desires demonstrates that there will 
be times when these desires conflict with one another. These conflicts require prudence 
and knowledge of the particulars to reach a resolution. Variation then is caused in large 
part by the prudence required by the human condition. Prudence, however, is not 
separate from universal principles, but is guided by them. Instead of radical variability, 
we have prudential variability, which is not relativistic, or at least only mildly so.
As Buller (2005) points out, variation is part of human nature. He points out the 
difficulty variation presents for evolutionary explanations, since there is nothing inherent 
in genetics that allows us to describe something as “normal” other than, perhaps, the 
statistically most frequent trait (433), which is not quite what those who are concerned 
with grounding ethics in something other than relativism are looking for. Buller's overall 
criticism is that it is difficult to demonstrate persuasively that humans are a natural kind 
with species-typical values, since we call some people humans who lack important 
“essential” human traits. My response to this question of variation in general is to again
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revert to Aristotle (2003). He warns us in the first book of the Ethics that it is dangerous 
to demand more certainty from a discipline than that discipline is capable of supporting. 
That humans in general know what traits are normal in a kind of intuitive way, 
demonstrates to me that there is something there that is at least graspable by the human 
mind, even if it is not capable of strict definition or delineation. Moreover, if the 
presence of variation is enough to preclude an object from having a stable nature, we 
would be unable to consistently study geology, politics, economics, anatomy, or any of 
the other myriad sciences that deal with variable things.
The “I know it when I see it” response may be philosophically unsatisfying, but 
neither biology nor ethics are fields that can stand up to strict categorization. As in other 
cases, those cases well within the norm, which obviously benefit society and the 
individual, will be understood by most people as “normal” traits. It is always in the 
shady areas around the edges that we must struggle to define a trait as normal or 
abnormal, or an action or desire as moral or immoral. It is in these shady areas that we 
require prudence rather than the strict lines that philosophers are so fond of drawing.
Most people can tell when variation moves outside of the norm, and trusting these 
intuitive judgments may be all we need in most cases. In the other cases, prudent 
deliberation will be important.
Variation is a part of human nature, not proof that it does not exist. The variation 
is, however, somewhat predictable in that usually it is the result of a stable human nature 
reacting in different ways to different environments. Moreover, in most cases, humans 
do not have a difficult time determining the normalcy of traits, just as, most of the time, 
scientists do not have difficulty categorizing animals, even though the term “species” is
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problematic. More important, however, is that the variation within human nature does 
not lead to a radical relativism. The fact that we do not actually see radical variation 
supports the idea that there are stable traits within human nature that restrict the amount 
and type of variation possible. Moreover, people like Brown (see Pinker 2002) and 
Amhart (1998) both demonstrate that there are universals that can be found in all 
societies, thus yet again destroying the argument for radical heterogeneity in human 
traits.
If we can infer values from facts, and if evolutionary natural right is stable 
enough across time to support enduring natural human desires, and if variation is not 
indeed radical but in fact is supported by the existence of an enduring, stable human 
nature, there seems to be very little in the way of moving carefully toward a naturalistic 
ethics. The connection between ethics and the project presented in the rest of this 
dissertation is obvious. Human political systems are the results of human desires. What 
those desires are will be relatively stable over time, though different stable desires may 
conflict (such as the desires for equality and liberty) and will therefore need to be 
reconciled through prudential deliberation. How we construct a political community has 
serious implications for the happiness and health of those living in those communities. 
Determining how those communities support the natural desires of humans is, then, an 
inherently normative concern.
If there were no connection between normative judgments and factual statements, 
one could not argue about the best regime. If there were no stable human nature, there 
could be no best regime, only a “best regime for now in these particular circumstances”. 
If again human nature is nothing but radical variation, there is no limit to what humans
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can do with political systems, and yet no basis on which to judge whether regimes are 
right or wrong, an extremely dangerous combination. All these alternatives make 
political theory essentially impossible, insofar as it is concerned with the best regime for 
humans. I argue ultimately that evolutionary theory, because it provides an 
understanding of a stable, knowable human nature, supports political philosophy's quest 
for the best regime.
In conclusion, I have argued that the most obvious objections to the application of 
evolutionary theory to political philosophy (at least from the standpoint of political 
philosophy) are at the very least not obvious. I do not know how persuasively I have 
defended myself against these objections, and there are many more that would be leveled 
at such a project. But it does seem important, especially as naturalistic arguments for 
moral judgments gain ground, to reiterate the facts that were known to the ancients, 
which is that simply because nature is variable does not mean that there is no standard, 
and that simply because we cannot directly deduce values from facts does not mean that 
the two do not interact in important ways. Most importantly, this section seemed 
necessary to me in large part not just to dispel serious objections, which will come in 
their own time from thoughtful philosophers, scientists, and political philosophers, but to 
deal directly with those objections that are ideologically driven, coming from both sides 
of the aisle, that tend toward gut reactions and which have the pernicious tendency to 
replace thoughtful discourse with overly simplistic arguments. My point throughout the 
dissertation has been similar to the position taken by Smith and Hayek, which is to 
mistrust systems which unduly simplify human experience, and to add back in the 
complexity that makes scientific and political discourse difficult but meaningfully rich.
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CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION
The major themes have been the role of nature in human life, the complexity of 
that nature, and the corresponding political implications of dealing with an organism that 
refuses to be neatly categorized. We are both individualistic and social, and it is these 
tendencies that make political life possible and at the same time difficult. While we are 
intensely individualistic at times to the point of endangering the group, we can also be 
pulled together in enormously cooperative endeavors, sometimes with less than 
charitable motives. Any political regime will need to deal with this variation and 
complexity. There are at least three alternatives. One is to use the coercive force of the 
state to keep individual desires in check. Another is to rely on social pressure of close 
relatives and friends, which requires keeping communities small for self-policing. The 
last is to foster individual desires, allowing them to express themselves in a variety of 
situations and environments, while protecting all individuals from coercion by other 
individuals. The first option is an option chosen by most large-scale societies. The 
second option probably bears more resemblance to the communities of individuals in 
which our species evolved. The last option is that of a free society operating under rule 
of law. It is this last option that has been rare, and when it appears, it is often mixed with
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elements of the first. Yet, despite its rarity, it is this option, the free society, that fulfills 
human nature most completely, and which allows for human flourishing.
I have argued that free societies are natural in that they fulfill natural human 
desires. The more we find out about human nature, the more we will be able to make the 
leaps between the biological and social sciences, thus providing a grounding for the 
social sciences. Whether or not my analysis has been correct, the importance of applying 
what we know about human nature to the social sciences should be clear. The growth of 
the field of biopolitics has been slow, and this for many, diverse reasons. But ultimately, 
scholars, policy makers, and other individuals will need to address the fact that our 
biological nature places limits on what we can accomplish socially, and these limits need 
to be understood. If we are to try to put together the myriad theories and disparate 
research that make up the field of political science, or even attempt to tie together pieces 
of political philosophy into a coherent whole, we need to understand the larger questions 
of how humans act and why.
More specifically, rule of law, private property, and a private sphere are 
institutions that grow out of our nature as social and individualistic animals. These 
institutions play the dual role of controlling and channeling our individualistic desires 
while promoting our social desires. The system is not perfect, and I do not want to end 
up having made an argument for a kind of utopian libertarianism that is as unrealistic as 
the utopias based on equality or justice. What classical liberal institutions offer is a way 
of taking the imperfections in human nature and turning them to good ends. The nature 
of this good may not be the highest kinds of good in many cases (as a Platonist, for 
example, would point out), but they are goods in that they allow individuals to live
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together peacefully while promoting and allowing for the fulfillment of the desires that 
constitute a complete life.
Relationship Between Private Sphere, Rule of Law, and Private Property
Again, I believe that rule of law, a private sphere, and private property are 
necessary for a society that has the fulfillment of human desires as its general aim.
While I have separated rule of law, private property, and the private sphere into separate 
chapters, in reality the three are interconnected. Private property is at the center of a 
private sphere in that it preserves resources for use that protect against total dependence 
on government. Further, rule of law understood properly as a general framework for 
action is central to the idea of the private sphere, since law that is little more than a 
general framework will necessarily leave many facets of life out of government's control. 
The interconnectedness of these three ideas means that we must be especially careful to 
avoid encroaching too much on any one of them, since while the interconnectedness of 
the three operates as a kind of bulwark against some attacks on liberty, encroachments in 
one area will have effects on the others. The interconnectedness of classical liberal 
institutions mimics the interconnectedness and complexity of human nature itself. Only 
a regime that allows for the spontaneous formation of complex institutions and social 
structures can deal with the similarly complex nature of man.
The foregoing discussion may demonstrate yet again, as Amhart (1998) and
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Masters (1993) have argued, that Aristotle was largely right about human nature, and 
therefore about politics. Man truly is a political animal, but Aristotle recognized that 
man's political nature does not require man to be unequivocally cooperative, nor does 
man's political nature imply that our political nature does not also come with costs. The 
best government will tame the beast while liberating it, taking advantage of the 
cooperative instincts of man while at the same time channeling the selfish instincts into 
paths that are beneficial to the group.
Ultimately, the primary question asked by political philosophers concerning the 
best life depends in large part on what kind of animal we are to begin with. Evolutionary 
theory offers precise predictions and scientific evidence pointing to universal traits 
shared by all humans in diverse environments. Specific knowledge of human nature 
allows us to make predictions about what kinds of political environments will be good 
for humans. Overall, governments that support liberty are more successful and require 
less coercion of individuals than utopian governments based on justice or equality. If 
human nature is mixed and generally untrustworthy, we ought not place the 
responsibility for attaining evolutionary goods in the hands of others. As autonomous 
individuals, selected by natural selection with certain desires and needs, we alone hold 
the responsibility for our own survival and that of our children. Allowing such 
responsibility to rest in the hands of another is reckless. Denying to individuals 
responsibility over their own lives is immoral.
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Future Research and Points of Departure
What is presented here is a small foray into interdisciplinary research, and I have 
brought out more questions than answers. What makes interdisciplinary research of this 
kind so exciting is the fact that there are so many different unexplored avenues down 
which to go. In this case, the link between social and biological emergence, or the way 
natural conventionalism occurs, is a subject primed for further research. How precisely 
do customary laws and norms grow out of our nature as evolved organisms, and how do 
different environments impact this growth? The classical liberal emphasis on flexible, 
grown norms of conduct rather than strict, inflexible laws would allow for faster 
adaptation, and more comfortable meshing of the natural with the conventional. There is 
interesting work to be done on the creation and growth of a spontaneous order, as well as 
the links between biological and social systems.
Amhart emphasizes that “a Darwinian conservatism can recognize the special 
capacities of the human soul as manifesting the emergent complexity of life, in which 
higher levels of organization produce mental abilities that cannot be found at the lower 
levels. In contrast to the reductionism often associated with modem science, Darwinian 
conservatism affirms the idea of emergence” (2005, 105). This emergent complexity of 
life is part of the argument for a free society. What makes the argument all the better is 
the beautiful interplay between emergent biological and social orders. The spontaneous 
order of evolution is mirrored in the spontaneous order of the free society, and the latter 
allows the fullest outgrowth and expression of the former. Evolutionary psychology and 
other evolutionary sciences do not restrict us to psychologies rooted in the Pleistocene. It
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is one of the surprising features of a Darwinian approach to politics that the political 
system that allows for the maximal fulfillment of human nature is one that is in many 
ways completely and radically different from the social systems in which we evolved.
The capacity for existence in a large, cooperative society made up of strange individuals 
emerges from psychological adaptations that grew up in small bands of known 
individuals.
Political Implications of an Evolutionary Understanding of Man
There are admirable and worthy ends that are not possible because they require 
impossible or immoral means. The interdependence of ends and means, and the 
intertwining of theory and practice, highlights the importance of prudence in human 
political life. Both Hayek and Smith understood this and struggled with it. Both 
recognized that the best theoretical regime is not the same thing as the best possible 
regime. As a result of this conviction, they have set their sights firmly on the best 
possible, and some would say they lost sight of the best of all possible worlds altogether.
But, while neither makes the case that a classical liberal regime resembles the best 
theoretical regime, there are hints in their works, especially Hayek's, that such a regime, 
if done right, could come close to fulfilling the best of which humanity is capable. An 
imperfect man must necessarily construct an imperfect society. There will always be 
aspects of any society that we wish we could change. Yet, taking man's nature into
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consideration, it seems that Smith and Hayek both feel that the classical liberal ideal is 
the best of all possible worlds, at least of those worlds in which man is imperfectly 
constructed.
If we take the idea of natural conventionalism seriously, we find that it supports 
the grown regimes and gradual evolution of social institutions so favored by thinkers like 
Hayek and Smith. While gradual growth (or good old fashioned trial and error) may 
seem foolhardy to many, such an approach has created stable societies the foster freedom 
and individualism, while helped out along the way by the prudent creation of a 
framework of general laws.
As we can see around the world, the spontaneous order is not completely 
spontaneous. It needs some important supports, such as a stable rule of law, and a people 
who are capable of self-rule, which means at least that they are free from serious 
factional conflicts. The general framework of freedom within a rule of law needs 
cultural and political supports, and it is unclear at this point which comes first.
Thus, I offer nothing in the way of advice on how to create and maintain liberal 
institutions on foreign soil. Part of the problem with liberal institutions is that they must 
grow from previously existing institutions, and must be a part of the cultural background 
of a people. Simply because something is natural does not mean that it cannot be 
thwarted by disease or disorder, and political institutions are no exception. Classical 
liberalism may best fulfill human nature, but that does not mean that it can simply be 
exported. The difficulty of growing a free society should make us all the more 
careful of our own free institutions. As Hayek points out time and time again, there is a 
continual slippage toward despotism and paternalism, and ultimately all that stands in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
257
way of that slippage is the love that a people has for its freedom.
If public opinion really is the only thing that prevents the erosion of freedom, 
those who care about freedom ought to make an effort to defend “negative” liberty as a 
positive good. I have laid out various arguments for free society, including the 
psychological benefits, the moral strengths, the political consequences, and the economic 
advantages of freedom. These arguments stem from the evolutionary argument about 
human nature that is at the core of this work, but there are other arguments to be made. It 
seems to be time for those who believe strongly in free institutions to stop focusing 
primarily on the wealth-generating aspects, but to attempt a comprehensive justification 
for liberty that goes beyond mere wealth-creation.
The broadest political implication of an evolutionary understanding of man is that 
a free society will consist in freedom of many types. The spontaneous order has not 
freed us from our nature. It has freed us to fulfill that nature. If we take the argument 
made by Amhart and others seriously, that human flourishing exists and is a goal worthy 
of our pursuit, we need to understand the myriad parts that make up that flourishing. 
Unfortunately for ideologues, that flourishing does not consist in one specific part of the 
human life, not the life devoted to intellectual pursuits, nor the life of pleasure. The 
flourishing human life will have a bit of everything.
A spontaneous order of individuals does not require human nature to be anything 
in particular, or to have one primary end toward which all humans must strive. In a 
spontaneous order, the good and the bad interact indiscriminately, allowing for voluntajy 
cooperation while turning self-interest into unconscious cooperation. By not expecting 
human nature to be either entirely good or bad, the spontaneous order of a free society
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supports all the different aspects of humanity, the altruistic, the nepotistic, the selfish, the 
self-interested, the dominant and the submissive, the private and the public, the loving 
and the aggressive, while at the same time preventing any of these desires from 
coercively or fraudulently infringing on other individuals.
Political philosophers are often enamored of the ideas of ends, and argue for an 
end or purpose to human life that seems to exist in some perfect ether. This desire for 
purpose or meaning may be a natural human desire, but simply because humans have a 
desire does not mean that the object of our desire actually exists. A spontaneous order of 
individuals eschews ends, or at least eschews all ends except that of liberty, which is, in 
itself, not really an end of the Platonic or Aristotelian variety. Many people will not like 
this interpretation. Some people seem to feel that human life needs one particular 
architechtonic end in order for life to have meaning. But humans cannot have one shared 
end. In reality they have many shared ends, some of which compete and express 
themselves at different times, or at different strengths in different individuals. The best 
way, then, to fulfill all those ends is to avoid ranking them, and to avoid seeking out one 
that is somehow “highest.” Some would argue that avoiding the ranking of ends means 
that those ends are not important, or that we have descended into relativism. In fact, I 
argue just the opposite. Because the ends of human life are so important, it does not 
make sense to commit the care of those ends to a government which, even if it does have 
good motives, certainly does not have the knowledge necessary to act successfully on 
those motives.
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So What?: The Eternal Question
Political theorists need to get back to the question of “so what?” Ideas matter 
because they have real-world consequences, and they have impacts on real people's lives. 
As an angry George Emerson cries in A Room With a View, “That is the man all over -  
playing tricks on people, on the most sacred form of life that he can find” (Forster 1923, 
253). Forster's Cecil is in many ways a man devoted almost entirely to theory, who does 
not appreciate the fact that philosophy can change individual lives, which may ultimately 
be of more importance than the ideas that are often placed above them. If we agree with 
George Emerson that individuals are indeed important, and if individual desires are 
important, we need to find a way of incorporating those individual desires into the 
framework of society. The best way found thus far is to let those desires intermingle, 
creating a spontaneous order of desires and cooperation that supports flourishing of both 
individuals and groups. Theory without practice is just as empty as practice without 
theory.
Political theory also needs to align itself with the quest for the truth. It is 
important to understand the theories and ideas of political philosophers of the past; we 
also need to critically examine their thought and decide for ourselves whether they are 
right, and what the implications of their rightness and wrongness are for human life. I 
have attempted to highlight the work of Smith and Hayek, arguing that their work 
matters. I have also attempted to, as far as I can, support and supplement their thought 
with empirical evidence. More than anything, however, I have tried to make an
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argument for why the kinds of political institutions we choose matter. Human happiness 
is an important goal, and how we approach that happiness will determine our success.
Ultimately, the restrictions that complex, variable human nature places on our 
social institutions supports social institutions that grow slowly out of that nature. These 
institutions should be changed only after careful, prudent regard for the possible 
consequences. A complex, variable human nature will lead to a complex, variable 
system of life that no individual will be able to fully understand. The quest to understand 
human nature ultimately requires humility, prudence, and moderation, especially in the 
political sphere.
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